Economics of gender, risk and labour in horticultural households in Senegal by Ndoye, A.F.
 1 
 
 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in 
Horticultural Households in Senegal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aïfa Fatimata NDOYE NIANE 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis committee 
 
Thesis supervisor 
Prof. dr. ir. E.H. Bulte  
Professor of Development Economics  
Wageningen University 
  
Thesis co-supervisor 
Dr. C.P.J. Burger 
Associate Professor 
Development Economics Group  
Wageningen University 
  
Other members 
Prof. dr. A. H. Akram-Lodhi, Trent University, Peterborough, Canada 
Prof. dr. G. Antonides, Wageningen University 
Prof. dr. M. Maertens, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium 
Prof. dr. A. Niehof, Wageningen University 
 
This research was conducted under the auspices of Mansholt Graduate School of Social Sciences  
 3 
 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in 
Horticultural Households in Senegal 
  
 
Aïfa Fatimata NDOYE NIANE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor 
at Wageningen University 
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus 
Prof. dr. M.J. Kropff, 
in the presence of the 
Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board 
to be defended in public 
on Wednesday 16 June 2010 
at 11 a.m. in the Aula. 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aïfa Fatimata NDOYE NIANE 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 
254 pages 
 
PhD Thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2010) 
With references, with summaries in Dutch, English and French 
 
ISBN 978-90-8585-653-5 
 5 
 
 
 
 
In honor, I dedicate this thesis to: 
 
 My wonderful mother, Adja Coumba Fall 
 
 My adorable husband, Ibrahima Niane 
 
 My lovely daughters, Oumy Kalsoum and Awa … 
 
 My nice mother in law, Adja Fatim Ka 
 
 All my family 
 
 
 
 
  6 
Table of Contents 
List of Acronyms                                                                                                                      10 
List of Tables                                                                                                                            11 
List of Figures                                                                                                                          14 
Chapter 1: Introduction                                                                                                       16 
1.1. Background                                                                                                                    17 
1.2. The setting: Senegal                                                                                                       20 
1.2.1. Senegal’s macroeconomic environment                                                            20 
1.2.2. Agriculture for development and poverty alleviation: a huge challenge           23 
1.2.3. Overview of the dynamism of Senegalese Horticulture                                    24 
1.3. Problem statement                                                                                                          28 
1.4. Research objectives and questions                                                                                 30 
1.5. The study area                                                                                                                31 
1.6. The methodological design                                                                                            33 
1.7. The relevance to policy questions                                                                                  35 
1.8. An outline of the thesis                                                                                                  36 
Chapter 2: A characterization of horticultural households: gender and  
               intra-household resource allocation. Elaborative description of data         39 
2.1. Introduction                                                                                                                   40 
2.2. A characterization of horticultural households                                                             41 
2.2.1. Social and demographic characteristics of horticultural households                41 
2.2.2. Horticultural household resources and assets endowment                                46 
2.2.3. Gender and bargaining within the household                                                    51 
2.2.4. The horticultural household livelihood or income gender-disaggregated         53 
 Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 7 
2.3. Details on horticultural plots                                                                                       57 
2.3.1. Plots and managers                                                                                          57 
2.3.2. Horticultural crops                                                                                           58       
2.3.3. The horticultural plots’ physical condition                                                      59 
2.3.4. An evaluation of the plot production cost                                                        61 
2.3.5. Evaluating the output of the plot                                                                      70 
2.3.6. Seasonal effects: a gender comparison of the yield over crop and season       73 
2.3.7. The profitability of crops across gender                                                           75 
Chapter 3: Household resource allocation, gender and economic performance:    
efficiency measurement                                                                                78 
3.1. Introduction                                                                                                                 79 
3.2. Literature review                                                                                                          81 
3.2.1. Economics of household resource allocation and gender                                81 
3.2.2. Efficiency as an indicator of performance                                                       84 
3.3. Gendering efficiency modelling                                                                                   85 
3.4. The empirical analysis: functional form and variables                                                 87 
3.5. The data                                                                                                                        90 
3.6. Empirical results and discussion                                                                                   91 
3.6.1. An estimation of unitary and gender-specific stochastic frontier                   
production functions                                                                                         91 
3.6.2. Gender and the efficiency of the allocation of resources within  
the household                                                                                                    95 
3.6.3. Technical efficiency across gender                                                                 101 
3.6.4. Determinants of technical inefficiency across gender                                    104 
3.7. Conclusion and policy implications                                                                            109 
Appendix 3.1.                                                                                                                          112 
 
  8 
Chapter 4: Households profit optimization and the efficiency of labour                                                                 
               contract choice                                                                                                115 
4.1. Introduction                                                                                                                116 
4.2. A literature review on land tenancy                                                                            117 
4.3. The theory                                                                                                                   122 
4.4. Household modelling and labour                                                                                124 
4.5. The empirical analysis                                                                                                133 
4.5.1. Functional forms and variables                                                                       133 
4.5.2. Endogeneity and the choice of estimator                                                        134 
4.6. Empirical results and discussion                                                                                    135 
4.6.1. A comparison of plot size, inputs use intensity and output across  
labour contract                                                                                                 135 
4.6.2. An estimation of the production functions                                                      138 
4.6.3. Household profit optimization across plots under a sharecropping  
labour contact and a wage labour contract                                                      143 
4.6.4. An efficiency test of the labour contract choice based on  
optimum profit: the sharecropping labour contract versus  
the wage labour contract                                                                                  149 
4.6.5. An efficiency test of the labour contract choice based on 
 optimum profit: household labour versus the sharecropping  
labour contract                                                                                                  150 
4.6.6. An efficiency test of the labour contract choice based on 
 optimum profit: household labour versus the wage labour contract               152 
4.6.7. An efficiency test of inputs use based on household profit  
optimization across labour contract                                                                  154 
4.7. Conclusion and policy implications                                                                                 156 
Chapter 5: Risk attitude and its effect on resource allocation                                        159 
5.1. Introduction                                                                                                                      160 
5.2. The experimental design and procedure                                                                           163 
 Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 9 
5.3. The theoretical model                                                                                                    165 
5.3.1. Modelling risk attitude                                                                                   165 
5.3.2. Modelling the effect of risk on the efficiency of choice of 
inputs and labour                                                                                             167 
5.3.3. Modelling the effect of risk on the choice of labour contract                         170 
5.4. The empirical model and estimation                                                                              177 
5.5. The empirical results                                                                                                      178 
5.5.1. The identification of different risks and classification by  
           order of severity                                                                                               178 
5.5.2. Measurement of risk occurrence                                                                     180 
5.5.3. Measurement of the perception of the output market price risk                     181 
5.5.4. Measurement of the risk attitude toward the output market                                 
price across   gender                                                                                        185 
5.5.5. The effect of risk attitude on the allocative efficiency of inputs                     192 
5.5.6. The effects of risk attitude on the choice of labour contract                           195 
5.6. Conclusion and policy implications                                                                                198 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Discussion                                                                           202 
6.1. Introduction                                                                                                                     203 
6.2. Summary and discussion of the main findings                                                                204 
6.3. Policy implications                                                                                                           212 
6.4. Main limitations and the future research agenda                                                             214 
References                                                                                                                                217 
Summary                                                                                                                                  229 
Résumé (Summary in French)                                                                                                 235 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)                                                                                         242 
Acknowledgments                                                                                                                   248 
Citation of Sponsors                                                                                                                 251 
  10 
Curriculum Vitae                                                                                                                    253 
Training and Supervision Plan                                                                                                254 
List of Acronyms 
GDP                  Gross Domestic Product 
MDG                 Millennium Development Goal 
DSRP-PRSP     Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
GNI                   Gross National Income (GNI) 
CFA                  Communauté Financière Africaine (West African currency exchange)  
OLS                  Ordinary Least-Squares     
2SLS                 Two-Stage Least-Squares 
SNEEG             National Strategy for Gender Equity and Equality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 11 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1:   The volatility of horticultural crops’ market prices in case of tomato and  
                    cabbage.                                                                                                                27 
Table 2.1:   Horticultural households’ characteristics over gender                                          45 
Table 2.2:   Other wealth of the household                                                                              50 
Table 2.3:   The participation of women on men’s plots and vice versa                                  51 
Table 2.4:   The household annual income and its composition over gender and season        56 
Table 2.5:   Distribution of plots over gender, zone and social status of the plot manager     58  
Table 2.6:   Distribution of crops across men and women plot managers in the sample.        59 
Table 2.7:   Gender comparison of inputs used per hectare on men’s and women’s plots  
                   within households.                                                                                                 62 
Table 2.8:   Time spent per plot and season by household members working on men’s and  
                    women’s plots over plots under household labour.                                               65 
Table 2.9:   Time spent per cropping operation by household members working on men’s  
                    and women’s plots under household labour.                                                         66 
Table 2.10:  Labour time and wage over plots under household labour, a wage labour  
                    contract and a sharecropping labour contract.                                                      69 
Table 2.11:  Output in value per plot, per hectare, and per crop on men’s and women’s  
                    plots.                                                                                                                      73 
Table 2.12:  Comparison per crop and season of yield in quantity and in value per hectare  
                    over men’s and women’s plots.                                                                             75 
Table 2.13:  Comparison of profit per hectare across crops, gender, and labour.                     76 
Table 3.1:    Gender comparison of the means of the variables used in the production             
                    functions.                                                                                                                91 
Table 3.2:    Maximum Likelihood estimates of the unitary and gender-specific stochastic  
                    frontier production functions for cross-sectional and panel data.                          93 
Table 3.3:    Gender comparison of the Value of the Marginal Product of inputs within the  
  12 
                    household.                                                                                                            97 
Table 3.4:    Gender comparison of technical efficiency scores using unitary and gender- 
                    specific stochastic frontier production functions.                                                102 
Table 3.5:    Gender comparison of technical efficiency scores by crop and by model.         104 
Table 3.6:    OLS estimates for the determinants of technical inefficiency, based on the  
                    unitary and gender-specific inefficiency models.                                                 105 
Table A 3.1: Estimates of the parameters of the unitary and gender-specific stochastic   
                    frontier production functions for onion.                                                                113 
Table A 3.2: Estimates of the parameters of the unitary and gender-specific stochastic  
                     frontier production functions for cabbage.                                                           114 
 
Table 4.1:   The distribution of labour across clusters, based on plot size cropped                  136 
Table 4.2:    A comparison of input use intensity and output across labour.                             138 
Table 4.3:    Descriptive statistics of variables used in the plot level, crop-specific  
                    production functions estimation.                                                                            139 
Table 4.4:    The Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) and Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS)   
estimation for plot level crop-specific production functions (robust clusters in 
households).                                                                                                           140 
Table 4.5:    The return to scale, controlling for crop and irrigation equipment                        143 
Table 4.6:    Plots with an efficient labour contract choice                                                         150 
Table 4.7:    Comparison of the optimum profit derived from a sharecropping labour contract  
                    (pis) and household labour (pih) for a given plot and controlling for crop, irrigation 
equipment, and labour.                                                                                           151 
Table 4.8:    Descriptive statistics of the wage paid by the household to hired wage labour  
                    across plots, crops, and motor pump (fcfa/hr).                                                        153 
Table 4.9:    A comparison of the optimum profit derived from a wage labour contract (piw)  
                    and household labour (pih) for a given plot and controlling for crop and irrigation 
equipment.                                                                                                              153 
Table 4.10:   The efficiency of the use of inputs based on household profit optimization  
                     across labour contract and crops.                                                                            155 
Table 5.1:    The identification and prioritization, by order of severity, of different risks  
 Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 13 
                    faced by plot managers across gender                                                                180 
Table 5.2:    The chance of an occurrence of risk across gender                                            181   
Table 5.3:    The appreciation of the output market predictability by men and women plot     
managers                                                                                                            181 
Table 5.4:    The annoying output market price fluctuation                                                   182 
Table 5.5:   Next month’s predicted output price probability across gender and given the  
                   current output market price (P).                                                                           183 
Table 5.6:    Risk aversion scores across gender.                                                                    188 
Table 5.7:    The distribution of risk aversion classes across gender.                                     188 
Table 5.8:    The pairwise correlation of risk perception and risk attitude across gender.      190 
Table 5.9:     Risk attitude, individual and household characteristics (robust cluster in the  
   household).                                                                                                          192 
Table 5.10:   Estimation results of the effects of the producer’s risk attitude on the  
                     allocative inefficiency of inputs over gender.                                                      194 
   Table 5.11:   Risk aversion scores across labour contract choice                                             195 
Table 5.12:   The choice of labour contract and the producer’s risk attitude: a seemingly  
 unrelated bivariate probit estimation.                                                                  196 
   Table 5.13:   Probit estimation results and marginal effects of producer risk attitude  
                        on choice of sharecropping contract (robust cluster in household)                      198  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  14 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1:   The growth of Senegal’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the share of  
                     agriculture over time.                                                                                          22 
Figure 1.2:   The evolution of the Senegalese vegetable production over time.                      25 
Figure 1.3:    Map of the study area in the Niayes Zone of Senegal, West Africa.                 33 
Figure 2.1:    Composition of men’s and women’s total annual income.                                 57 
Figure 2.2:    Box plots of yield and plot size over the gender of the plot manager.                70 
Figure 2.3:    Gender comparison of the yield evolution over years.                                        71 
Figure 2.4:    Gender comparison of horticultural crops’ selling price over harvesting  
                     sequence per plot.                                                                                                 72 
Figure 3.1:    Gender comparison of the distribution of the value of the marginal product  
                     of inputs and land.                                                                                                 99 
Figure 3.2:    Kernel density estimate of the distribution of the value of the marginal  
                      product of hired wage labour on men’s plots.                                                     100 
Figure 3.3:    Gender comparison of the cumulative distribution of the technical efficiency  
                      scores.                                                                                                                  103 
Figure 4.1:     Diagrammatic presentation of the model of labour contract choice over   
mechanization of the production.                                                                      122 
Figure 4.2:    Values of the profit ratio R0 (no supervision and the sharecropping opportunity   
wage equals the wage paid by the household: σ=0 and ho www == ), and values 
                     of the wage ratio 
h
o
w
w
 (opportunity cost of sharecropper / wage including  
                    supervision cost) at which the profit ratio R (
*
*
w
S
pi
pi ) is equal to one for γ=0.1  
                    and varying values of λ.                                                                                          131 
Figure 4.3:   Distribution of the supervision rate of wage labour.                                              144 
Figure 4.4:    A comparison of the average optimum profit derived by the household from   
                     plots under a sharecropping contract and a wage labour contract and controlling  
                     for a motor pump.                                                                                                    146 
Figure 4.5:   A comparison of the average optimum profit derived by the household from  
                     plots under a sharecropping contract and a wage labour contract, and controlling 
                     for crop and motor pump.                                                                                        148 
 Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 15 
Figure 4.6:    An efficiency test of labour contract choice based on optimum profit and  
                     varying supervision rate or wage ratio: sharecropping labour contract versus 
                     wage labour contract.                                                                                            149 
Figure 5.1:   The fall in profits for unit changes in relative risk aversion coefficients.             175 
Figure 5.2:    All crops and cabbage, observed market prices, average, minimum and  
                     maximum market prices predicted for next month, given the current prices.       184 
Figure 5.3:    Modified minimum and maximum prices of the risky market and modified  
                     certainty equivalent prices over gender.                                                                186 
Figure 5.4:    Kernel density estimation of the distribution of risk aversion scores across        189 
                     gender. 
Figure 5.5:    Histogram of the distribution of risk aversion classes across gender.                  190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 17 
1.1. Background 
Women play an important role in agricultural production, particularly in Africa. By managing 
their own farm and by providing their labour to their husband’s fields, women contribute 
significantly to agricultural development. Women mostly accomplish several management and 
decision-making roles in farming practices together with their male counterparts (Samanta, 1995), 
but also on their own. 
In Africa, and all over the world, regardless of the predominance of a gender bias in the access to 
resources, women present a vital and active force in the elaboration of a multitude of strategies 
that make farming and rural life economically viable and environmentally sustainable (Howard-
Borjas and Rooij, 1996). Even across European countries, women farmers are far from playing 
passive roles; rather, they are major actors in the processes of transformation occurring in food 
and agricultural systems (Howard-Borjas and Rooij, 1996). 
Throughout the world, gender issues in the development of agriculture and women’s role and 
contribution to agriculture continue to be a great subject of debate. Despite the wide variety of 
literature available, the importance of agriculture to the economic development in Africa and the 
critical role that rural women play within this sector still remain an attractive agenda of research 
(Singh, 1988; Argawal, 1994; Samanta, 1995; Henderson, 1995; FAO, 1995; Howard-Borjas and 
Rooij, 1996; Adesina and Djato, 1996; Quisumbing et al., 1998; Deer and Doss, 2006; Koopman, 
2009). 
In Sub-Saharan African countries, in which on average 29% of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
is generated by agriculture (World Bank, 2007), women contribute about 60-80% (FAO, 1995) of 
the labour force used in the production of food destined for both household consumption and the 
market. However, due to customary norms, women’s access and control over the resources of 
production are very limited. For instance, women’s ownership and use of land is usually 
constrained by inheritance and land tenure laws1. In Africa, as a result of customary norms rather 
than religious rules, women are usually excluded from land ownership through inheritance in 
                                               
1
 http://www.fao.org/Gender/en/agrib3-e.htm . 
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favour of men, who hold the property and hand it over to the sons within the household or to 
other male relatives within the extended family. Therefore, in Senegal like in most African 
countries, while men can inherit land from their parents, such is usually not the case for women, 
who get allocated just a portion of land by their husband, with a right of use rather than a right of 
ownership. For this reason, many African women’s customary land rights are insecure; these 
usually depend on their marital status and can be lost after a divorce from or death of the husband 
(Joireman, 2008; Koopman, 2009). 
Over all the continents, women own and control far less land than men do (Deere and Doss, 
2006), but particularly in Africa, women rarely own land in their own right (Joireman, 2008; 
Koopman, 2009). However, throughout Africa, many countries like Senegal have reviewed some 
of their legislation related to land use and ownership rights in order to attain a better gender 
equity. Nevertheless, customs and a lack of information still prevent women from getting access 
to land, despite some improvements made on the gender equity regarding land use rights. 
Therefore, until now, these improvements have not been very effective. 
Evidence has shown that agricultural production can be improved through equal access to 
production factors for men and women (Alderman et al., 1995; Quisumbing, 2003; Koopman, 
2009). Inequality between men and women, or gender disparities, limits economic growth and 
favours poverty. For this reason, one of the main objectives of the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG), aimed at reducing poverty and stimulating growth2, is to promote gender equality and 
women’s empowerment. In Senegal, for instance, a National Strategy for Gender Equity and 
Equality (SNEEG) has been elaborated in order to promote gender equality. The SNEEG will 
permit the development of tools and methodologies of gender analysis, the implementation of 
programmes that aim to reinforce the capacity of actors in terms of the promotion of gender 
equity and equality, the promotion of the elaboration of gender-sensitive budgets for the different 
economic sectors, the reinforcement of the decentralisation of funds for the economic promotion 
and support of women’s activities, and the reinforcement of women’s leadership capacity (DSRP 
2, 2006). 
                                               
2
 The World Bank : http://go.worldbank.org/NMIS5MXCH0 . 
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Yet, it still remains a challenge to improve women’s agricultural performance by improving their 
access to land, to inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, to credit, to extension services, 
and to better technologies, like labour-saving technologies and improved irrigation equipment. 
Women can do much better if their gender-specific constraints related to access to land and 
technology are addressed, and if they can enjoy the right and the economic incentives to farm 
their own plots (Koopman, 2009). Women’s specific needs and priorities are hardly ever taken 
into account by researchers when designing agricultural technologies. Many agricultural 
development programmes did not achieve the expected impacts because they were mainly 
oriented towards the male household heads, implicitly assuming that the effects will be 
distributed over other household members. As mentioned in The World Development Report 
2008, many economic development policies continue to wrongly take for granted that farmers are 
men. The key importance of women in the agricultural sector in many parts of the world, and 
particularly in agriculture-based countries in Africa, calls for urgent attention for a more gender-
sensitive policy, allowing for gender-specific production constraints and priorities. 
Similarly, in many economic theories, the “rational economic man” has been the main agent 
targeted. However, gender-asymmetric identities, gender difference in terms of social position, 
roles, preferences, basic and strategic needs, endowment assets, access to resources, allocation of 
time and income, performance, risk attitude et cetera widely justify the need for a greater 
awareness of gender issues in economic analysis. 
Particularly at the household level, an economic analysis based on a gender perspective is the 
way to shed light on the differentiation between men and women as economic agents who behave 
differently and specifically, in terms of their choice of labour, non-labour inputs and risk attitude. 
Regarding access to resources within the household, gender inequality arises with an array of 
social and economic implications. A better understanding of these gender issues requires moving 
beyond unitary models of the household and into the household itself (Akram-Lodhi, 1997). 
Farm households involved in the horticultural supply chain in Senegal, in West Africa, provide a 
convenient context to illuminate such gender issues in agricultural development. Usually, in 
Senegal, within horticultural households, both men and women or husbands and wives manage 
their separate horticultural plots. Next to household labour, men and women plot managers hire 
Introduction 
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labour, based on a sharecropping contract or a wage contract. The development of horticulture is 
strongly linked to the economic performance of both men and women plot managers within these 
households. Economic performance can be captured through the analysis of the efficiency of the 
allocation of productive resources between men and women plot managers and the efficiency of 
the use of these resources by them. Equally, economic performance can be scrutinized by 
analysing the efficiency of the labour contract choice made by men and women plot managers. 
Men and women are heads of the horticultural households or managers of separate plots within 
the households; in this role, they may show different preferences or behaviour, notably towards 
risks. Such differences may have an effect on their economic performance and choice of labour 
contract; thus, they need to be measured and accounted for. By providing theoretical and 
empirical evidence on these issues, this thesis intends to make a scientific contribution to the 
gender and economics literature. The results show to what extent female heads of horticultural 
households differ from male heads, and wives from husbands, in economic performance and in 
risk preferences. The specific social, cultural, economic, and institutional context that men and 
women face is accounted for. 
1.2. The setting: Senegal 
1.2.1. Senegal’s macroeconomic environment 
In developing economies, such as African countries, economic development is strongly linked to 
the agricultural sector. In most of them, more than half of the population is rural and has 
agriculture as its major economic activity and source of food and income. Paradoxically, for most 
African countries, the local food crop production remains far insufficient to cover the national 
staple food needs. These countries face chronic food insecurity and poverty. Senegal can be seen 
as a typical example of such developing Sub-Saharan African countries. 
An analysis of Senegal’s economic evolution shows that the annual economic growth rate was 
about 2.7% between 1960 and 1993, while its demographic growth rate was 2.9% (DSRP 2, 
2006). This difficult economic situation was one of the reasons for a structural adjustment 
programme that included policy reforms devaluating the parity of the CFA franc. This change of 
parity and the other policy reforms provided an impulse to the economy. It  again started to grow 
better, with a sustained increase of the gross domestic product (GDP) of about 5% between 1994 
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and 2002, in a context of relative control of inflation and a decrease of public deficit (DSRP 2, 
2006). The increase of the economic growth is imputable to the regaining of competitiveness of 
some export products, such as fish, horticultural products, peanuts, and phosphate. 
In 2003, the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 1 – DSRP 1) was elaborated, covering 
the 2003-2005 period. The PRSP can be considered as the document of economic and social 
policy for economic growth and poverty reduction and as the reference for government 
interventions as well as development partners, civil society, the private sector, and local 
communities. The evaluation of PRSP 1 showed satisfactory results. In fact, between 2003 and 
2005, the economic growth maintained a positive trend, with an annual average rate of more than 
5% (figure 1.1) within a context of improvement of the management of public finance, a 
controlled inflation rate of less than 2%, and the consolidation of other macroeconomic 
aggregates (DSRP 2, 2006). The growth of the agricultural sector was 13% in 2005, due to the 
improvement of horticultural production and other agricultural programmes (DSRP 2, 2006). 
Between 1995 and 2005, Senegal achieved one of the best economic performances in Sub-
Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2009)3. Nevertheless, the growth of the GDP was not enough to 
create sufficient employment, to significantly improve the welfare of households, or to reduce 
poverty. 
For this reason, a second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 2 - DSR 2) is being 
elaborated, covering the 2006-2010 period, to halve poverty in 2015 and to realize the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG). The objective of economic growth is to reach a rate of 7 
to 8% per year. To this end, the government has elaborated a Strategy of Accelerated Growth 
(SCA), to create the conditions for new gains of productivity. According to this plan, the primary 
sector should grow by 11% per year, influenced mainly by crop-growing, which should increase 
by 13%. This agricultural growth should be driven by the implementation of agricultural 
programmes aiming at a sustainable development, food security, an improvement of the revenue 
of the rural population, poverty alleviation, and protection of the environment (DSRP 2, 2006). 
However, from 2006 to 2008, a series of shocks hit the Senegalese economy, which prevented it 
from achieving the projected economic growth rate and from meeting the objectives of the MDG. 
                                               
3
 World Bank, 2009: http://go.worldbank.org/PO6JPCB5P0 . 
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Escalating oil and food prices in 2007 troubled the economy by pushing up inflation, from 0.5% 
in 2003-2005 to 4% in 2006 and 6% in 2007, and by widening the external current account deficit 
(World Bank, 2009). As Senegal imports 100% of its consumption in oil and wheat and 80% of 
its consumption in rice, it is heavily affected by the increasing oil and food prices. To these 
external shocks were added other, internal shocks. The economic growth was dampened by the 
deficit in rainfall in 2006 and 2007, which caused a fall of about 15% of agricultural production, 
and the crisis, which affected the phosphate mining and phosphoric acid production firm 
(Industries Chimiques du Senegal –ICS), one of the largest Senegalese exporting firms (World 
Bank, 2009).  In 2008, the GDP growth was estimated at 2.5% and the inflation rate at 6%. 
Because of a favourable rainfall in 2008, agriculture started to grow again, but the industrial 
production is still declining. Graph 1.1 shows the evolution of the GDP over time, using data 
from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2009). 
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Figure 1.1: The growth of Senegal’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the share of agriculture 
over time.  
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1.2.2. Agriculture for development and poverty alleviation: a huge challenge  
In Senegal, like in other Sub-Saharan African countries, agriculture remains one of the most 
important sectors of the economy. About 60% of the economically active population are working 
in agriculture (DSRP 2, 2006). Agriculture continues to be the lever to activate for an equitable 
economic development and for poverty reduction. However, its contribution to the formation of 
the GDP is still relatively low and variable: from one year to another about 15 to 20% (figure 
1.1). This implies that 60% of the Senegalese labour force contributes only up to 15% to the GDP 
while in 2008, for instance, the other 40% of the national labour force, involved in the industry 
and services, contributed up to 23% and 62% to the GDP, respectively (World Bank, 2009). 
Consequently, in Senegal, like in other developing economies, the gap between the share of 
agriculture in the GDP and the share of agriculture in the labour force is persistently large and 
challenging. 
Moreover, with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 840 US$ in 2006, Senegal remains a 
poor country (World Bank, 2009). The incidence of poverty is still high, despite the sharp 
decrease observed between 1994 and 2005. The share of the national population living below the 
poverty threshold fell from 68% in 1994 to 57% in 2002 and 51% in 2005 (DSRP 2, 2006; World 
Bank, 2009). The incidence of poverty is higher in rural areas, where in 2002, 65.2% of the 
individuals and 57.5% of the households were living below the poverty line (DSRP 2, 2006). 
Consequently, poverty affects the population involved in agriculture more. 
In such a context, getting agriculture to move forward is crucial. Agriculture must be the leading 
sector for the attainment of overall growth, poverty alleviation, and a reduction of income 
disparities. While the growth of non-agricultural sectors has accelerated, poverty persists, which 
shows the difficulty of redistributing the income generated. This suggests that only a GDP growth 
driven by agriculture can drive out poverty. A strong agricultural growth is required to foster 
Senegal’s overall economic growth and to overcome poverty. There is evidence that agriculture is 
more powerful when it comes to poverty reduction than other sectors in agriculture-based 
economies are. Actually, cross-country econometric evidence has shown that, in terms of welfare 
gains, the poor benefit more from a GDP growth in agriculture than from GDP originating from 
the rest of the economy (World Bank, 2007). Moreover, there is evidence that a GDP growth 
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generated in agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as growth generated by 
other sectors is (World Bank, 2007). 
However, agriculture for development and as the main pathway out of poverty can be achieved 
by improving the economic performance of smallholder farmers and particularly their efficiency 
in the use of productive resources. In Senegal, despite the augmentation of the resources allocated 
to agriculture with an annual increase of about 15% of the investment budget (DSRP 2, 2006), the 
economic performance is still too inconsistent to boost agricultural growth, to stimulate overall 
economic growth, and to alleviate poverty significantly. In such a context, there is a need to have 
more insight into the economic performance of the producers and the reasons behind it, in order 
to figure out ways of improvement. This is one of the motivations of this thesis, which 
investigates the economic performance of households involved in horticultural production. 
1.2.3. Overview of the dynamism of Senegalese horticulture 
In Senegal, over the last decades and since the devaluation of the CFA in 1994, the horticultural 
subsector has constituted an important element of agriculture. It contributes to food security, to 
the diversification and increase of agricultural exports, and to the creation of employment. In 
addition to the farm households, horticulture attracts many national economic actors interested in 
the agro-business, and even foreign export-oriented firms. With the decline of traditional exports, 
such as groundnuts and fish, horticulture remains one of the subsectors providing the largest 
economic growth. 
In Senegal, horticultural crops (vegetables, fruits and ornamental crops) are the third important 
crops, in terms of tonnage as well as in value, after cereals and groundnut. Specifically, the 
production of vegetables has recorded a net increase during the last decades. Production rose 
from about 150,000 tons in 1992 to 386,200 tons in 2006 (Direction Horticulture, 2007). This is 
equivalent to a growth rate of 157% over fifteen years. In 2003-2004, the vegetable production 
decreased due to the invasion of locusts, and the partial or total abandonment by some 
horticultural producers of a number of sites because of problems linked to the cost of water4. 
                                               
4
 Producers who were using drinkable water provided by the water corporation for irrigation, could not pay their 
water bill and were constrained to reduce or cease their horticultural production activities. 
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From 2005 to 2006, the production increased considerably, with a growth rate of 10%, as can be 
seen in graph 1.2. 
The area cropped in horticulture rose from 11,600 ha in 1992 to 20,690 ha in 2002, which 
corresponds to a growth of 78% within 10 years. This growth is equal to the production growth, 
which means a proportionality of evolution of area and production. However, in 2003 and 2004, a 
great decrease of the cropped area was observed for the reasons underlined above, before they 
starting to grow again from 2005 on. As can be read from graph 1.2, from 2003 to 2006, the 
production increased less than the area. While the production rose by 44%, the area increased by 
59%, showing a decrease in productivity. 
 
Figure 1.2: The evolution of the Senegalese vegetable production over time (Source: data from 
the National Direction of Horticulture). 
The dominant crops of the Senegalese vegetable production are tomato with 46% of the volume 
produced, onion with 21%, sweet potato with 10%, and cabbage with 8%.  Potato, carrot, turnip, 
eggplant, green bean, cassava and hot pepper represent the second important vegetables produced 
in Senegal. On the other hand, vegetables such as cucumber, squash, zucchini squash, asparagus, 
and lettuce, as well as diverse aromatic and spicy vegetables such as green pepper, sorrel, mint, 
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parsley, and so on, constitute the other crops grown. Thus, the Senegalese horticultural 
production really is diversified enough with more than twenty-five vegetable species (Direction 
Horticulture, 2007). 
Due to the commitment of the economic operators of the agro-business, their organization in 
professional associations, and the effects of the projects and programmes promoting agricultural 
exports, the volumes of vegetables and fruits exported by Senegal have increased from 6,175 tons 
in 1995 to 11,125 tons in 2002 (Projet de Promotion des Exportations Agricoles, 2004) and 
16,000 tons in 2005 (Maertens, 2008). This corresponds to an absolute decennial growth rate of 
159%. Green bean (42% of the exported volume), tomato (23%) and mango (16%) are the chief 
horticultural products exported. With more than ten billion CFA francs as revenues, vegetables 
and fruits have become the second important product exported after fishing (Projet de Promotion 
des Exportations Agricoles, 2004). The horticultural products are exported mainly to France 
(40% of the exported volume), the Netherlands (35%), Belgium (16%), and the neighbouring 
countries (Maertens, 2008), like Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea, and Mali. After Morocco, Egypt, 
and Kenya, Senegal is the fourth African supplier of green beans to the European Union 
(Maertens, 2008). In addition to the farm household specialized in horticultural production, agro-
business firms and exporters have also contributed a lot to the growth of the horticultural exports. 
There have been efforts to better meet the stringent quality standard requirements of the 
international markets. 
However, despite these positive results, the national demand for horticultural products still 
remains strongly dependent on the importation of vegetables, estimated annually at 30,000 tons, 
which is equivalent to three billion CFA francs (Direction Horticulture, 2003). Onion constitutes 
50% of the annual amount of horticultural products imported, and potato 40%. Thus, the two 
crops represent 90% of the total annual horticultural imports and cost 2.6 billion CFA francs. 
These imports come almost exclusively from the Netherlands, which accounts for 99% of the 
onion and 95% of the potato (GEOMAR International, 2004). However, these imports put the 
national horticultural production into hard competition. The main complaint of the horticultural 
producers is the imperfections noticed in the regulation of the imports of onion, which overlap 
with the commercialisation of their production. However, over the last years, to satisfy producers’ 
complaints while protecting consumers’ interests, too, the government has taken some measures 
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to suspend the imports of onion during the period of the commercialisation of the national 
production, in order to avoid the oversaturation of the market and the fall of the price. 
Overall, the high volatility of the horticultural crops’ market prices is one of the major risks that 
men and women producers face. When producing, men and women cannot reliably predict the 
price at which they will sell their crop. The market price fluctuates a lot from one month to 
another (table 1.1) and even from day to day. This high market price volatility impacts upon the 
horticultural revenue of the farm households. Even if the yield achieved per hectare is high, if the 
output market price is low, the revenue derived from the production will be low, too. Moreover, 
producers choose the amount of labour and non-labour inputs given the uncertainty of the output 
market price. Consequently, the way in which horticultural producers behave toward the output 
market price risk may influence their decision-making with regard to the choice of inputs and 
may affect their economic performance. Therefore, the attitude of male and female horticultural 
producers toward the output market price is an important issue to take into account while 
investigating their economic performance. For this reason, men’s and women’s behaviour toward 
the output market price risk and its implications for their economic performance are of particular 
interest in this thesis. 
Table 1.1: The volatility of horticultural crops’ market prices in case of tomato and cabbage.  
Crops’ market prices (FCFA/kg)5 
Period 
Cabbage Tomato 
September 2006 192 175 
October 2006 237 162 
November 2006 264 229 
December 2006 355 633 
January 2007 323 580 
Source: my own survey over 2006-2007 in the Niayes Zone. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 1 USD=485 FCFA; 1 Euro = 656 FCFA 
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1.3. Problem statement 
In large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural productivity is very low due to insufficient and 
erratic rainfall, problems of water control and management, a low level of soil fertility, a lack of 
equipment and financial resources required for purchasing appropriate inputs, the rural exodus, et 
cetera. The potential for economic development is strongly limited by environmental, agro-
technical, socio-economic, and institutional constraints (Sissoko, 1998). In addition, the 
underinvestment by most governments and international donors (De Janvry, 2009), the poor 
infrastructures and limited markets access (Kuyvenhoven et al., 2004; World Bank, 2007) have 
all contributed to agricultural and economic stagnation. 
However, agriculture still remains “a vital development tool for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goal that calls for halving by 2015 the share of people suffering from extreme 
poverty and hunger” as mentioned by Robert B. Zoellick, World Bank President (World Bank, 
2007). Consequently, in Sub-Saharan Africa, it has become more of a challenge than ever to 
boost up agriculture in order to stimulate economic growth, improve food security, and alleviate 
poverty. Evidence has shown that in Africa, public investment in agriculture provides a high rate 
of return because of its growth and poverty reduction effects (Adesina, 2009). 
Over the world, and particularly in Africa, women’s involvement in agricultural production is 
broadening and deepening (World Bank, 2007). An agriculture-led development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa requires community-driven approaches, with women, who account for the majority of the 
producers in the region, playing a leading role (World Bank, 2007). Much more attention must be 
paid to the gender dimension of agriculture. 
Moreover, in the current context of high and volatile world food prices, which affects Africa 
much more than other developing regions of the world (Adesina, 2009), a sharp increase of 
agricultural productivity of both staple and high added-value crops is more than ever necessary. 
As a result of the emergence of the monetary economy and the requirement for the rural 
population to have money in order to satisfy their vital needs, cash crops have gained importance 
over food crops. For this reason, current alternative strategies focus on growing products with a 
higher net added value per hectare, like horticultural products such as vegetables, flower bulbs 
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(Bremmer, 2004), and fruits. Particularly in developing countries, because of market 
opportunities at the national and international level, horticultural products saw a rapid agricultural 
market growth, shown by an increase of the production by 3.6% a year for fruits and 5.5 % for 
vegetables over the 1980-2004 period (World Bank, 2007). This horticultural revolution, driven 
by the domestic and global market, contributes a lot to the growth of agriculture in developing 
economies. Compared to cereal production, horticulture is twice as labour-intensive and rises by 
tenfold the returns on land (World Bank, 2007). Accordingly, horticulture is a real source of 
income and employment generation. 
Particularly in Senegal, over the last decades, the horticultural subsector constituted without any 
doubt a vital element of agriculture, due to its contribution to the satisfaction of food needs, the 
foreign exchange generated through exports, and the importance and diversity of the economic 
actors involved. Horticulture remains one of the subsectors providing the largest economic 
growth and constituting a great hope for Senegal’s agricultural development. However, despite 
the dynamism observed and shown by the increase of the horticultural production and the exports, 
the national production is still far from being sufficient to cover the national demand. Senegal is 
strongly dependent on imports of horticultural products, which contribute to weighing down the 
balance of payment. 
To increase horticultural growth by scaling up the productivity and the land cropped, to reduce 
the import bill, to export more horticultural products, and to be more competitive are some of 
Senegal’s major objectives. Given the relatively high horticultural potential of the country and the 
domestic, regional, and global market opportunities, these objectives do not seem to be 
unrealistic. However, the performance of the different actors involved in the horticultural supply 
chain is a concern. Accordingly, it remains a challenge to gain more knowledge about the level of 
economic performance of the producers and especially the farm households, taking into account 
the technical, economic, institutional, social, and environmental constraints they face. These 
constraints may vary across households and across the gender of the plot managers within 
households. While some households can afford some modern and adapted equipment, such as 
motor pumps, which reduce the labour needs, other households cannot, and subsequently, have to 
rely on family labour and hired labour. Similarly, while male heads of household or managers of 
plots have enough land and access to credit, female ones have limited access to these factors. 
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Moreover, the way in which horticultural producers behave toward the output market price risk, 
may have implications for their economic performance, particularly for their efficiency and their 
choice of labour contract. Such issues are of particular interest in this research thesis. 
1.4. Research objectives and questions 
This research is a part of the African Women Leaders in Agriculture and Environment (AWLAE) 
programme, which aims to examine and enhance gender roles in the food production systems in 
Africa at the level of the householdi. 
The goal of this research is to contribute to improving the income of horticultural households in 
Senegal through the development of horticultural production, to attain more economic growth, 
food security, and poverty alleviation. Specifically, this research aims to acquire more insight into 
the economic performance of horticultural households, by using efficiency as key indicator of 
performance and through two main approaches or perspectives: 
1. firstly, a gender perspective based on a differentiation within farm households (male and 
female managers of plots) and between farm households (female-headed and male-
headed);  
2. secondly, a labour perspective founded on the demarcation between production systems 
based on household labour and hired labour, based either on sharecropping contracts or 
wage contracts. 
Moreover, this research aims at theoretically and empirically investigating men’s and women’s 
behaviour towards the output market price risk and its implications for their economic 
performance and choice of labour contract. 
To achieve these objectives, the main economic issue addressed is the question of economic 
performance, and especially of efficiency. This efficiency is assessed in a specific social, 
economic, and cultural context in which polygamy occurs and husband and wives usually manage 
their plots separately. Moreover, it is assessed in a context where household labour is generally 
the dominant input and where the labour market offers two common forms of contract, based on 
wage and sharecropping. The labour market also shows high transaction costs linked to the 
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supervision of labour. Specifically, this research has the ambition to find answers to four main 
research questions: 
1. Is the household’s allocation of resources over men and women efficient?  
2. Are contracts with hired workers, either as wage labourers or as sharecroppers, 
efficient for household profit optimization? 
3. Do risk preferences differ between husband and wives, and between male and female 
heads of the household? 
4. If so, how are they related to individual characteristics, and what are the effects on 
their performance and choice of labour contracts? 
A fifth question follows from the findings and is related to the conclusions regarding policy: 
5. How to improve the economic performance of men and women involved in 
horticultural production? What is the best way to reduce the likely gap in economic 
performance linked to gender, scale and labour contract? What can policy do to 
influence or accommodate male and female producers’ risk behaviour towards the 
output market price and its repercussions on their performance? 
1.5. The study area 
We have carried out the research in Senegal, in the Niayes Zone, which is the band surrounded by 
the Atlantic Ocean and located along the axis Dakar – Saint-Louis Regions (see the map in figure 
1.3). We have chosen the Niayes Zone as research area because it constitutes, together with the 
Senegal River Valley, an agro-ecological zone of Senegal that is excellently suited to horticulture. 
The Niayes Zone is still the leading horticultural production zone and is the best example in terms 
of an integrated use of favourable factors of production and marketing (Matsumoto-Izadifar, 
2008). About 80% of the national horticultural production comes from the Niayes Zone. This 
horticultural vocation is conferred by numerous potentialities related to favourable climatic, soil 
and hydraulic conditions as well as by the proximity to the urban markets. In fact, its tropical and 
sunny climate is marked by a great maritime influence. The average temperatures, ranging from 
22oC in January and 31oC in October, are favourable to horticultural production. They are 
relatively fresh compared to the temperatures observed in the country’s interior, a relatively 
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consistent humidity varying between 58% in December and 83% in August, and a rainfall varying 
from the North to the South from 300 to 500 mm per year. 
The relief of the Niayes zone is modelled with a succession of sandy dunes and depressions. The 
soil, characterized by a dominant sandy texture, is very favourable to horticultural crops. The 
hydrograph is characterized by the proximity of the water table in most of the areas and the 
presence of lakes, temporary basins and ponds. With its potentialities, the Niayes zone is a 
veritable pivot of development for horticulture. However, in some places, particularly in the south 
zone of Niayes, the availability of water is a limiting factor. While in the centre zone of Niayes, 
the water table can be reached even with a non-cemented, traditional well at a depth of one meter, 
in the south zone of Niayes, near Dakar, in some places, the water table is so deep that the source 
of water used for irrigation is that of the water corporation. It is water filtered for drinking, and 
for this reason it is expensive and its provision is irregular. The water constraint has caused some 
producers to cease their horticultural production completely, while others have only partially 
done so, by reducing their cropped area. 
In terms of demography, in the last national agricultural census done in 1998, the Niayes Zone 
accounted for 35.000 rural households, distributed over 20.000 family residences and more than 
750 villages (RNA, 1999).  
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Figure 1.3: Map of the study area in the Niayes Zone of Senegal, West Africa. 
1.6. The methodological design 
The research strategy 
This research uses a quantitative focus, based on a large-scale survey of horticultural households. 
A stratified and random sample of 203 horticultural households was selected in 30 villages, 
distributed over the three main subzones of the study area, the Niayes Zone. The stratification 
was based on subzone, villages, gender, and labour used. Based on a list of the villages classified 
by zone and district, a sample of 30 villages was selected randomly. In each village, 6-7 
horticultural households were sampled randomly but also in a stratified manner, in order to 
include horticultural households headed by both men and women and including those using 
household labour, wage labour, and sharecropping labour. In each village, household heads were 
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listed and classified into different groups, based on gender and type of labour used in the village. 
As much as possible, we randomly selected the same number of households (by lottery) in each 
group. In each horticultural household, we surveyed all the male and female managers of 
horticultural plots. In this way, we surveyed a total of 422 horticultural plots in 203 households, 
of which 308 are managed by men and 114 are managed by women. On these fields, men and 
women produce the same horticultural crops. 
The research material 
In addition to direct observations and semi-structured interviews, formal structured questionnaires 
were designed and used to collect the required labour and gender-disaggregated field data at 
household level and at plot level, related to: 
 the major characteristics of horticultural households, such as their socio-demographic 
composition, migratory movement, labour availability, resources or assets (land and its 
allocation to different members, and crops, livestock, agricultural equipment and so on), 
and organisation; 
 the quantities and prices of different factors of production, inputs and outputs at plot level; 
 the access to information, markets and other institutions (credit, saving, insurance, 
extension services, professional organisations), opportunities, constraints and strategies;  
 the determinants of preferences, including the risk attitude, control of assets according to 
gender (land ownership, the allocation of labour, time and inputs, control of other assets 
and income), and production planning. 
In addition to the survey, we implemented a new experimental measurement of the risk attitude of 
men and women plot managers within the farm household. The experimental game is inspired by 
methods used by Binswanger (1980), Wik et al. (2004), and Senkondo (2000), but it is based on a 
game with a set of output prices as payoff. 
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The research methods 
The research methods are based on various theoretical and empirical models and econometric 
estimates allowing for gender. Each specific model is considered to be suitable for answering a 
specific research question. Accordingly, in order to answer the first research question, unitary and 
gender-specific stochastic frontier production functions are estimated. From these models are 
derived the technical efficiency scores, the inefficiency component and its relationship with other 
individual and socio-economic household characteristics, and the allocative efficiency. 
To address the second research question, a theoretical and empirical model based on household 
profit optimization is used, to test the efficiency of the choice between household labour, a 
sharecropping labour contract and a wage labour contract, while controlling for the irrigation 
equipment used on the plot. 
For the third research question, we have used a model based on producer-expected utility, which 
is in concordance with the experimental game implemented, to determine men’s and women’s 
risk attitude. Theoretical and empirical models based on the maximization of the expected utility 
of profit, given the uncertainty of the output market price, are designed to examine the effects of 
risk attitude on economic performance and choice of labour contract, an examination that helps to 
reply to the fourth research question. 
The empirical evidence of each model tested leads to recommendations to policy makers and thus 
contributes to tackle the fifth research question. The different theoretical and empirical models 
are presented in detail in each chapter. 
1.7. The relevance to policy questions  
This research sheds light on the level of economic performance of horticultural households, 
taking into consideration gender, type of labour contract and risk attitude. Such information is 
useful for producers, agro-business operators, agricultural research, extension services, NGOs, 
donors, and particularly for policy decision makers aiming at the enhancement of the horticultural 
subsector. Especially in the current context of world food crisis, there is a need, more than ever, 
to examine the economic performance of the agricultural producers, in order to confront the 
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challenges ahead. This research provides policy decision makers with suitable strategies, which 
will lead to an improvement of the economic performance of horticultural households and is 
based on a gender perspective. Future horticultural projects, programmes and policies will be 
designed better and more accurately when based on the results, information and recommendations 
provided by this research. 
1.8. An outline of this thesis 
This study is structured into the six following chapters: 
 Chapter 1, which is the present one, consists of the general introduction outlining the 
background, biophysical, social, and macroeconomic context of this research, the problem 
statement, the purpose and the research questions, the methodology, the policy relevance, 
and the different chapters. 
 Chapter 2 will describe the characteristics of the horticultural households from a gender 
standpoint. In doing so, this chapter will provide enough background information about 
the environment of the study at the micro level. 
 Chapter 3 will shed light on the economic performance of men and women measured in 
terms of efficiency. Thus, in addition to the technical efficiency and its determinants, this 
chapter will examine the optimum efficiency of the allocation of resources over husband 
and wives managers of separate plots within a household. Accordingly, this chapter will 
address the first research question. 
 Chapter 4 will focus on the comparative analysis of household profit optimization across 
plots under household labour, a sharecropping labour contact and a wage labour contract. 
Next, the chapter will provide evidence on the efficiency of labour contract choice and the 
inputs used at plot level. In doing so, the chapter will seek to answer the second research 
question. 
 Chapter 5 will examine the difference in risk preferences between husband and wives, and 
between male and female heads of the household. Also, it will investigate the effects of 
risk attitude on the economic performance and on the decisions made regarding the choice 
of labour contracts. Consequently, this chapter will deal with the third and fourth research 
questions. 
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 Chapter 6, finally, after answering the fifth research question, will come up with the 
recommendations. It will examine suitable strategies that will lead to an improvement of 
the economic performance of horticultural households by means of a gender perspective. 
This chapter will also discuss the policy implications, the conclusion, and the outlook for 
future research. 
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i
 This research thesis is one of the twenty PhD theses managed by the African Women Leaders in 
Agriculture and Environment (AWLAE) and Winrock International (WI), in partnership with Wageningen 
University and Research Centre (WUR) and funded by the Netherlands Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation (DGIS), aiming at contributing to gender research in Sub-Saharan Africa in a 
context of HIV/AIDS prevalence. 
There is hardly a requirement to repeat that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is one of the most dangerous diseases 
affecting the world, devastating African societies and economies in particular. The number of persons 
living with HIV/AIDS, the number of deaths, widows and orphans due to this disease, and the prevalence 
rate are very high. In 2007, the number of deaths due to AIDS was estimated at 2.1 million worldwide, of 
which 76% occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS/WHO, 2007). Compared to the past two years, 
some declines are observed, which according to UNAIDS/WHO (2007) are partly attributable to the 
scaling up of antiretroviral treatment services. “AIDS remains a leading cause of mortality worldwide and 
the primary cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa, illustrating the tremendous, long-term challenge that lies 
ahead for provision of treatment services, with the hugely disproportionate impact on sub-Saharan Africa.” 
(UNAIDS/WHO, 2007).  The social, economic and political implications of this disease are numerous and 
various. In this situation, decisive actions are required to fight against this disease and its heavy and 
negative effects. 
While the implications of the AIDS crisis are devastating Sub-Saharan Africa, some countries like Senegal 
have made progress fighting the pandemic (PUTZEL, 2003). This progress results from a strong 
commitment by the government, which has in an early stage adopted a multi-sectored approach based on 
the mobilization and involvement of key partnerships, such as between different ministries, influential 
religious organizations, and non-governmental actors, such as NGOs, associations, the private sector, and 
so forth. The result of these combined efforts was a low HIV/AIDS national prevalence rate of 1% in 2007 
(UNAIDS/WHO/UNICEF, 2008). Because of this low prevalence rate, it is difficult to find in the studied 
sample a representative number of horticultural households affected by this disease and to find a 
correlation with the socio-economic data. For this reason, this study does not deal with HIV/AIDS. 
However, we recommend that, despite its positive results, Senegal must not rest on its laurels; it needs to 
keep up its efforts to better inform the population, whether urban or rural, about the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
This remains the key strategy to safeguard its relative progress. 
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2.1. Introduction 
For any study centred on the household, it is greatly important to get insight into the household 
itself to find out its main social, demographic and economic characteristics, before proceeding to 
any other type of analysis. For this reason, this chapter gives a characterization of horticultural 
households located in the Niayes Zone of Senegal. This characterization will be given from a 
gender standpoint, in other words, using a disaggregation into men and women of all the data 
collected from a survey of 203 horticultural households. 
A horticultural household is defined as a group of people or a family-based community composed 
of a head (usually a man and sometimes a woman), wives and children as well as extended 
relatives, living together in a unit of residence, sharing their meals, cultivating mostly 
horticultural crops on their land jointly or separately, and/or doing other work with as overall 
objective the welfare and secured livelihood of its members. 
Accordingly, this chapter first focuses on: 
i. the social and demographic characteristics of horticultural households in section 2.2.1;  
ii. the economic characteristics with a particular focus on horticultural household 
resource and assets endowment in section 2.2.2;  
iii. gender and bargaining within the horticultural household in section 2.2.3; 
iv. and finally, estimating the horticultural household income in section 2.2.4.  
Secondly, after this global characterization of horticultural households, this chapter intends to 
shed light on the gender distribution of household resources between husband and wives or, more 
globally, men and women managers of separate plots within the household. Getting inside the 
horticultural household, this second part of the chapter identifies the horticultural plots and crops 
sampled (sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), describes the issues linked to the physical conditions of men 
and women’s plots (section 2.3.3). This is followed by an evaluation of the inputs used by men 
and women plot managers (section 2.3.4), the output (section 2.3.5), the seasonal effects (section 
2.3.6), and the profitability. 
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Thus, this chapter gives an elaborate description of the data, providing enough background of the 
horticultural households for the analysis of their economic performance.  
2.2. A characterization of horticultural households  
2.2.1. Social and demographic characteristics of horticultural households 
Horticultural households’ headship, gender and age 
A total of 203 horticultural households were surveyed in the Niayes Zone. Among them, 190 are 
headed by men and only 13 by women (6.4%). These female heads of household are mainly 
widows (10 out of 13) with often young children, or married women with a husband permanently 
migrated inside the country, particularly to Dakar, the capital city of Senegal, or to foreign 
countries like Europe. The widowed women become head of household, managing all the 
resources; they are responsible for the family needs. The women whose husbands have migrated 
permanently, coming back home for only a short time, are in a similar position.  
In terms of age, households heads show a large diversity. The youngest household head is 21 
years old and the oldest one is 84. This denotes that some heads are very young and some others 
rather old. On average, the age of a household head is about 51 years. Most of the household 
heads are in their forties and sixties. There is no major age difference between male and female 
heads of horticultural households. 
Household kinship composition and size  
In terms of kinship, a horticultural household is commonly composed of a husband who is the 
head, wives, sons, daughters, and other extended relatives. The marital status of horticultural 
household heads shows that polygamy is widely practised. The number of wives ranges from 1 to 
4. Among the 190 male heads of household, 43% are monogamous and 57% are polygamous. In 
greater detail, 35% of the heads of household have 2 wives, 18% have 3 wives, and 4% have 4 
wives. The wives share the same house. 
Obviously, the polygamous status of most horticultural household heads impacts on the number 
of their children. Household offspring varies from 0 to 21 persons, with an average of 6. It is 
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important to note that only the children who are living with the household head or who have 
emigrated but still belong to the household are accounted for. The children who are married 
and/or living outside the household are not taken into account. Moreover, as is usual in African 
countries, in addition to wives and children, the household accommodates other extended 
relatives of the household head, such as a mother, father, brother, sister, aunt, niece, nephew, 
cousin, grandson, granddaughter, sister-in-law, brother-in-law… The number of extended 
relatives varies greatly from one household to another, from 0 to 12, with an average of 1.5. Half 
of the households have no extended relative living in. 
In total, the household size varies greatly. The smallest household houses 3 members and the 
largest one 26 members. On average, a household counts about 10 members, which can be 
decomposed in terms of kinship as shown in table 2.1. 
Household education 
Household heads education 
The majority of household heads (74%) has attended a Koran school named “Daara” in Woloff 
(the local language) for several years when they were young, learning the Holy Koran. For this 
reason, some of them can still read or write in Arabic, while others lose these abilities over the 
years. In terms of formal education, the schooling rate of heads of household is very low. Among 
202 household heads, only 17 heads have just attended primary school, 9 have made it to 
secondary school and only one has reached university level. About 24 of the 202 household heads 
have not mastered any form of literacy. However, if only formal education is taken into account, 
175 household heads are illiterate and 27 are literate. This is equivalent to an illiteracy rate of 
87% for household heads, as can be read from table 2.1. 
Household members’ education 
Regarding other household members, on average 5 members have attended Koran school, while 3 
have attended primary school over an average household size of 11 members. This is equivalent 
to a rate of Koran school attendance of 45% and a rate of primary schooling of 30%. As to 
secondary education and/or university or superior education, very few household members have 
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reached this level. Eighty percent and 97% of the households have zero members who attained a 
secondary education or a university degree, respectively. A gender disaggregation of the data 
shows that 49% of the households have 0% as female primary schooling rate, while 89.5% of the 
households have 0% as female secondary schooling rate. 
In conclusion, the results show low rates of schooling and also a small gender gap. Nevertheless, 
these results are better than in most rural areas. The horticultural villages are generally relatively 
large and are located in the proximity of the big cities and roads. Consequently, most of them 
have primary schools. However, the absence of secondary schools is a constraint. They are 
obliged to go to cities and this is not easy for some households because of the loss of labour and 
costs involved. 
However, it is important to note that tremendous efforts have been made by the Senegalese 
authorities to increase the schooling rate, particularly for girls, through awareness campaigns, 
building schools, and increasing the number of teachers. As a result, the national primary 
schooling rate, which was about 75% in 2003, amounting to 79% for boys and 72% for girls6, 
rose in 2007 to 81% for boys and 79% for girls7. A universal primary education or, in other 
words, a schooling rate of 100%, is one of the major challenges of the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) for 2015. 
Household labour endowment 
The household labour capacity is calculated as the number of economically active household 
members, using a scale varying according to the age8. Household labour varies greatly from one 
household to another. It ranges from 2 to 19 economically active members, with a mean of 7.5 
(table 2.1). The ratio of the household’s economically active members over household size gives 
the complement of an economic dependency ratio of 0.69. This means that 69% of the 
household’s members are economically active, in others words, each household member depends 
on 0.69 economically active members. Or, inversely, on one economically active member depend 
1.44 household members. Moreover, a gender disaggregation of household labour shows that, on 
                                               
6
 http://www.education.gouv.sn/statistiques 
7
 http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/senegal_statistics 
8
 The number of economically active household members: 7 – 9 years = 0.25; 10-14=0.5; 15-70=1 defined with 
horticultural households. 
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average, male labour consists of 4 economically active members and female labour on 3.5 
economically active members. This represents respectively 53% and 47% of the overall 
household labour. The household’s labour done by sons and daughters consists of 3.9 
economically active members on average; this is 52% of the household labour.  
Children constitute an important component of horticultural household labour, due to their great 
contribution to the different cropping operations. Consequently, child labour by children older 
than 6 and younger than 15 is estimated. Globally, a household’s own child labour plus other 
child labour gives the total household child labour, which varies from 0 to 4 persons that are 
economically active, with an average of 0.9. There is no difference between boys and girls. 
To the question “Is the family labour sufficient for your horticultural activities?”, only 11% of the 
horticultural households reply “yes”. Horticultural cropping is labour-intensive, particularly in 
developing countries such as Senegal. As a result, most households have insufficient labour to 
cover the production needs and, subsequently, they employ sharecroppers, hired wage labour and 
daily hired labour. The number of sharecroppers used per household yearly ranges from 0 to 20, 
with an average of 2. About 25% of the horticultural households do not use any sharecropping 
labour contract. The number of daily hired workers varies between 0 and 120 per year, with a 
mean of 11 persons; they are hired mainly for time-consuming cropping operations like 
transplanting, weeding and harvesting. About 10% of the households do not used daily labour. 
Only a few households (7%) are using permanent hired wage labour. 
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Table 2.1: Horticultural households’ characteristics over gender 
Household Characteristics 
Men Women Total 
Household headship    
Number  
Proportion (%) 
190 
93.6 
13 
6.4 
203 
100 
Household kinship composition     
Head 1  1 
Wives  1.8 1.8 
Children 3.9 2.6 6.5 
Other extended relatives 0.5 1 1.5 
Household size (total members) 5.4 5.4 10.8 
Household education    
Household heads’ illiteracy rate (%) 87 77 87 
Household members’ illiteracy rate (%) 66 80 70 
Households with no secondary schooled member (%) 80 89 80 
Households with no member with a university level (%) 97 99 97 
Household labour (economically active) 4 3.5 7.5 
Household land ownership (hectare) 3.5 0.1 3.6 
Household livestock (number of heads)    
Cattle  2.6 0.9 3.5 
Sheep  2.4 1.4 3.8 
Goats  2.7 1.9 4.5 
Poultry  2 6 8 
Source: Own households survey, 2005-2006. 
Emigration within the household  
The results of the surveys done by the end 2005 show that some horticultural households count 
some migrants among their members. The migrants can be the head of household, sons or 
daughters, or other relatives household members who leave the village to settle in an another city 
or foreign country. Among 203 households surveyed, 82% of the households have no migrant, 
while the other 17% of the households count 1 to 6 migrants. However, one year later, at the end 
of 2006, the number of migrants had increased. Clandestine emigration is becoming an increasing 
and astonishing movement, affecting horticultural households in particular. In fact, the first 
reason is that the Niayes Zone is located on the Atlantic Ocean and accordingly, is a departure 
point of boats transporting migrants. The other reason is that horticultural crops are cash crop; 
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this provides the cash that affords producers the boat ticket, which costs about fcfa 500,000 (769 
euro). In the sample studied, about 8 households were affected by this migration. In this way, the 
number of households with migrants reached 43 (21%) by the end of 2006. 
Two types of migratory flow can be identified according to their destination:  
 A domestic flow, generally to Dakar, the capital city, and to other big cities as well as to 
some major agricultural production and fishing zones (the Senegal River Valley, the 
coastal zone).  
 An international flow, toward the other African and European countries. 
In their region or countries of destination, the migrants are engaging in  diverse occupations: they 
work, for instance, as masons, drivers, traders, students, transporters, fishermen, wage workers, or 
domestic workers. The majority of them have migrated permanently (82%); only some have 
migrated seasonally. 
2.2.2. Horticultural household resources and assets endowment 
Resources are the base of any production activity. Diversity among rural households is mainly 
based on differences in resource endowments (Ruben et al., 2004). After having a look at the 
household human capital that constitutes the labour, we will now examine the other resources, 
such as land, livestock and other assets. 
Household land ownership 
Land ownership varies greatly from one household to another. It ranges from 0 to 20 hectares, 
with a median of 3. About 75% of the households have less than 5 hectares, and 90% has less 
than 9 hectares. In most households, land is owned exclusively by men. An exception is formed 
by some households headed by widowed women who became the “supposed” landowners until 
the male children will become adults and will marry. Also, in some rare cases, powerful women, 
strongly involved in horticultural production, manage to buy their own land portion. Only in 34 
out of 201 households (17%), women own land, the area ranging from 0 to 10 hectares, with a 
mean of 0.1 hectare. Only 10% of the female landowners have more than 0.5 hectare. 
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Because of customary norms rather than religious norms, women usually do not inherit land from 
their parents, as they are supposed to be away, living with a husband who can provide them with 
land, of which the woman becomes a tenant rather than an owner. When religious norms and 
particularly Islamic norms are applied, daughters should inherit half of the sons’ share for any 
asset. However, land is usually sold to the sons, while the daughters get their inheritance share in 
value rather than in nature or land. Often, the head of household shares out land to his sons when 
they get married, so there is even no land left for inheritance. In some cases where a woman’s 
husband lives in her parents’ village, she can generally inherit a small portion of land from her 
father, if her father has enough land to cover her brothers’ needs. That means that, in all cases, 
men have priority in terms of access to land as the head of the household and as food provider. 
Household total land cropped in horticulture ranges from 0.02 to 10 hectares, with a mean of 1.4. 
About 10% of the horticultural households produce less than 0.25 hectare in horticulture and 
about 90% of the households less than 3 hectares. In addition to horticultural crops, some 
households have other crops, like cereals and peanut during the rainy season, in an area of 0.5 
hectare on average. About 50% of the households produce only horticultural crops. Not all the 
land available is cropped. The land use rate, which is the ratio of land cropped over the total land 
owned gives an average of 46% for horticultural crops and 59% including other crops. This 
means that on average households are cropping about 59% of their available land per season, 
showing some possibilities to scale up the cropped area. While some households are just able to 
exploit a small part of their land, due to limited means or due to too much land owned, some 
others own just a very small piece of land that they crop completely, even borrowing or renting 
additional land. Only 9% of the households are borrowing land and 19% are renting land. The 
land rent costs, on average, fcfa 200,000 per hectare and season. About 90% of the households 
are cropping less than 100% of their land in any season. Consequently, in general, land 
availability does not appear as a major problem. 
A gender disaggregation shows that in 60% of the households, women are managing their own 
plots with a total of land cropped in horticulture ranging from 0 to 3 hectares, with a mean of 0.1 
hectare. About 55% of the households have land cropped by women for less than 0.01 hectare 
and 80% for less than 0.5 hectare. Women exploit small plots, usually allocated by their husband. 
In about 45% of the households, it is the husband who chooses the plot allocated to his wives (or 
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sisters, mothers …). Only in about 15% of the households, women themselves choose their plots 
in their husband’s field. In 40% of the households, women did not manage their own separate 
horticultural plots; instead, they just participate on men’s plots or engage in other off-farm work, 
mainly small-scale trading, or deal with domestic work, which is enough of a burden in itself 
(cooking, cleaning house, washing, fetching water and wood …). 
Household livestock 
Horticultural households are also cattle breeders. The livestock includes cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses, donkeys and poultry. The household livestock size varies greatly from one household to 
another. Some households do not own any livestock or have just a limited number, while others 
have a livestock well stocked, both in terms of species and the number of heads. Regarding the 
cattle, sheep and goats, respectively 60%, 45% and  50% of the households have none of them. 
About 75% of the households have less than 3 heads of cattle, 5 sheep and 5 goats. On average, 
the household livestock counts 3 to 4 of each of these species. A gender analysis shows that men 
as well as women are owners of cattle, sheep and goats. However, there is a gender difference 
regarding livestock ownership within the household. As can be seen from table 2.1, men own 
more livestock than women, particularly for cattle. 
Some households (actually the men) have a horse (22%) or a donkey (38%), used for 
transportation as well as for animal traction. About 75% of the households have some poultry. 
Unlike the other animals, poultry is mainly for women. On average, a household has 8 chickens 
or ducks, of which 2 belong to men and 6 to women. 
For cattle grazing, some households use their fallow fields (19% of the households), others use a 
village grazing area (29%) or a grazing area outside of the village (23%). Some others keep and 
feed their cattle at home (12%). 
In general, livestock plays an important role in the household economy because of its value of 
reserve and saving. It helps households to overcome hard periods marked by a cash flow deficit. 
In such periods, households sell some cattle. After harvesting, part of the revenue realized is used 
to buy cattle. Moreover, for horticultural households, cattle constitute a great source of manure, 
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useful to restore and maintain soil fertility. For women, big cattle as well as poultry is very 
important to meet emergency needs and to be able to welcome guests warmly with a nice meal. 
Other wealth of the household  
Housing 
Only 6% of the households do not have their own house and generally live in their parents’ 
house. Very few households (6%) live in a straw house. The majority of the households (86%) 
have their stone wall house with a zinc or slate roof. Some households (8%) have a house with a 
cemented flat roof (terrace). So, contrary to most Senegal rural areas, the horticultural area knows 
a great divergence in terms of housing, with well-built houses showing their relatively great 
wealth or standing compared to others. Obviously, houses belong to men. Only in a few 
households, the houses belong to women, who then mainly are heads of household (table 2.2).  
Transport means 
Carts play an important role in the transportation of inputs and outputs. Unfortunately, the 
majority of the households have no cart (table 2.2). In all households, men are the cart owners, 
except in three households headed by women. As is quite unusual for rural households, some 
horticultural households (5%) own a car. All cars belong to men. The car owners are typically 
men with off-farm work like trade, transport and house building, or men with a pension, or men 
receiving a remittance from a migrant. 
Other appliances 
Only 5% of the households do not have a radio while 58% do not have a television. In most of 
these households, the television belongs to the male heads of household and rarely to female 
heads or a simple household member (table 2.2). The majority of the villages are not yet 
electrified and solar panels are used for the television and other household appliance. Freezers 
and air conditioners are still a luxury for horticultural households, essentially due to the lack of an 
electric connection. Only 33% of the households do not have a mobile phone. The majority of the 
households have 1 to 5 mobile phones. Particularly for market price information, the mobile 
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phone is most helpful for horticultural households. A gender disaggregation shows that women 
are lagging behind. Contrary to mobile phones, landline phones are rare (table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Other wealth of the household 
Household Other wealth of the household 
Total  Men Women 
Housing     
Household with a straw house (%) 6 6 0 
Household with a stone wall house (%) 94 88 6 
Household with transport means (%)     
Cart  43 41 2 
Car   5 5 0 
Household with other appliances (%)    
Radio  95 89 37 
Television  42 36 6 
Mobile phone  67 66 15 
Freezer  10 5 5 
Air conditioner 17 15 9 
Source: Own households survey, 2005-2006. 
Bank account 
The analysis of access to financial institutions shows that 40% of the households do not have an 
account either in a bank or in a micro-financial institution (MFI), while about 60% of  households 
do have one. In 54% of the households, only men have a bank or MFI account, whereas in 6% of 
the households women have one. However, in some households, the husband borrows money 
from his bank or MFI and shares a part of his loan with his wives as credit to be reimbursed later. 
In this way, some women have an indirect access to credit through their husband. Some men have 
some money in their account, whereas others have an unpaid debt. Men’s account balance ranges 
from fcfa -500,000 to 1,500,000, with a mean of fcfa 37,500. In more than 50% of the 
households, men’s account balance is null. In about 75% of the households, men have a balance 
account of less than fcfa 2,500. In five households, women have an account balance of not null, 
ranging from fcfa 2,750 to 150,000. For both men and women, these savings have been reserved 
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for the restart of the upcoming horticultural campaign, or are meant to serve as the initial 
contribution required to get another loan. 
2.2.3. Gender and bargaining within the household 
In some areas of the Niayes Zone, particularly in the north and centre, women manage their own 
horticultural plots next to men. In other areas, particularly in the south zone and in a part of the 
centre zone of Niayes, women work on men’s plots and do not have their own separate plots. It is 
interesting to look at the contribution of men on women’s plots, as well as to that of  women on 
the plots of their husband. Moreover, the control of inputs used and the decision-making process 
within the household must be acknowledged, as well as the control of income earned. 
The division of labour on men’s plots versus women’s plots 
On men’s plots, women rarely participate in nursery work, land preparation and plant treatment. 
Inversely, transplanting and harvesting are considered as two of women’s specialities. Similarly, 
in most households (71%), women participate in watering. Women’s participation on men’s plots 
in cropping operations, such as weeding, fertilizing, and the application of organic fertilizers in 
particular, is not general. In a few households (7%), women help men to transport the production, 
basically in cases in which the household does not have a cart. In about 30% of the households, 
women participate in the selling of specific crops produced on men’s plots. 
Evidently, on women’s plots, men participate a lot in cropping operations such as the nursery, 
land preparation and plant treatment, which are considered more or less to be men’s speciality. In 
more than half of the households, the participation of men is recorded in the transplanting, 
harvesting and selling of products of women’s plots. Male participation in the weeding, fertilizing 
and transport of production on women’s plots is noticed as well. Inversely, in the majority of the 
households (83%), men do not help women to irrigate their plot. 
To sum up, as can be seen from table 2.3, a reciprocal participation of men and women is not 
always generalized in all households for all cropping activities. Some gender specialisation comes 
up, depending on the type of cropping activity. However, although men and women, or more 
A Characterization of Horticultural Households 
 52 
precisely husband and wives, manage their own plots, they provide each other with a reciprocal 
labour contribution. 
Table 2.3: The participation of women on men’s plots and vice versa 
On men’s plots, do women 
participate in this cropping 
activity? (% of households) 
On women’s plots, do men 
participate in this cropping 
activity? (% of households) Cropping activities 
Yes No Yes No 
Nursery 10 90 69 31 
Land preparation 1 99 70 30 
Transplanting 75 25 56 44 
Weeding 9 91 35 65 
Watering 71 29 17 83 
Fertilizing 17 83 48 52 
Plant treatment 0  100 84 16 
Harvesting 89 11 58 42 
Transport of production 7 93 47 53 
Selling of production 30 70 53 47 
Source: Own households survey, 2005-2006. 
The control of inputs and the decision-making process within the household 
To the question “Who decide which horticultural crops to produce in male plots?”, about 91% of 
the households reply “men themselves” and 9% of the households answer “men with the advice 
of women”. Thus, in the vast majority of the households, men themselves decide on the 
horticultural crops they grow. Meanwhile, the decision maker of crops to grow on women’s plots 
are the women themselves in 37% of the households, women with the advice of men in 47% of 
the households, and men in 16% of the households. 
Men decided on and paid for all the inputs used in their own plots themselves. This is not always 
the case on women’s plots. About which seed varieties to use, in 35% of the women’s plots, men 
are the decision makers. In 21% of the women’s plots, men paid the seed used. With regard to 
organic and mineral fertilizers, respectively in 13% and 19% of women’s plots, men decided on 
the quantity to be used. In 11% of the women’s plots, men paid for the mineral fertilizers and in 
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4%, for the organic fertilizer, too. In 28% of the women’s plots, men decided on the pesticide to 
be used and paid for it in 12% of the women’s plots. 
In about 44% of the households, women reimburse to their husband the cost of the input 
provided. As input providers, men are somewhere decision makers of input choice and the timing 
of application on women’s plots. This creates a kind of dependency of women vis-à-vis men 
because of (i) a lack of financial means to buy their own input themselves, (ii) or a relative lack 
of experience compared to men’s with regard to input choice and the timing of application, as 
women are not used to do it, (iii) or men’s altruism. This limits the bargaining power of women. 
The control of income and the decision-making process within the household 
The large majority of the households leave the decision on how to spend a woman’s income to 
herself. In 21% of the households, women decide but with men’s advice, while in 3% of the 
households, it is the men. In 68% of the households, women use their horticultural revenue to 
satisfy both their own needs and family needs; in 26% of the households, only their own needs; in 
4% of the households, only family needs; and in 2% of the households, their husband’s needs. To 
recap, in the large majority of the households, women use their horticultural revenue for their 
own needs and/or family needs. Women do not co-decide on how men’s revenues are spent. This, 
however, is often spent on family needs, as feeding the family is men’s responsibility. 
2.2.4. The horticultural household livelihood or income gender-disaggregated 
Household horticultural income 
 A diversity of horticultural crops is grown by the households during the three main seasons. The 
first horticultural season, which is the most appropriate season with the lowest temperature (about 
20o C) and the greatest air humidity, is from around November to February. It is also the most 
important season, both in terms of the number of crops and the area grown. The second season is 
from around March to June. The third season is the period covering July to October; it 
corresponds to the rainy season and is the less important season in terms of the diversity of crops 
and the area covered. It is the most difficult period of production because of the high infestation 
of parasites and the high temperatures, to which some crops are not well adapted. Yet, as the 
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supply of horticultural crops decreases during the third season, the prices increase. This is a great 
motivation for the producers who increasingly step up their efforts to produce during the rainy 
season. While some horticultural households produce during all seasons and several crops per 
season, others limit their production to a few crops and one to two seasons. 
The revenue earned varies greatly from one season to another, from one household to another, 
and from men to women. For both men and women, the revenue decreases from season 1 to 
season 3. Men’s horticultural annual income ranges from fcfa 0 to 9,800,000, with a mean of fcfa 
1,400,000, while that of women varies from fcfa 0 to 4,720,000, with an average of fcfa 139,000. 
Accordingly, women earn far less than men. In more than 25% of the households, women do not 
have any horticultural income. 
About 75% of the households earn less than fcfa 2,000,000 per year from horticulture, and 90% 
of the households earn less than fcfa 4,000,000. There are some households where only men earn 
money from horticulture and others (basically female-headed), where only women have a 
horticultural income. Table 2.4 presents in detail the household horticultural revenue and its 
composition regarding gender and seasons. 
The household off-farm income earned by men and women 
Off-farm work is defined in this study as all work done other than working on the land plot. Thus, 
off-farm work includes cattle breeding. In about 45% of the households, no man is doing off-farm 
work. In the other 55% of the households, men are engaging in off-farm work such as cattle 
breeding (56/203 households), trade (52), a craft, fishing, transport, forestry, and wage earning. In 
about 55% of the households, there is no woman doing off-farm work while in the 45% 
remaining households, women are doing off-farm work such as trade (33% of the households), 
cattle breeding (15%), the processing of horticultural products, fishing, delivering, a craft, 
tailoring, weaving, and wage earning. 
The off-farm work provides income. Particularly trade constitutes a great source of income for 
both men and women. While in some households, the off-farm annual income is equal to zero, in 
the others, it can add up to a relatively great amount both for men (up to fcfa 6 million) and 
women (fcfa 2.6 million). In almost all of the households engaged in off-farm work (95%), men 
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as well as women found their off-farm annual income to be variable or even very variable over 
the years. From November 2004 to October 2005, the off-farm income was estimated on average 
at fcfa 321,000 for men and fcfa 162,000 for women. Men earn more than women, despite the 
latter’s strong engagement in off-farm activities, in particular in small trading businesses, 
specifically in the southern zone of Niayes and some parts of the central zone of Niayes, too. In 
these areas, instead of partaking in horticultural production, women engage in small-scale trading, 
mainly the trading of horticultural products. In this way, they are involved in the horticultural 
supply chain. 
The household remittance received  
As analysed earlier, some households have members who have migrated inside of Senegal or to 
European countries. These migrants, some of whom are even heads of household, send a 
remittance that can be considered as part of the household income. The remittance ranges from 
fcfa 0 to 1,2 million yearly, with a mean of fcfa 30,000. More than 90% of the households do not 
receive any remittance. The frequency of remittances ranges from 1 to 12 per year. 
 The household total net income 
The sum of the horticultural income, other agricultural income, the off-farm income and 
remittances gives the total annual income (table 2.4). It varies greatly for men, women and the 
household itself. Men’s total annual income ranges from fcfa 0 to 11,020,000, while that of 
women varies from fcfa 0 to 4,720,000. The household total annual minimum income is equal to 
fcfa 103,000 and the maximum is fcfa 11,020,000. This means that while some households earn a 
very low annual income, equivalent to 157 euro, others earn much more, about 16,824 euro. On 
average, men’s annual income is about fcfa 1,800,000 (2,748 euro) while women’s income is 
about fcfa 298,000 (455 euro). Consequently, the household annual income is on average about 
fcfa 2,100,000, equivalent to 3,206 euro. Thus, per day, the horticultural household income 
amount to about fcfa 5,753, equivalent to 8.7 euro and 13 US dollars. Divided by the household 
size, which is about 10 members, the daily income per member is about fcfa 575, or 0.8 euro or 
1.3 US dollars. This means that each household member earns less than 2 US dollars a day, which 
is the poverty threshold. It is, however, more than 1.25 US dollars, which is the new extreme 
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poverty line in developing economies (World Bank, 2009)9. Compared to the national poverty 
line estimated at fcfa 497 in rural areas, based on the national household survey in 2001/02 
(Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique et Banque Mondiale, 2002), horticultural 
households are living slightly above the poverty threshold. Nonetheless, compared to the majority 
of the other rural households growing non-horticultural crops and living with less than 1.25 US 
dollar a day, horticultural households can be considered as the wealthier group. Obviously, 
horticulture can be considered as an activity which can help to alleviate poverty. “Experience 
shows that horticulture can offer good opportunities for poverty reduction because it increases 
income and generates employment.” (Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007). 
Table 2.4: The household annual income and its composition over gender and season  
Share over 
gender (%) Share over seasons          (%) Variable 
Household 
annual income 
(fcfa) Men Women First 
season 
Second 
season 
Third 
season 
Mean 1,600,000 84.80 15.20 61.06 29.96 8.97 Horticultural 
annual income Std. dev. 1,700,000 26.00 26.00 24.19 21.32 14.39 
Mean 2,100,000 81.76 18.23    Total annual 
income Std. dev. 1,900,000 24.44 24.44    
Source: Own households survey, 2005-2006. 
Horticulture is the foremost source of income, both for men and women. The second source of 
income is off-farm work. The share of off-farm income is more consistent in women’s income 
than in that of men. Income generated by the other non-horticultural crops and remittances 
represents a tiny part of both men’s and women’s annual income, as can be seen from figure 2.1. 
                                               
9
 http://go.worldbank.org/CUQLLRX1Q0 
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Men annual income (%)
Horticultural 
crops, 76.5
Off farm work, 21
Remittance, 2
Non horticultural 
crops, 0.5
 
Women annual income (%)
Horticultural 
crops, 59
Off farm work, 
39.5
Remittance, 
0.2
Non 
horticultural 
crops, 1.3
 
Figure 2.1: Composition of men’s and women’s total annual income.  
2.3. Details on horticultural plots 
2.3.1. Plots and managers 
The data are considered as cross-sectional data, with the identifier variable household. In total, 
422 horticultural plots were surveyed in the Niayes Zone, managed by 279 producers, of which 
190 are men and 89 are women, distributed within 203 households. The number of plots range 
from 1 to 9 per household, from 1 to 5 per male plot manager and from 1 to 4 per female plot 
manager. The horticultural plot managers were chosen in such a way that they are dispersed in the 
northern zone of Niayes as well as in the centre and in the southern part. Within each household, 
next to men, women are managing their own separate plots, particularly in the northern zone of 
Niayes. In the centre and to a lesser extent in the south zone of Niayes, there are some women 
managing their own separate plots, but most of them just participate in men’s plots and do other 
off-farm work. This off-farm work consists mainly of the small-scale trading of horticultural 
crops they bought from their husband and other, surrounding households. 
Among the 422 plots, only 19 belong to households that are female-headed, while all the others 
belong to households that are male-headed. The female plots are 114 out of 422 plots (27%). 
Table 2.5 represents the distribution of plots by gender and zone. 
The social status of male plot managers is head of household, while female plot managers are 
mainly wives in a polygamous household, holding the status of first wife, second wife or third 
wife. Generally, the fourth wives did not live with their husband and the other wives. Only a few 
A Characterization of Horticultural Households 
 58 
female plot managers are head of household, or sisters, relatives, or mother of the head of 
household (table 2.5). 
Table 2.5: Distribution of plots over gender, zone and social status of the plot manager 
Managers 
Frequency  Percent Plots over zone and manager’s status 
Men Women Total  
Zone      
North 131 74 205 49 
Centre 83 10 93 22 
South 94 30 124 29 
Total 308 114 422 100 
Social status       
Household head  308 19 327 77.49 
First wife  52 52 12.32 
Second wife  28 28 6.64 
Third wife   8 8 1.90 
Sister or female relative  6 6 1.42 
Household head’s mother  1 1 0.23 
Total 308 114 422 100.00 
Source: Own households survey, 2005-2006. 
2.3.2. Horticultural crops  
Five of the most frequently cultivated crops, such as onion, cabbage, tomato, green bean and 
potato, were surveyed.  All these crops are destined for the national and sub-regional market. 
Only green bean is exported to European countries, mainly to France. Except potato, all the other 
crops are produced by both men and women, in the same order of frequency. Table 2.6 gives the 
overall distribution of the crops across men and women plots in the sample. 
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Table 2.6: Distribution of crops across men and women plot managers in the sample. 
Plot managers Crops 
Men Women Total 
Onion 
11010 
69.1811 
38.1912 
49 
30.82 
42.98 
159 
100.00 
39.55 
Cabbage 
100 
68.49 
34.72 
46 
31.51 
40.35 
146 
100.00 
36.32 
Tomato 
49 
75.38 
17.01 
16 
24.62 
14.04 
65 
100.00 
16.17 
Green bean 
16 
84.21 
5.56 
3 
15.79 
2.63 
19 
100.00 
4.73 
Potato 
13 
100.00 
4.51 
0 
0.00 
0.00 
13 
100.00 
3.21 
Total 
288 
71.64 
100.00 
114 
28.36 
100.00 
402 
100.00 
100.00 
2.3.3. The horticultural plots’ physical condition  
Plot area 
The plot area cropped varies greatly between households and within the household. Overall, the 
plot area ranges from 20 m2 to 1 hectare, with an average of less than 1/5 hectare. About 46% of 
the plot managers crop less than 1,000 m2, while 5% crops more than 4,000 m2. A gender 
disaggregation shows that, with an average of 460 m2, women’s plots are 4.7 times smaller than 
men’s plots, with an average of 2,184 m2. 
 
                                               
10
 Frequency. 
11
 Row percentage. 
12
 Column percentage. 
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The plots’ physical condition 
The plots’ soil suitability appreciation 
Overall, most of the plot managers found the quality or suitability of their soil to horticulture to 
be good (77%). Some others (22%) found it medium and very few found it bad (1%). The gender 
analysis reveals some difference, with fewer women appreciating their plot soil as good (72%) 
and more women qualifying it as medium (25%) and bad (3%), compared to the overall and 
men’s appreciation frequencies.  
The plots’ slope appreciation  
Overall, 84% of the plot managers well appreciate the slope of their plot. A gender disaggregation 
also shows that 81% of the male plot managers and 90% of the female plot managers found the 
slope of their plot favourable for cropping. This means that there is no a priori gender 
discrimination regarding access to good land. 
 The plots’ soil problem 
Overall, almost half of the plot managers affirmed having no soil fertility problem at all on their 
cropped plots. The others identified as soil fertility problem the scarcity of organic matter (37%), 
the salinity (7%), a nematode infestation (3%), and the acidity (2%). The number of women plot 
managers having no soil fertility problem on their plots (45%) is a little bit lower than that of men 
(50%). For both men and women, the soil problems remained the same in terms of order, but 
differ a little bit in terms of frequency. 
The distance from the house to the plot 
The distance from the plot to the house ranges globally, from 0.01 km to 8 km, with a mean of 
1.4 km. It varies greatly from one household to another, and less within the household. Women’s 
plots are nearer to the house, with a distance varying from 0.01 km to 5 km and an average of 
1.14 km, compared to men’s plots, which are located on average 1.45 km from the house. 
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In terms of the appreciation of the distance from the house to the field, globally, 33% of the plot 
managers found it near, for 45% it was acceptable, and for 22% it was far. There is no major 
gender difference in the appreciation of the distance. 
Conclusion:  To conclude, with respect to plot area and land ownership, a great gender gap 
occurs. Within the household, most of the female plot managers are not the owner of their land 
plot; it is mainly their husband’s property. In terms of the area, plots cropped by women are much 
smaller than those of men. However, regarding the physical condition of the plot, no major 
gender discrimination is noticed. In terms of the plots’ soil quality or suitability, the plots’ soil 
fertility problem, the plots’ slope as well as the distance from the plot to the house, women in any 
case are not in an unfavourable situation compared to men. 
2.3.4. An evaluation of the plot production cost 
Inputs used on men’s and women’s plots 
The quantities of inputs such as seed, organic fertilizer, urea, and NPK fertilizer vary greatly from 
men’s to women’s plots, between and within households. As can be seen from table 2.7, there is a 
great difference in the input used. The quantity of inputs and, consequently, the cost per hectare, 
are higher on women’s plots than on men’s plots. As a result, women surprisingly used inputs 
more intensively than men do. The mean difference between men’s plots and women’s plots in 
terms of the quantity and cost of the seeds, organic fertilizer, and urea used per hectare is negative 
and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However, the difference in NPK fertilizer 
and pesticide used on men’s and women’ plots is not significant even at  the 10% level (table 
2.7). 
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Table 2.7: Gender comparison of inputs used per hectare on men’s and women’s plots within 
households. 
Input quantity per plot (kg/ha) Input cost per plot (fcfa/ha) 
Men’s plots Women’s plots Men’s plots Women’s plots Variables input 
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean 
Seeds13 2.50 3.19 3.12 4.03** 166,666 197,081 195,000 330,155*** 
Organic 
fertilizer 
7,500 13,412 13,500 17,736** 110,000 142,118 145,000 177,448** 
Urea fertilizer 340 467 500 704.34*** 82,725 113,119 110,000 165,472*** 
NPK fertilizer 310 413 310 450.05 60,000 74,763 66,666 85,728 
Pesticides     40,000 70,039 50,000 85,158 
***, ** Gender mean difference significant, respectively, at the 1% and 5% level. 
Conclusion: Taking into account the plot area, women use inputs more intensively than men. In 
terms of decision-making about the use of inputs, some women still remain dependent on their 
husband. To restore soil fertility and particularly organic matter, and to have a good yield, both 
male and femlae horticultural producers use a lot of organic and mineral fertilizers, which casts 
doubt on the quality or appropriateness of the formula of the mineral fertilizers. Moreover, the 
excessive doses of mineral fertilizers used contribute to increasing the acidity of both the soil and 
water table, which is becoming a great environmental and public health problem.  
Water used on men’s and women’s plots 
Water sources used for irrigation  
The sources of water used for irrigation vary, depending on the household’s financial capacity 
and access to information, but also on the zone and the proximity of the water table. 
Consequently, in the centre zone of Niayes, where the water table is high, households are using 
traditional non-cemented wells and trench wells. In the north and south zones of Niayes, on the 
other hand, where the water table is very deep (up to 10 metres), households use cemented wells 
and water from the SDE (the Water Corporation), respectively. 
                                               
13
 For seed, only cabbage, tomato, and onion are accounted for. Potato and green bean are not considered because the 
type of seed is not similar to the previous ones.  
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The number of traditional wells per plot ranges from 1 to 7 for men and from 1 to 3 for women. 
As in most cases the land belongs to men, so do the wells. Among the 35 out of 114 women using 
traditional wells, only 11 are the owners. The number of wells per hectare is 72 on average. 
Hydraulic wells or cemented wells are used mainly in the north zone of Niayes and in part of the 
south; 65% of the male plot managers used it, with a number varying from 1 to 30 wells per plot 
and with an average of 60 wells per hectare. Among female plot managers, 76% used from 1 to 6 
hydraulic wells per plot, but only 24% of these women own their hydraulic wells.  
Micro tube wells or boreholes are used only by three men plot managers. In the south zone of 
Niayes, water from the SDE corporation is used by 5% of the plot managers. This involves 21 
plot managers, of whom 17 are men and 4 are women. 
Irrigation equipment used on the plot 
The sources of water as well as the irrigation equipment used vary greatly, not only from one 
zone to another, but also between and within households, depending on the gender of the plot 
manager. For instance, in the centre zone of Niayes, where motorized pumps are used for 
irrigation, none of the women plot managers has a motorized pump for irrigation, whereas 22.5% 
of the male plot managers do have one. The women use buckets, ropes and pulleys to fetch water 
from wells and for irrigation. Twenty percent of the male plot managers used a garden hose as 
watering material, while none of the women used it. Twelve out of 288 men and 3 out of 113 
women plot managers use a sprinkler for watering. Only 6 men and 1 woman use a drip system, 
covering 1,000 to 5,000 m2. A proportion of 9.3% of male plot managers use 1 to 52 basins to 
water their plot, versus 2.6% of the female plot managers, who use 1 to 3 basins. 
Conclusion 
The sources of water and the irrigation equipment vary greatly from one zone to another, between 
and within households. In terms of the appreciation of water availability and water quality by 
men and women plot managers, we have found no major difference. However, while some men 
plot managers used some improved, less time-consuming irrigation equipment, like a motor 
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pump, women are still using buckets, ropes and pulleys for irrigation. Subsequently, there is a 
gender gap in terms of irrigation equipment used and regarding the ownership of water sources. 
Labour used on the plot 
On some plots, only household labour is used, while on others, the managers in addition use hired 
labour as well. Labour is hired under a wage contract or sharecropping contract. 
Labour on plots under household labour  
The household members working on the plot consist of the plot manager him- or herself, spouses, 
sons, daughters, and other parents or relatives (brother, sister, mother, nephew, niece …). The 
time spent by these household members varies from men’s plots to women’s plots within 
households as well as between households. On average, men plot managers spend 177 hours on 
their plot, whereas women plot managers spend 265 hours. Despite the fact that women’s plots 
are smaller than those of the men, women spend more time working on it. In addition, women 
spend 32 hours on their husband’s plots, while men spend 8 hours on their wives’ plots. This can 
be explained by the fact that the men are polygamous, which means that they have one to three 
wives working on their plots. While sons work more on their father’s plots than on their mother’s 
plots, daughters work more on their mother’s plots than on their father’s plots. Other household 
members spend more time on men’s plots than on women’s plots. In total, more time is spent by 
household members on men’s plots than on women’s plots (table 2.8). 
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Table 2.8: Time spent per plot and season by household members working on men’s and 
women’s plots over plots under household labour.  
Men’s plots Women’s plots 
Time (hours) Time share (%) Time (hours) Time share (%) Household 
members Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Plot manager 177 224 30 34 265 201 59 36 
Spouses 32 128 3 6 8 10 2 2 
Sons 623 1811 49 40 69 208 13 26 
Daughters 49 178 5 15 106 194 19 32 
Other members 162 459 13 26 37 116 7 22 
Total 1048 1425 100  486 298 100  
Observation (plot) 153 96 
Regarding the different cropping operations, on men’s plots as well as on women’s plots, 
watering is the most time-consuming operation. Watering takes 873 hours of household working 
time on men’s plots and 422 hours on women’s plots. In terms of the share of total working time 
of household members, watering represents 75% and 85% respectively on men’s plots and 
women’s plot. This means that watering takes more time on average on women’s plots. This can 
be explained by the difference in irrigation technology used. In fact, women do not have access to 
a motorized pump or other more sophisticated irrigation material as do men. On men’s plots, the 
use of a motor pump reduces the time spent by household labour per cropped area by 39%. 
Transplanting, weeding, and harvesting come in second in terms of time consumption (table 2.9). 
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Table 2.9: Time spent per cropping operation by household members working on men’s and 
women’s plots under household labour. 
Men’s plots Women’s plots 
Time (hours) Time share (%) Time (hours) Time share (%) 
Cropping 
operations 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Nursery bed 13 22 2 3 6 5 1 1 
Land preparation 28 42 3 3 8 13 2 2 
Transplanting 38 40 5 7 20 36 4 6 
Watering 873 1806 75 21 422 281 85 8 
Weeding 42 57 6 8 11 15 3 3 
Fertilizing 9 13 2 7 3 3 1 1 
Plant treatment 6 12 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Harvesting 39 47 6 8 14 9 3 3 
Total 1048 1425 100  486 298 100  
Labour on plots under a hired wage labour contract 
On 29 out of 422 plots, hired wage labour is used; this is about 7% of the plots. Among the 29 
plots, 26 are men’s and 3 are women’s. The number of workers hired per plot ranges from 1 to 8 
on men’s plots and from 1 to 2 on women’s plots. The hired wage workers are men. The contract 
duration is 3 months for 86% of the plot managers. For some crops, it can be a shorter (2 months) 
or a more extended (4 months) period. Plot managers provide hired workers with facilities, such 
as food provision, housing, health care and others, like a telephone. The most costly facility is 
food provision, which amounts on average and per season to fcfa 91,788 on men’s plots and fcfa 
75,000 on women’s plots. Housing costs about fcfa 10,000 for both men’s and women’s plots.  
The time spent by wage workers is higher on men’s plots than on women’s plots. In most of the 
cases, hired wage labour is paid at the end of the cropping season rather than monthly. This 
means it is paid after the harvesting and selling of the production on both men’s plots (77% of the 
cases) and women’s plots (67%). The total cost of wage labour per plot, including facilities, is on 
average fcfa 223,000 on men’s plots and fcfa 186,000 on women’s plots. The monthly wage per 
hired worker is on average more or less the same on men’s and on women’s plots (table 2.10). 
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Labour on plots under a sharecropping labour contract 
Under a sharecropping contract, the landowner provides all the required inputs and some 
facilities, such as housing, food and health care to the sharecropper. In return, the sharecroppers 
provide their labour force and expertise to produce. At the end of the season, the profit of the 
production is divided equally over the landowner and the sharecropper. 
About 31% of the plot managers use labour based on a sharecropping contract. A total of 110 out 
of 288 men’s plots (38%) and 14 out of 113 women’s plots (12%) are under sharecropping 
labour. The number of sharecroppers used ranges from 1 to 10 on men’s plots and 1 to 3 on 
women’s plots. The sharecroppers came from the other regions of Senegal (80.5%), from 
neighbouring countries such as Mali, Guinea Conakry, Bissau Guinea, Burkina Faso (8.5%), or 
both from inside and outside of Senegal for the same plot manager (11%). The average age of 
sharecroppers ranges from 22 to 30 years, with a minimum age of 12 and a maximum age of 49. 
A proportion of 54% of the plot managers provides to sharecroppers both feeding and housing 
facilities, while 30% provides food, housing, and health care facilities, and 8% provides only 
feeding facilities. Only 8% of the plot managers do not provide any facility; this occurs when 
sharecropper lives in the same village as the plot-managing landowner. 
The sharecroppers’ total working time per cropping season is on average 1,325 hours for an 
average of 2 sharecroppers on men’s plots, against 589 hours for an average of 1.1 sharecroppers 
on women’s plots. The average payment per sharecropper is greater on men’s plots than on 
women’s plots; this difference is significant at the 10% level. Sharecroppers earn more on men’s 
plots than on women’s plots. Per hour, a sharecropper earns on average fcfa 262 on men’s plots 
and fcfa 194 on women’s plots. Including the cost of all facilities provided or in-kind payments 
(food, housing …), the average wage rate per hour and per sharecropper amounts to fcfa 584 on 
men’s plots and fcfa 466 on women’s plots. 
A worker hired under a sharecropping contract earns more per season than a worker hired under a 
wage contract, both on men’s and women’s plots. However, as sharecroppers work more than 
wage workers in terms of time, their average wage rates per hour are comparable (table 2.10). 
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Even on plots under a sharecropping or wage labour contract, household labour contributes to 
time-consuming cropping operations such as transplanting, weeding, and harvesting. The time 
spent by household labour on plots based on wage labour is greater than that on plots based on 
sharecropping labour for both men’s and women’s plots. On plots under a wage labour contract, 
not only household labour contributes more to the work, but in addition, the plot manager also 
spends time supervising the hired workers. Table 2.10 recapitulates the time spent by labour and 
the wage paid by a household to labour over gender and labour contract. 
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Table 2.10: Labour time and wage over plots under household labour, a wage labour contract and 
a sharecropping labour contract.  
Men’s plots Women’s plots 
Labour time and wage  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Labour time     
Plots under household labour     
Total labour time per plot and season (hr) 1048 1425 486 298 
Observations (plots) 153  96  
Plots under a wage labour contract     
Hired wage workers’ time per plot and season  (hr)  536 589 353 295 
Household labour time per plot and season (hr) 666 551 533 558 
Total labour time per plot and season (hr) 1028   708 822 495 
Observations (plots) 26  3  
Plots under a sharecropping contract     
Sharecroppers’ time per plot and season  (hr)  1325 1492 589 157 
Household labour time per plot and season (hr) 246 402 84 64 
Total labour time per plot and season (hr) 1552 1553 650 267 
Observations (plots) 110  14  
Wage or payment      
Wage labour     
Monthly wage per worker (fcfa/month)  23,425 12,202  20,000 0 
Seasonal wage per worker (fcfa/season) 68,545   37,643  60,000 0 
Total wage paid per plot (fcfa) 117,980   79,595  100,000   34,641 
Wage paid per hour and worker (fcfa) 283  211  
Working time per hectare (hours/ha) 1,697 1,725  425 193 
Total wage paid per hectare (fcfa/ha) 315,865   172,399      200,000 69,282 
Sharecropping labour      
Seasonal payment per sharecropper (fcfa)  140,008 67,825              107,057    68,469      
Total payment of sharecroppers (fcfa/plot) 347,763 462,871 114,200 67,264 
Wage per hour and per sharecropper (fcfa) 262  194  
Working time per hectare (hour/ha)  2,481   4,505  1,240    5,414          
Total payment per hectare (fcfa) 1,514,172 972,153 1,533,564 563,223 
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2.3.5. Evaluating the output of the plot  
The production and yield per plot 
The ratio production and plot area gives the yield, which permits us to make an appropriate 
comparison between men and women plot managers. Since the crops (onion, cabbage, tomato, 
green bean, and potato) are all vegetables and have a similar average yield per hectare, it is 
possible to compare their yield together. For all crops, women’s plots yield on average 2.8 kg/m2, 
while men’s plots yield 2.3 kg/m2; per hectare, this is 28,979 kg and 23,277 kg, respectively. This 
difference is significant at the 1% level. Women’s plots are smaller than men’s plots but yield 
more per hectare, as can be seen from the box plot graph (figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: Box plots of yield and plot size over the gender of the plot manager. 
The analysis of the yield evolution between 2004 and 2006 shows that women’s plots yield more 
than men’s plots. The yield varies over the years, but the same tendency is observed for both men 
and women for all crops and for onion (figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3: Gender comparison of the yield evolution over years. 
The output price 
For most horticultural crops, the harvest does not take place in one go, but is spread over time. 
The same goes for the selling. Globally, the number of sales corresponding to the number of 
(partial) harvests ranges from 1 to 10 per crop and plot. Because of a lack of storage and 
conservation means, the horticultural production harvested is usually sold automatically at the 
field gate or at the markets. The selling price varies greatly (fcfa/kg 134 to 340) between 
households as well as within households and from men to women (figure 2.4). The selling price 
also changes greatly from one harvesting to the next one (fcfa/kg 213 to 268), which usually takes 
three days to one week and two weeks for the last harvesting. This high price volatility is one of 
the major risks men and women producers face. Surprisingly, for overall crops, the women’s 
selling prices are almost always higher than those of the men. While for some crops, like onion, 
the husband usually does the selling, for others, such as tomato and cabbage, the women mostly 
do the selling. The latter do their selling generally in retail, which allows them to have a better 
price compared to the men, who sell the production in wholesale. While the women’s crops’ 
selling prices increase over time, or from the first to the last harvest, the men’s crops’ selling 
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prices decrease. This can be seen from graph 2.4 for all crops (onion, cabbage, tomato, green 
bean and potato) on 402 plots and for tomato on 65 plots. 
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Figure 2.4: Gender comparison of horticultural crops’ selling price over harvesting sequence per 
plot. 
The output in value or revenue 
Women earn from their plot fcfa 465 per m2, while men earn fcfa 396 per m2 on average for all 
crops. In percent, women’s plots bring 17% more output in value per hectare than men’s plots do. 
The difference is significant at the 5% level (table 2.11). Moreover, the output in value or revenue 
varies greatly for each of the crops from one plot manager to another, for both men and women. 
In percent, the difference of output in value per hectare between women’s and men’s plots is 15% 
for onion, 13% for cabbage, 22% for tomato, and 0% for green bean. Nevertheless, the difference 
remains not significantly different from zero even at the 10% level for each of the crops (table 
2.11). 
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Table 2.11: Output in value per plot, per hectare, and per crop on men’s and women’s plots. 
Output in value per hectare (in 1000 fcfa/ha) 
Men’s plots Women’s plots 
Crops 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
All crops 3,964 3,005 4,656 2,520 
Onion 4,380 2,952 5,057 2,785 
Cabbage 3,847 3,004 4,361 2,129 
Tomato 3,762 2,718 4,615 2,743 
Potato 2,508 1,424   
Green bean 2,640 1,641 2,648 808 
Conclusion: The horticultural market is characterized by a high variability of the price over time. 
Taking into account the area, the revenue per hectare is 17% higher on women’s plots than on 
men’s plots. 
2.3.6. Seasonal effects: a gender comparison of the yield over crop and season 
For onion, the yield decreases from season one (November - February) to season two (March - 
June) both on men’s and women’s plots. A gender comparison indicates that women’s plots yield 
more than men’s plots do for each season, but the difference is significant at the 1% level only on 
season one. For cabbage, the yield of men’s plots is almost the same for seasons one and two and 
lower in season three, while the yield of women’s plots is roughly equal for seasons one and three 
(July - October) and higher in season two. For all three seasons, women’s plots yield more 
cabbage than men’s plots do, but the difference is not significant even at the 10% level. For 
tomato, on men’s plots, the highest yield is observed in season two, followed by seasons one and 
three. Women’s plots yield more in season one than in season three for tomato. In the sample, 
there is no woman producing tomato in season two and for season three, the number of 
observations does not allow to do a comparison test. For season one, women’s plots’ yield is 
higher than that of men’s plots’ yield, but the difference remains not significant even at the 10% 
level. Green bean is cropped only in season one, which is the most appropriate period for 
production and export. The difference of the green bean yield between men’s and women’s plots 
is not significantly different from zero even at the 10% level (table 2.12). 
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Furthermore, for overall crops, for both men’s and women’s plots, the output in value per hectare 
rises from season one to season three. For each season, the output in value per hectare is higher 
on women’s plot than on men’s plots, with the difference being significant at the 10% level 
particularly for seasons one and two. Controlling for onion, the output in value per hectare is 
higher in season one than in season two for both men and women. The production of onion is not 
adapted to season three, corresponding to the rainy season. The seasonal comparison also shows 
that women’s output value per hectare is not significantly higher than that of men for the first and 
second seasons. 
Both men and women produce cabbage during the three seasons. For both groups, the greatest 
output in value per hectare is obtained in season three. As mentioned previously, season three is 
evidently the most difficult period due to the rainy season, which is characterized by high 
pressure from plant parasites. More and more, with the newly-adapted seed varieties of cabbage, 
the production during season three is better controlled by producers, while the high price, due to a 
low supply, is a great source of motivation. The women’s output in value per hectare is higher in 
season two than in season one, contrary to that of the men. For all the seasons, the women’s 
output in value per hectare is higher than that of the men, but the difference is only significant for 
season two at the 5% level.  
For tomato, the mean output in value per hectare is increasing from season one to season three for 
men, while it is just the opposite for women. In season one, women’s output per hectare is 
superior to that of men but the difference is not significant even at the 10% level. For green bean, 
men’s and women’s output in value per hectare is roughly the same (table 2.12). 
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Table 2.12: Comparison per crop and season of yield in quantity and in value per hectare over 
men’s and women’s plots. 
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 
Yield Crops Men’s 
plots 
Women’s 
plots 
Men’s 
plots 
Women’s 
plots 
Men’s 
plots 
Women’s 
plots 
Onion  25,026 33,032 23,998 27,942   
Cabbage  24,148 26,702 24,312 30,160 21,473 27,000 
Tomato 24,367 29,443 28,763    21,308 24,000 
Potato 17,088        
kg/ha 
Green bean  10,184 10,050     
Onion  4,413 5,199 4,318 4,701   
Cabbage  3,450 3,658 3,449 5,464 5,928 9,173 
Tomato 3,513 4,671 3,906     4,187 3,770 
Potato 2,508         
1000 
fcfa/ha 
 
Green bean  2,640 2,648     
Note: In bold, gender difference significant at the 5% level. 
Conclusion: To sum up, the yield per hectare varies from one season to another. For both men 
and women, season one and two recorded the highest yield in quantity. Inversely, as the output 
price rises from season one to season three due to a low supply, it results in an increasing output 
in value. Except for green bean, for all the other crops, women’s plots yield more per hectare in 
quantity and in value than men’s plots do for each of the seasons, but the difference is mostly not 
significant at the 10% level. 
2.3.7. The profitability of crops across gender  
The revenue per hectare minus the total costs per hectare of inputs, including seeds, mineral and 
organic fertilizers, pesticides, water (the connection to the water corporation), fuel (for the motor 
pump), hired wage labour and sharecropping labour, gives the profit per hectare. The costs of the 
depreciation of the equipment and household labour are not accounted for. On average, for all 
crops (onion, cabbage, tomato, green bean, and potato), the profit per hectare is fcfa 2.6 million 
on men’s plots and fcfa 3.7 million on women’s plots. Consequently, the profit is 40% higher on 
women’s plots than on men’s plots; this gender difference is significant at the 1% level. 
Controlling for crop, a similar significant gender difference in profit is observed for onion and 
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cabbage (table 2.13). For both men and women, the highest profit is realized with onion, but the 
difference is only significant with green bean and potato. 
Table 2.13: Comparison of profit per hectare across crops, gender, and labour. 
Men’s plots (in 1000 fcfa/ha) Women’s plots (in 1000 fcfa/ha) 
Variables  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
All crops 2,638         2,696 3,699         2,543*** 
Onion  2,871        2,327 4,162         2,823*** 
Cabbage  2,659      2,942 3,381         2,100* 
Tomato 2,504         2,587 3,554          2,749 
Potato  1,214          1,482   
Green bean 1,572          1,255 1,571           1,344 
***, **, * gender difference significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Altogether, this descriptive chapter brings to the fore three issues: 
1) A great gender gap occurs in the resource and assets allocation, particularly with regard to 
access to land and irrigation equipment. Mainly the men are the owners of land within the 
household. In 60% of the households, women are really involved in horticulture, managing 
their own piece of land, which is usually allocated to them by their husband. Women’s plots 
are 4.7 times smaller than men’s plots are. With this small plot size, the intensity of inputs 
used is higher on women’s plots than on men’s plots. As a result, women’s plots yield 17% 
more in terms of the output in value per hectare and 40% more in terms of the profit per 
hectare than men’s plots do. Does this imply that women are more efficient than men? This 
raises the problem of the optimality of the allocation of household resource between men and 
women. 
 
2) The horticultural production is so labour-intensive that household labour is not always 
sufficient. In addition to household labour, some households have recourse to hired labour. 
However, while some households hire labour based on a sharecropping contract, others hire 
labour based on a wage contract. The returns to a sharecropper from sharecropping per season 
are on average higher than the seasonal wage paid by the household to a wage worker. 
Moreover, the most time-consuming cropping operation is irrigation, which takes 75% and 
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85% of the total working time of household members on men’s plots and women’s plots, 
respectively. Thus, the time-share of irrigation is on average higher on women’s plots than on 
men’s plots, because women do not have access to improved irrigation equipment, like a 
motor pump. A comparison of men’s plots irrigated and non-irrigated with a motor pump 
shows a decrease by 39% of the working time spent by household members per cropped area 
when a motor pump is used. Such a context calls for an investigation of the reasons behind 
the choice of a labour contract, based either on a sharecropping contract or a wage contract. 
Such a context calls for investigation of the reasons behind the choice of labour contract 
either based on a sharecropping contract or a wage contract and allowing for the use of 
labour-saving irrigation equipment like a motor pump. With regard to a household’s profit 
optimization, what is the efficient labour choice, especially in view of the use of a motor 
pump?  
 
3) The horticultural marketing context is characterized by a high variability of the output price, 
which is a major risk that men and women plot managers within a household have to tackle 
when producing. For the same plot and crop, the selling price of the production varies greatly 
from one harvesting sequence to the next one, which takes no more than a few days. Such a 
risky marketing context raises some questions: how do men and women or husband and wives 
behave when confronting this output market price risk? To what extent are men’s and 
women’s risk preferences related to their individual and household characteristics? How does 
their risk behaviour regarding output market price impact upon their economic performance, 
and particularly on their efficiency in their use of inputs and choice of labour contract? 
To find out the answers to all these research questions, raised by this descriptive chapter, is the 
objective of the next analytical chapters. 
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3.1.   Introduction 
The economics of the intra-household allocation of resource has undergone substantial changes 
over the last decades. After the introduction by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker of the New 
Household Economics, in which he distinguished activities within the household from those 
outside the household, the approach has changed considerably. While Becker maintained a single 
objective function for the household, later analyses (McElroy and Horney, 1981; Manser and 
Brown, 1980) considered households as collective decision-making units. A decision of this unit 
was seen as the result of bargaining between individual household members. Within this context, 
the unitary household model would result only as a special case (Alderman et al., 1995). The 
collective decision model predicted that individual consumption not just depends on the 
collective income, but also on the individual’s own contribution to this income. 
More recent studies, such as those by Chiappori (1997), did no longer focus on the distribution of 
power within the household but on the Pareto efficiency of the allocation. Within the household, a 
Pareto efficiency of the allocation of resource arises if there is no way to reallocate the resource 
to make some members better off without making somebody else worse off. In many 
applications, the allocation of resource in these models came out as efficient, even though income 
pooling would be rejected (Fafchamps, 1998). Many of the approaches focused on the 
distribution of consumption goods, and while Chiappori’s model related to the labour supply of 
husband and wife, this was done in an otherwise perfect market setting. 
A model that relates to production efficiency within the household is that of Udry (1996). He has 
shown that yields of plots under the control of women and the control of young adults in 
Burkinabe rural households were substantially lower than those of the plots of the (male) head of 
the household. The difference in yield and in the technical efficiency of male and female farmers 
is a result of lower levels of input use on women’s plots, and not of inherent managerial 
differences between men and women farmers (Adesina and Djato, 1996; Udry, 1996). As 
illustration, studies carried out in Kenya, Thailand and Korea show that, controlling for 
education, age, and levels of land, labour, fertilizer and other inputs, female farmers are as 
efficient as male farmers are (Quisumbing et al., 1998; see also Deere et al., 2004, for Latin 
America). Yet, as mentioned above, the distribution of resources within the household may be 
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such that the household as a whole is inefficient (Udry, 1996). These results cast doubt on both 
the collective and the unitary model of the farm household, at least where efficiency is concerned. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the efficiency of the distribution of resources within 
horticultural households in Senegal. With the gender-disaggregated data collected, this chapter 
also aims at showing the extent to which the economic performance of the wives deviated from 
that of the husband heads of household. This chapter intends to shed light on the gender 
differential between men and women heads of household as well as between the men themselves, 
whether they manage their plots separately or jointly with their wives, and between the women 
themselves, depending on their social status. To attain these objectives requires the application of 
gender-specific economic models to the horticultural households. In doing so, this chapter 
provides key evidence contributing to an evaluation of the unitary model by illustrating its 
weaknesses. 
As Quisumbing has mentioned, “Despite evidence rejecting the unitary model, the body of 
research from which generalizations can be drawn is limited. Few studies have been replicated 
over a range of conditions and cultures (Haddad et al., 1997). Other factors besides policy clearly 
affect intra-household allocation, such as the extended family, community, and other social 
groups. More important, existing empirical work in economics may not adequately capture the 
specific cultural contexts in which individuals within households and families make decisions.” 
Using gender-specific stochastic frontier production functions, we have found that women plot 
managers are as technically efficient as men plot managers are, but neither men nor women are 
fully technically or allocatively efficient. From the findings, it can be concluded that, from a 
household perspective, an optimality or allocative efficiency that corresponds to the situation in 
which an equality of the value of the marginal product of the inputs between men and women’s 
plots within the household occurs, is far from being achieved for all the inputs. Some 
improvements can be made in the allocation of inputs, labour, and capital irrigation equipment 
between men’s and women’s plots, taking into account the value of marginal products. These 
findings call for some policy implications to become more gender-sensitive, in order to improve 
men’s and women’s ability to manage their productive resources more efficiently. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. After a review of the literature in the next 
section, this chapter proceeds to the measurement of the economic performance of men and 
women plot managers, using indicators such as technical and allocative efficiency to capture and 
explain the gender differential. Thus, sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the model used and the 
empirical specifications. Section 3.5 briefly presents the gender-disaggregated data used for the 
estimation. Based on the empirical results presented in section 3.6, we will draw a conclusion 
with some policy implications to end this chapter. 
3.2.   Literature review 
Intra-household resource allocation is marked by gender inequalities. To provide a good 
understanding of the scientific significance of this research, a review of the literature is done 
while focusing on two fields:  
 The economics of household resource allocation and gender; 
 Efficiency as an indicator of performance. 
3.2.1. Economics of household resource allocation and gender  
Intra-household resource allocation refers to the processes by which resources are distributed 
among individual household members and the outcomes of those processes (Quisumbing, 2003). 
Becker has pioneered the investigation of intra-household resource allocation and has initiated the 
“New Household Economics” (NHE). According to the NHE, a household can be considered as a 
unit maximising the joint utility of its different members (Akram-Lodhi, 1997). This approach, 
named the “unitary household model”, derives its label from the fact that the household is 
supposed to act as one or, in other words, to behave as a homogeneous, single entity. 
Consequently, in the theoretical approach of the NHE, household preferences are represented by a 
single welfare function. The unitary household model is based on the assumptions that all 
household resources are pooled and that all expenditures are paid out of pooled income (Haddad 
et al., 1994).  
Much policy analysis was based on Becker’s approach, which assumes that the household has a 
single set of preferences, represented by a household utility function (Haddad et al., 1994). The 
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household unitary model has been the dominant model used by neoclassical economists as a 
theoretical as well as an empirical tool in the examination of intra-household resource allocation 
(Akram-Lodhi, 1997). However, despite its predictive power and its relative simplicity, the 
unitary household model has been criticised by several authors (Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Udry, 
1996; Haddad et al., 1994; Akram-Lodhi, 1997; Fafchamps, 1998). Equating the household with 
one person, household economic theory carries a gender bias, implicitly assuming that the 
individual making the decision and orchestrating the strategy is the man (Niehof, 1999; Akram-
Lodhi, 1997). 
Numerous policy levers that are normally able to address development problems did not provide 
the expected impacts because they were disabled by the assumption that households act as one 
(Quisimbing, 2003). Many development projects and programmes were concentrated on the male 
head of household, presuming that he would distribute development benefits within the 
household unit. Over the past decades, studies have demonstrated not only that individuals within 
a household make decisions to maximize their individual goals, but also that these goals may 
even be antithetical to those asserted for the household as a unified entity (Henderson, 1995). 
In a gender approach to the household, the division of labour within the household is considered 
as based on gender, as is the access to and control over resources (Niehof, 1999). Obviously, 
households reproduce gender roles. No matter where they are located or how they are organized, 
households recurrently broadcast gender roles to the next generations (Niehof, 1999). The first 
place of gender specialization is households, passing along knowledge, skills, and social 
expectations (World Bank, 2001). Children acquire a gender identity that moulds the set of 
socially acceptable activities for women and men and the relations between them (World Bank, 
2001). 
Ultimate decision making within farm households on the allocation of resources may be linked to 
the control of property, resources and income (Akram-Lodhi, 1997). The control of these 
resources confers relative power on certain specific individuals operating in the household and, 
subsequently, may establish intra-household gender asymmetries (Akram-Lodhi, 1997). It is 
apparent that in order to understand these social relations of gender, it is required to move beyond 
the unitary model and into the household itself, by examining the ways in which relative power is 
Household Resource Allocation, Gender and Economic Performance 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 83 
socially constructed and expressed (Akram-Lodhi, 1997). In this regard, the approach of the new 
household economics is a failure (Akram-Lodhi, 1997). 
The NHE unitary approach lacks a gender perspective. Other alternative models called "collective 
models" have been developed and used by neo-classical economists (Manser and Brown, 1980; 
McElroy and Horney, 1981) to analyse intra-household resource allocation. The collective 
models can be divided into cooperative and non-cooperative models on the one hand, and 
bargaining models on the other (Haddad et al., 1994). However, even if the non-cooperative 
models can be considered more convenient than the cooperatives ones, they still have some limits 
with regard to figuring out the inequality in terms of resource allocation and power in the 
decision-making process. These inequalities may be revealed by conflict and consensus within 
the household (Akram-Lodhi, 2005) and can be analysed with the bargaining models. 
Farm households must have implicit objectives, which motivate rational behaviour. At the very 
least, they need to survive by fulfilling certain fundamental, basic needs. However, in fulfilling 
those needs, household members may in many instances attempt to make separate decisions 
concerning the use of gender-specific decisions and gender-specific production functions in 
pursuit of gender-specific preferences. It would be better to say that the farm household does not 
have a single production function, but rather has gender-specific production functions (Evans, 
1991, Akram-Lodhi, 1997), because the technology used by men and women within the 
household may be different. The production function measures the maximum possible output that 
the producer can obtain from a given combination of inputs, which may vary across gender. 
One of the scientific contributions of this research lies in testing this assertion by comparing 
unitary and gender-specific production functions, and broadly, unitary and gender-specific 
economic models. Next, it tests the Pareto efficiency of the household resource allocation 
between male and female plot managers while analysing their economic performance. This 
economic performance is measured using their technical and allocative efficiency as indicators. 
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3.2.2. Efficiency as an indicator of performance 
The explanation of farm performance has been the subject of a multitude of studies, and those 
focusing particularly on efficiency constitute a main category within that multitude (Bremmer, 
2004). Substantial literature has been devoted to the evaluation of efficiency since the pioneering 
work of Farrell in 1957 (Audibert, 1997). Even in the African region, over the past decades, 
significant research has scrutinized agricultural efficiency (Seidu, 2008; Kamau, 2007; Tesfay, 
2006; Chavas et al., 2005; Ndoye-Niane, 2002; Audibert, 1997; Adesina et al., 1996 ..). The 
experience of structural adjustment programmes since the 1980s shows how particularly 
important farm household efficiency is to the African rural economy (Abdulai et al., 2000). 
The distinction between ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ is that “effectiveness” means “doing the 
right things”, while “efficiency” means “doing the things right” (Anderson, 1987). Accordingly, 
effectiveness implies an ability to choose appropriate objectives and goals, while efficiency is an 
‘input-output’ objective. The question of how to evaluate efficiency has received considerable 
attention in economic literature. Efficiency can be defined as the ability to produce a given level 
of output at the lowest cost. The traditional concept of efficiency, as defined by Farrell (1957), 
has three components:  
 Technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximum output from 
a given set of inputs, or the capacity to use minimum input to produce a given set of 
outputs. Then, technical efficiency is attained when the best available technology is used. 
In this chapter, the technical efficiency across gender will be assessed in section 3.6.3 
 Allocative efficiency, which exhibits the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal 
proportions, given their respective prices and the production technology. In other words, 
allocative efficiency deals with the extent to which farmers make efficient decisions by 
using inputs up to the level at which their marginal contribution to the production value is 
equal to the factor cost. Consequently, taking market prices as given, allocative efficiency 
holds when resource allocation decisions minimize the cost, and maximize the revenue or 
profit. The allocative efficiency will be examined in section 3.6.2. 
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 Economic efficiency, which is the combination of technical, allocative and scale 
efficiency. Economic efficiency, at the micro level, refers to the ability of firms to utilize 
the best available technology and to allocate resources productively. It is possible for a 
firm to exhibit either technical efficiency or allocative efficiency without having 
economic efficiency. Therefore, both technical and allocative efficiency are necessary 
conditions for achieving economic efficiency (Coelli et al., 1998; Bremmer, 2004; 
Adesina and Djato, 1996; Ruben, 1997; Abdulai and Huffman, 2000). 
The production frontier represents the maximum possible output level related to the given input 
level, connecting the efficient firms. Firms produce either on that frontier if they are technically 
efficient, or beneath that frontier if they are technically inefficient (Bremmer, 2004). Efficiency 
measures can be input-oriented or output-oriented. 
In the efficiency literature, a large number of studies explain efficiency using a two-stage 
approach. The first stage calculates the individual level of efficiency, whereas the second stage 
explains efficiency by means of a set of socioeconomic and environmental variables. Preferably, 
all variables representing input and output have to be included in the first stage (Bremmer, 2004; 
Chavas et al., 2005).  
Within the household, Pareto efficiency of the allocation of resource arises if there is no way to 
reallocate the resource to make some members better off without making somebody else worse 
off. As pointed out by Alderman et al. (1995), many household models are based on the 
assumption that the allocation of resource is Pareto-efficient. This implies that the distributional 
implications of household resource allocation and gender are not related to productive efficiency 
(Alderman et al., 1995). This chapter intends to investigate these issues. 
3.3.   Gendering efficiency modelling  
The measurement of efficiency is generally based on parametric and non-parametric methods. 
While the parametric approach assumes an explicit functional relationship between output and 
inputs, the non-parametric approach did not assume any a priori functional form between inputs 
and outputs and sets a linear, piecewise function from empirical observations. The parametric 
method, like the stochastic frontier, involves the use of econometric methods, whereas the non-
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parametric method, like data envelopment analysis (DEA) is based on linear programming. The 
drawback of a non-parametric approach like DEA lies in the fact that the frontier is deterministic 
rather than stochastic and, consequently, may be sensitive to outliers, measurement errors, and 
other noise (Coelli et al., 1998; Dhungana et al., 2004). Although the stochastic frontier method 
requires some distributional assumptions, it has the advantage of decomposing the error terms in 
systematic (efficiency) and non-systematic components (random factors and measurement 
errors). For these reasons, in this study, we opt for the stochastic frontier method.  
Particularly, we have used the stochastic frontier production function for cross-section or panel 
data proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). The difference is that, in addition to the unitary (or 
pooled) stochastic frontier model, gender-specific stochastic frontier models are used to better 
capture the gender difference. The models can be specified as follows: 
( ) )(., hijcthijct UVhijcthijct eXfQ −= β                                                                                      (1.1) 
where: 
 Qhijct is the output in value per hectare obtained in household h, for crop c ∈{onion, 
cabbage, tomato, potato, green bean}, on plot i (i=1, 2, ..n), managed by plot manager j 
who is a male or a female household member (j∈{m, w}), in season t (t∈{1st season, 2nd 
season, 3rd season});   
 Xhijct is a (1 * k) vector of inputs used on plot i by plot manager j; 
 β is a (k * 1) vector of parameters to be estimated; 
 Vhijct is the random error term assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
(IID) N(0, σv2);  
 Uhijct is referred to as an inefficiency term, assumed to have a strictly non-negative 
distribution, and obtained from a truncation at zero of the normal distribution N (Zhijctλ, 
σ2), where Zhijct is a (1*m) vector of plot- or plot manager-specific inefficiency variables, 
and λ is a (m*1) vector of coefficients associated to be estimated. 
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The inefficiency component Uhijct can be modelled as follows: 
hijcthijcthijct ZU ελ += .  ,           ( )2,0~ uhijct NU σ   and  ( )2,0~ εσε Nhijct                          (1.2) 
The technical efficiency of production of plot i, with crop c and manager j∈{m, w} in season t 
can be specified as: 
( )hijcthijcthijct ZU
hijct eeTE
ελ−−−
==
.)(
                                                   
                                                  (1.3) 
Male and female plot managers within the household are allocatively efficient if the value of the 
marginal product (VMP) of each input X used is equal to its unit price Px:  
X
hijct
hijct
hijct PX
Q
XVMP =
∂
∂
=)(                                                                                          (1.4) 
Optimality or efficiency of the allocation of resources within the household holds if the value of 
the marginal product of inputs X used on plot i, with crop c and managed by male household 
members, is equal to the value of the marginal product of inputs X in a similar plot i managed by 
female household members. In other words, whatever the gender of the plot manager j (j∈{m, 
w}) within the household, the value of the marginal products of each input should be the same. 
 ( )
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3.4.   The empirical analysis: functional forms and variables 
The results of the data analysis did not show any major gender difference regarding physical 
conditions of the plots (Chapter 2). The gender difference is only observed for plot area and land 
ownership. Men’s plots are much larger than women’s plots and the men are mostly landowners. 
The gender variation in output is a function of the input used, such as seeds, fertilizers and 
pesticides, labour, and irrigation equipment. 
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To avoid multicollinearity between variables, we have used aggregated variables. Initially, a 
translog functional form was specified, but the interaction variables have been dropped because 
they are not significant and do not help to improve the specification. For the same reasons, the 
variables plot characteristics (soil quality, slope ...) have been excluded. The stochastic frontier 
production function finally estimated is like a fixed-effects model, specified as follows: 
log(Qhijct ) = β0 + β1 log(Plothijct) +  β2 log(Labhhijct) + β3 log(Labohijct) + β4 log(Inputhijct) +  
                   β5 log(Irreqhijct) + β6 Seas_01+ β7 Gender_01+ Vhijct - Uhijc                                   (1.6)    
where the dependent variable logarithm output in value per hectare (Qhijct ) is a function of 
logarithms14 of : 
 Plothijct, the plot area cultivated in hectare,  
 Labhhijct , the aggregated working time of household members (the plot manager, spouses, 
sons, daughters, and others) in hours per hectare, 
 Labohijct, the aggregated time of hired labour (sharecroppers, male and female hired daily 
labour, wage labour) in hours per hectare,  
 Inputhijct , the aggregated cost of other inputs used (seed, pesticides, mineral and organic 
fertilizers) in fcfa per hectare (inputs assumed to be perfect substitutes), 
 Irreqhijct , the aggregated cost of irrigation equipment used on the plot (a motorized pump, 
a manual pump, wells, drip systems, sprinklers, seals, ropes, pulleys, …) in fcfa per 
hectare, 
 Seas_01, the dummy variable horticultural season (1 = 1st season and 2nd season, 0 = 3rd 
season), 
 Gender_01, the gender of the plot manager (1 = woman, 0 = man), 
  Uhijc, time-invariant inefficiency effects or fixed effects measuring heterogeneity. 
The model is estimated three times. In effect, to shed light on the gender difference in addition to 
the unitary stochastic frontier production function (for j = men or women), in which gender is 
used as an explanatory variable, gender-specific stochastic frontier production functions (for 
                                               
14
 To handle the cases of plots with zero input or labour, the logarithm of the variable plus one is used: 
log(variable+1). 
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j=men and for j=women) are estimated as suggested by feminist development economics theory 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2005) to make a comparison.  
The time-invariant inefficiency frontier component Uhijc is specified as follows : 
Uhijc = λ0 + λ1 Zonehijc + λ2 Seplothijc + λ3 Eduhijc + λ4 Head hijc + λ5 Wstathijc +  
λ6 Agehijc +λ7 Mwhijc +  λ8 Wwhijc + λ9 Credhijc + λ10 Exthijc + λ11 Moffhijc +  
λ12 Woffhijc + εhijc ,         εhijc ~ N(0, σ2)                                                                             (1.7) 
where the technical inefficiency effects Uhijcs are defined as a function of: 
 Zonehijc, the dummy variable location (0=Zone North, 1=Zones South and Centre), 
 Seplothijc, husband and wives within the household are managing theirs plots separately or 
jointly (1=separate plots, 0=joint plots), 
 Eduhijc, the household head’s  education level (1 = formal schooling, 0 = Koranic school 
and illiteracy), 
 Head
 hijc the plot manager’s head status (1 = household head, 0 = otherwise),  
 Wstathijc, the women’s plot manager status (1 =  1st wife, 0 = 2nd wife, 3rd wife, and other, 
like mother, sister, or female relative),  
 Agehijc, the age of the plot manager (in years), 
 Mwhijc, the number of male household members working on the plot, 
 Wwhijc, the number of female household members working on the plot, 
 Credhijc, the plot manager’s access to credit (1 = access to credit, 0 = otherwise), 
 Exthijc, the plot manager’s access to extension services (1 = access to extension services, 0 
= otherwise), 
 Moffhijc, the share of men’s off-farm income in their total income,  
 Woffhijc, the share of women’s off-farm income in their total income. 
 These variables are hypothesized to have an effect on the inefficiency of male and female plot 
managers. Like the production functions, the inefficiency model is estimated three times: for j = 
men or women (unitary model), for j = men, and for j = women (gender-specific models). 
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The allocative efficiency of resources within the household is examined through the comparison 
of the value of the marginal product (VMP) of inputs on men’s and women’s plots. As the 
production function estimated is log-linear, the coefficients β correspond to the elasticity of the 
production Q, observed in value per hectare with respect to input X: 
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hijct
hijct
hijct
hijct
hijct X
Q
X
Q
XVMP β=
∂
∂
=)(                                                                                                                            (1.9) 
3.5.  The data 
As presented in the descriptive chapter, gender-disaggregated data were collected from 203 
horticultural households located in the Niayes zone, in Senegal. Within the households, men and 
women or husband and wives are generally managing their plots separately. From the 203 
households, a total of 422 horticultural plots have been surveyed, of which 308 plots are managed 
by men and 114 plots are managed by women. The major horticultural crops are onion, cabbage, 
tomato, green bean and potato, which are grown by both men and women. Thus, to better control 
for crop, these crops were chosen. For this reason, in this sample, men and women produce the 
same horticultural crops. 
Table 3.1 presents the gender comparison of the data used in the production functions estimated. 
Plots cropped by men are much larger than those of the women. Women’s plots are more 
intensive than men’s plots in terms of inputs (seeds, mineral and organic fertilizers, pesticides) 
and household labour used per hectare. However, men make more intensive use of hired labour 
(sharecropping, wage labour, or daily hired labour) than women do. Women’s plots yield more in 
terms of value per hectare than men’s plots. The gender difference in inputs and output is 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level, showing some dissimilarities in technology. It 
motivates the need to test the convenience of using gender-specific production functions rather 
than a unitary or pooled production function in order to better capture the gender difference. 
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Table 3.1: Gender comparison of the means of the variables used in the production functions. 
Variables 
Men and 
Women 
Men Women 
t-statistics 
(H0: Men-
Women=0) 
Output (fcfa/ha) 4,159,506 3,964,871 4,656,523   -2.15** 
Plot (ha) 0.17 0.22 0.05    7.57*** 
Labh - Household labour (hr/ha) 14,472 7,292 32,550 -10.64*** 
Labo – Hired labour (hr/ha) 2,239 2,509 1,513    1.92** 
Input (fcfa/ha) 608,661 562,747 732,710   -3.29*** 
Irreq – Irrigation equipment 
(fcfa/ha) 
3,623,587 3,298,710 4,444,479    -1.83* 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
3.6.   Empirical results and discussion 
3.6.1. Estimation of unitary and gender-specific stochastic frontier production functions 
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) of the Frontier programme of Stata for cross-sectional and panel 
data is used to estimate the parameters. Since the data used are cross-sectional with the household 
as the first sampling unit and plot as the second one, the household is used as identifier to allow 
for household heterogeneity. Therefore, since the fixed-effects specification is estimated as a 
within estimator, the consistency of the estimates does not need any assumption about 
endogeneity or correlation between the regressors and the inefficiency effects, as shown by 
Abdulai and Tietje (2007). In addition, the maximum likelihood is used as estimator and, 
consequently, the estimates are consistent and efficient as long as the distributional assumptions 
are correct (Verbeek, 2008). 
As can be read from table 3.2, apart from the dummy variable horticultural season, as expected, 
the other β
 
coefficients are all significant and positive, except for plot area and aggregated 
irrigation equipment cost in the unitary and men-specific stochastic frontier production functions. 
In the women-specific stochastic frontier production function, all the β
 
coefficients are positive, 
showing some difference between the models. However, the gender dummy variable of the 
unitary model is positive but not significant, casting doubt on a fixed proportional gender 
difference. 
Chapter 3 
 92 
The unitary model or pooled model shows that the variables cost of inputs (seed, mineral and 
organic fertilizers, and pesticides), household labour, hired labour, and horticultural season are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The effect of the season confirms the results of the 
seasonal comparison (see Chapter 2). Producing in the first and second seasons decreases output 
in value per hectare, because of the relative low output market price compared to the third season. 
The yield response to plot area cropped and capital equipment is negative but not significant at 
the 10% level.  
Considering the men-specific stochastic frontier production function, the coefficients of the 
variables show the same direction in terms of sign, magnitude and significance, compared to the 
unitary model particularly for inputs, household, and hired labour. Consequently, the analysis of 
the effects of these variables leads to the same conclusion as the unitary model. This is obviously 
influenced by the large share of male plots in the total number of plots. Unexpectedly, capital 
irrigation equipment is significantly and negatively related to output in value per hectare, 
indicating that male plot managers using more costly irrigation equipment, like motor pumps, did 
not achieve a higher yield in value per hectare compared to those using a rudimentary irrigation 
system based on buckets and ropes to fetch water from the wells. This irrigation system based on 
buckets and ropes is really meticulous and, as a result, yields more per hectare but is very time-
consuming. Thus, it constraints plot managers to crop small plots, whereas the use of a motor 
pump allows for large-scale production. 
Regarding the women-specific frontier production function, like the unitary and men-specific 
models, hired labour working time and inputs cost have positive and significant effects on the 
output in value per hectare. Contrary to the unitary and men-specific models, irrigation equipment 
cost is positively and significantly related to the output in value per hectare, while household 
labour and the seasonal effect are not significant at the 10% level. Obviously, the women-specific 
stochastic production function presents some differences compared to the men-specific model and 
the unitary model, as can be read from table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Maximum Likelihood estimates of the unitary and gender-specific stochastic frontier 
production functions for cross-sectional and panel data. 
Dependent variable log 
output in value per ha: 
log(Q/ha) 
Unitary stochastic 
frontier production 
function 
Men-specific 
stochastic frontier 
production function 
Women-specific 
stochastic frontier 
production function 
Explanatory variables  Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err.    
Log(Plot) -0.031 0.230 -0.144 0.253 0.773  0.749 
Log(Input/ha) 0.273  0.053*** 0.311  0.069*** 0.164  0.087** 
Log(Labh/ha)   0.065  0.028** 0.075  0.035** 0.085  0.057 
Log(Labo/ha) 0.042 0.011*** 0.051  0.014*** 0.033  0.017** 
Log(Irreq/ha) -0.044  0.034 -0.116  0.041** 0.137  0.072** 
Seas_01 -0.238  0.131* -0.241 0.147* -0.314 0.263 
Gender (1=female) 0.095 0.075     
Constant 11.895  0.705*** 12.331 0.868*** 10.615  1.344*** 
σ2 1.244 1.422 1.567  2.436 1.860  7.696 
γ =σu2/σ2 0.817  0.207 0.850  0.230 0.922  0.316 
σu
2
 1.017  1.420 1.333 2.433 1.716  7.688 
σv
2
 0.227  0.021 0.234  0.028 0.143  0.029 
Log likelihood -317.78  -238.53  -71.77 
 
Nb. Obs. (plots) 
Nb. Group (household) 
Obs. per group: Min 
                    Avg 
                    Max 
Wald chi2(7-6) 
377 
176 
1 
2.1 
9 
72.94*** 
271 
162 
1 
1.7 
5 
42.70*** 
106 
62 
1 
1.7 
4 
29.39*** 
Wald chi2(1): H0:CRT 0.02          0.32 1.06 
Likelihood-ratio test: 
LR chi2(9)  
 
14.95* 
   ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
As the estimation is based on the ML method rather than the OLS method, the Chow test cannot 
be performed to compare the unitary and the gender-specific models. The equivalent or 
alternative test for models fitted via ML is the likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis test is: the 
estimates are the same for both the unitary model and the gender specific-models. As can be read 
from table 3.2, the null hypothesis is rejected. The likelihood ratio test shows that all the 
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estimates of the unitary and gender-specific models are significantly different at the 10% level. 
Consequently, men’s stochastic frontier production function differs significantly from that of the 
women. In other words, there is some difference in the technology used by men and women plot 
managers. However, from an econometric point of view, is there any gain in estimating the 
unitary model rather than the two gender-specific models? The sum of the log likelihood of the 
gender-specific models is a little bit greater (closer to zero) than the log likelihood of the unitary 
model (-238.53 – 71.77 = -310.30 > -317.78), econometrically showing some efficiency gain 
while estimating the gender-specific models rather than the unitary model. 
A careful examination of the coefficients corresponding to the output elasticity, as the models are 
in logarithmic form, reveals some differences that are economically important. These support the 
use of gender-specific models rather than the unitary model to better capture the gender 
difference. For instance, an increase by one percent of inputs leads to an increase by 0.31% of 
output in value per hectare according to the men-specific model, and to an increase by 0.16% 
according to the women-specific model. Capital irrigation equipment provides another example, 
with an output elasticity of 13% on women’s plots. Thus, the gender difference in effects of extra 
inputs and capital irrigation equipment are economically meaningful; they illustrate the interest of 
using gender-specific models to highlight such a gender difference. Including a gender dummy 
variable (1=female plot manager) as the explanatory variable in the unitary model, as is usually 
done, is not enough because the gender variable comes out not significant (P=0.20). Rather, to 
allow for such a gender difference, the alternative of the gender-specific models would be to 
interact each of the explanatory variables with the gender dummy and to add the interaction 
variables to the unitary model. From this results a positive and significant (P=0.001) interaction 
of gender with capital irrigation equipment and a negative and significant (P=0.003) interaction 
of gender with input. Being a female plot manager increases the effect of irrigation equipment on 
output in value per hectare and decreases the effect of input. The likelihood ratio test does reject 
the assumption that the unitary model with a gender dummy is nested in the unitary model with 
the explanatory variables interacted with gender at the 1% level. The test of parameters also 
confirms that the variables interacted with gender are jointly significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. To sum up, from the gender-specific models, it can be concluded that while in terms 
of value per hectare, men’s plots are more responsive to a change in inputs, women’s plots 
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present a greater responsiveness to a change in capital irrigation equipment. This reflects the 
reality that women’s plots are very small and have low-capital irrigation equipment, but are 
intensively worked. 
Since in the stochastic frontier production functions estimated, the variables (value of output, 
household and hired labour, non-labour input and capital irrigation) are on a per hectare basis, the 
return to scale or scale elasticity is equal to 1+β115. It is equal to 0.97 for the unitary model, 0.86 
for the men-specific model and 1.77 for the women-specific model. Consequently, when 
household and hired labour, input and capital irrigation (all inputs) are scaled up by one unit, the 
output in value per hectare will go up by 0.86 units on men’s plots and 1.77 units on women’s 
plots. Thus, women’s plots are more responsive with regard to a change of scale of production 
than men’s plots are. The returns to scale for men are lower than one, while for women they are 
greater than one, showing that the technology displays decreasing returns to scale on men’s plots 
and increasing returns to scale on women’s plots. This is consistent with the interpretation that 
women's plots are too small and under the optimum size. This may be explained mainly by their 
labour constraint and by their land constraint as well. Women do not have any access to labour-
saving irrigation technologies, like a motor pump. In addition, women are usually not the 
landowner; they just benefit from a portion of their husband’s land. However, the Wald test of 
constant return to scale (H0: CRT), done by imposing the sum of the coefficients equal to one 
(1+β1=1 or β1=0), does not reject the constant return to scale for the unitary and the gender 
specific-models at the 10% level (table 3.2). 
3.6.2. Gender and the efficiency of the allocation of resources within the household 
For a further comparison of the efficiency of the allocation of resources between men and women 
plot managers within the household, we need to measure and compare the marginal product of the 
main inputs used. The marginal product refers to the increase in output resulting from one unit 
increase in input, assuming that all other inputs are constant. From a household perspective, the 
efficiency of the allocation of inputs between men’s and women’s plots within the household 
                                               
15
 Log(Qtotal) = β0+(1+β1 )log(Plot)+β2 log(Labh/Plot)+β3 log(Labo/Plot)+β4 log(Input/Plot)+ β5log(Irreq/plot) 
                       =(1+ β1-β2 -β3-β4-β5)log(Plot)+β2log(Labh)+β3 log(Labo)+β4log(Input)+ β5 log(Irreq) 
Return to scale= 1+ β1 - β2 - β3 - β4 - β5 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 =1+ β1 
Production elasticity of land=1+ β1-β2 -β3-β4 
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implies an equality of the value of the marginal product of the inputs between men’s and 
women’s plots. If the value of the marginal product of a variable input used by men and women is 
equal to its unit price, the household is allocatively efficient. The unit prices correspond to the 
rent per hectare and per season for land, to the wage rate per hour for labour, and to one for other 
inputs and capital irrigation equipment, because their costs are used rather than their quantity.  
The results of the gender comparison indicate that, based on both the unitary model and the 
gender-specific models, the value of the marginal product of land, inputs, labour, and irrigation 
equipment differs from men’s to women’ plots within the household, as can be read from table 
3.3. Consequently, one unit change in these production factors leads to a change in output that is 
significantly different at the 10% level from men’s to women’s plots. Except for input, the gender 
differences in the value of the marginal products predicted from the unitary model and the 
gender-specific models have the same sign, although they differ in terms of magnitude. The 
gender-specific models display greater gender differences in the value of the marginal products 
than does the unitary model. Altogether, in addition to the gender difference in the technology 
used, the gender distribution of the resource within the household has implications for the 
allocative efficiency. The value of the marginal product of land is higher on women’s plots than 
on men’s plots as shown by the ratio, which is lower than one. More specifically, an increase of 
land cropped by one hundred square meters, holding all other inputs constant, will rise the output 
by fcfa 21,000 and 63,000, respectively, on men’s and women’s plots, based on the gender-
specific models. The value of the marginal product of inputs, household labour, and hired wage 
labour is higher on men’s plots than on women’s plots, as shown by the ratios, which are greater 
than one. However, the value of the marginal product of irrigation equipment is higher on 
women’s plots than on men’s plots, where it is negative. Altogether, while within the household, 
land and irrigation equipment are better valued on women’s plots, labour and others inputs are 
better valued on men’s plots, as can be read on table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3: Gender comparison of the Value of the Marginal Product of inputs within the 
household. 
Value of  the Marginal Product (VMP) 
Unitary model Gender-specific models 
Variables Men Women Men 
(VMPM) 
Women 
(VMPW) 
t-statistic 
(VMPM-
VMPW) 
VMPM 
/ 
VMPW 
Unit 
price 
Land 
(fcfa/ha) 
2,528,696 
(1,120,349) 
2,980,175 
(681,120) 
2,133,587 
(945,294) 
6,379,436 
(1,458,024) 
 -12*** 0.33 200,000 
Inputs 2.18 
(0.93) 
2.46 
(2.35) 
2.50 
(1.07) 
1.45 
(1.39) 
 4.66*** 1.72 1 
Household 
labour 
(fcfa/hr) 
346 
(740) 
59 
(48) 
404 
(864) 
79 
(64) 
 4.13*** 5.11 142-
285 
Hired wage 
labour 
(fcfa/hr) 
785 
(175) 
322 
(34) 
982 
(219) 
242 
(25) 
 1.82* 4.05 310 
Capital 
irrigation 
equipment 
-0.20 
(0.52) 
 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.57 
(1.43) 
0.26 
(0.16) 
-5.44*** -2.19 1 
***, * significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. Standard deviation within the household 
in parenthesis. 
From the findings, it can be concluded that, from a household perspective, an optimality or 
allocative efficiency that corresponds to the situation under which an equality of the value of the 
marginal product of the inputs between men and women’s plots within household occurs is far 
from being achieved. Some improvements can be made in the allocation of land, inputs, labour, 
and capital irrigation equipment between men’s and women’s plots, taking into account the value 
of the marginal product. This result corroborates findings by Udry (1996) and by Alderman et al. 
(1995) in another way by using an additional step, comparing the value of the marginal products 
of factors of production. The results imply that a shift of land and capital irrigation equipment 
from men’s plots to women’s plots and a shift of labour and inputs from women’s plots to men’s 
plots will lead to more output in value per hectare for the household. 
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Furthermore, beyond an intra-household perspective, allocative efficiency reflects the ability of 
men and women plot managers to combine inputs profitably, so as to equalize the value of the 
marginal products of the inputs to their unit prices. Accordingly, neither men nor women plot 
managers did achieve absolute allocative efficiency. Regarding land, for both men and women, 
the value of the marginal product is much higher than the average rent per season and per hectare, 
which is about fcfa 200,000. Consequently, men and women would increase their output in value 
per hectare if they would enlarge their cropped land. Inefficiency in the use of land persists 
because of the low average rent, which may be due to institutional constraints, arrangements with 
family or friends, and differences in soil quality between owner-operated plots and rented plots. 
With the limited access to credit, very few households can rent out land. Usually, the rent is 
arranged between family members or friends, and so is fixed as low as possible. Land cropped by 
producers may have a better quality than rented land. The producers keep the best land for their 
own production, and invest in it to maintain the soil fertility. 
With respect to inputs (seed, fertilizers and pesticides), the value of the marginal product is higher 
than one, suggesting that both men and women should use more inputs to increase their output in 
value per hectare. Thus, men as well as women plot managers are not allocatively efficient with 
respect to inputs used; this finding is in line with Alene et al. (2008). Figure 3.1 depicts the kernel 
density estimation of the distribution of the value of the marginal product of inputs and land over 
gender. 
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Figure 3.1: Gender comparison of the distribution of the value of the marginal product of inputs 
and land. 
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The market hourly average wage rate is about fcfa 142-285 (1,000 – 2,000 per day) for unskilled 
workers. Thus, considering household labour, on men’s plots the value of the marginal product is 
higher than the market wage rate, whereas it is lower than the market wage rate on women’s 
plots. Similarly, on men’s plots, the value of the marginal product of hired labour is higher than 
the average hourly wage rate paid by the horticultural household to a hired wage worker, 
estimated at fcfa 310, while on women’s plots, the value of the marginal product is lower than the 
average wage rate paid. This implies that on both men’s and women’s plots, the allocation of 
household and hired labour is not efficient. Figure 3.2 depicts the kernel density estimation of the 
distribution of the value of the marginal product of hired wage labour, but only on men’s plots, 
because only a few women hire wage labour. 
0
.
00
02
.
00
04
.
00
06
.
00
08
De
n
si
ty
-1000 0 1000 2000 3000
Value of Marginal Product of Hired Wage Labour (fcfa/hr)
Hired wage labour on men's plots
 
Figure 3.2: Kernel density estimate of the distribution of the value of the marginal product of 
hired wage labour on men’s plots. 
Considering irrigation equipment, the value of the marginal product is negative on men’s plots 
and positive on women’s plots, but lower than one. Even if the improvement of irrigation 
equipment allows some male plot managers to increase the area cropped, it is not followed by an 
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increase of their output in value per hectare compared to the less equipped male plot managers. 
The negative sign of the value of the marginal product of irrigation equipment in reality does not 
mean an over-equipment or an over-investment. Rather, it shows inefficiency on the valorization 
of the equipment. A disaggregation of the irrigation equipment shows that, on women’s plots, the 
value of the marginal product of irrigation equipment is close to one when sprinklers are used. 
Consequently, to improve their efficiency, female plot managers need to have better access to 
improved labour-saving irrigation equipment to reduce their labour, to enlarge their cropped area, 
and also to increase their output in value per hectare. 
3.6.3. Technical efficiency across gender  
3.6.3.1.  Technical efficiency scores and its distribution across gender 
The technical efficiency scores are predicted from the stochastic frontier production functions 
estimated. From the unitary stochastic frontier production function, the overall mean technical 
efficiency is estimated at 0.73 for both men and women, with a minimum of 0.23 and a maximum 
of 0.91 (table 3.4). This means that some plot managers have a very low technical efficiency, 
while none of the plot managers have reached the frontier level, in other words, none of them are 
fully technically efficient. A gender disaggregation of the technical efficiency predicted from the 
unitary model gives an average technical efficiency index of 0.73 for men and 0.74 for women 
plot managers. Consequently, based on the unitary model, men and women exhibit the same 
technical efficiency, since the difference is -0.01 and is not significant even at the 10% level. 
These results differ from those derived from the gender-specific models. 
The men-specific stochastic frontier production function indicates an average technical efficiency 
of 0.75, with a minimum of 0.24 and a maximum of 0.90. Based on the women-specific 
stochastic frontier production function, the female technical efficiency index ranges from 0.39 to 
0.94, with an average of 0.81 (table 3.4). It is difficult to make a comparison between the scores 
achieved by men and women from the gender-specific models because the frontiers are not the 
same. The gender-specific models show that both men and women exhibit higher efficiency 
scores in their own gender group than in the whole group.  
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Table 3.4: Gender comparison of technical efficiency scores using unitary and gender-specific 
stochastic frontier production functions. 
Technical efficiency (TE) Stochastic frontier 
production functions 
Gender group 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Men 
Women 
0.73 
0.74 
0.148 
0.144 
0.23 
0.25 
0.91 
0.91 
308 
114 
Men and Women 0.73 0.147 0.23 0.91 422 
Difference  
(Men TE – Women TE) 
-0.01     Unitary model 
T 
Pr (|T|> |t|)  
-0.81 (H0: Men TE – Women TE = 0) 
0.41 
Men-specific model Men 0.75 0.136 0.24 0.90 308 
Women-specific model Women 0.81 0.104 0.39 0.94 114 
Figure 3.3 presents the cumulative distribution of the technical efficiency by gender, based on the 
unitary model and the gender-specific models.  
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Figure 3.3: Gender comparison of the cumulative distribution of the technical efficiency scores. 
3.6.3.2. A gender comparison of technical efficiency by crop 
In addition to the comparison of overall crops, it would be interesting to make a comparison by 
crop. Obviously, although all crops studied are horticultural crops and, more in particular, 
vegetables destined for the market, the technology use may present some difference from one 
crop to another and from men to women. Similarly, the managerial capacity and expertise may 
differ from one crop to another and from female to male plot managers. For these reasons, crop-
specific stochastic frontier production functions are estimated, particularly for onion and cabbage, 
using both unitary and gender-specific models. For tomato, green bean and potato, the 
comparison cannot be made due to insufficient data. Once again, some difference exists in terms 
of the magnitude and sign of the coefficients between the unitary and the gender-specific models 
for both onion and cabbage. Appendix 3.1 presents the crop-specific estimations.  
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The scores of technical efficiency predicted from the unitary and gender-specific models for 
onion and cabbage are presented in table 3.5. The predictions of the unitary model differ from the 
gender-specific models only for onion and particularly for women, while the predictions are 
similar for cabbage. Based on the unitary model, men and women plot managers achieved the 
same level of technical efficiency both for onion and cabbage since the differences are not 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. These results do not reflect the reality 
presented by the gender-specific models, particularly for onion. For onion, the gender-specific 
models show that men achieved a better performance compared to women on their own gender 
group. Men and women achieved a technical efficiency score that was higher for onion than for 
cabbage. This implies that women and men exhibit more ability to produce onion than cabbage. 
Table 3.5: Gender comparison of technical efficiency scores by crop and by model. 
Unitary model 
Horticultural Crops 
 
Men and 
women 
Men Women 
Men-specific 
model 
Women-specific 
model 
Mean  
Std. Dev. 
0.81 
0.10 
0.81 
0.09 
0.82 
0.10 
0.80 
0.10 
0.75 
0.08 
Onion 
t-statistic -0.37  
(H0: Men TE – Women TE = 0) 
 
Mean  
Std. Dev. 
0.56 
0.10 
0.55 
0.11 
0.58 
0.10 
0.56 
0.20 
0.58 
0.11 Cabbage 
t-statistic -1.41  
3.6.4.   Determinants of technical inefficiency across gender 
As shown in the model of inefficiency (equation 1.7), a set of variables of socio-economic 
characteristics of plot managers and their household heads (vector Z in equation 1.2 in section 
3.3) are used to shed light on the inefficiency effects. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test 
done showed an absence of multicollinearity between variables indicated by the VIF much lower 
than 10 for each variable. In addition, variables have been tested such as the share of men’s off-
farm income and women’s off-farm income, suspected to be endogenous due to simultaneity or 
reverse causality or measurement errors. The performed test of endogeneity of Durbin-Wu-
Hausman showed that the residuals predicted from the regressions of the suspected endogenous 
variables with respect to the other exogenous variables are not significantly correlated with the 
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inefficiency effects at the 10% level, both for the unitary inefficiency model and the gender-
specific inefficiency models. Consequently, according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the 
variables suspected may be considered as indeed not endogenous (Verbeek, 2008). In doing so, 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is consistent and unbiased and is used as estimator. Since the 
variables hypothesized to have an effect on inefficiency are mostly households characteristics and 
so are invariant within the household, random effects or fixed effects are not suitable. Table 3.6 
presents the OLS estimation of the different inefficiency models. In order to compute robust 
standard errors and t-statistics, the option robust is used for the estimation. 
Table 3.6: OLS estimates for the determinants of technical inefficiency, based on the unitary and 
gender-specific inefficiency models.  
Dependent variable: 
inefficiency (U) 
Unitary inefficiency 
model 
Men-specific 
inefficiency model 
Women-specific 
inefficiency model 
Explanatory 
variables 
Coef.  Robust 
Std. Err. 
Coef.  Robust 
Std. Err. 
Coef.  Robust 
 Std. Err.     
Zone_01 (1=North) -0.239 0.035*** -0.178 0.040*** -0.142 0.031*** 
Separate women’s 
plots_01 
-0.031 0.035 -0.134 0.028***   
Education_01 -0.012 0.093  0.024 0.087  0.090 0.113 
Head’s status_01  0.002 0.043    0.134 0.053*** 
Women’s status_01     -0.025 0.025 
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001*  0.004 0.001*** 
Male labour  0.012 0.009  0.024 0.008*** -0.025 0.007*** 
Female labour  0.002 0.007  0.004 0.007 -0.012 0.012 
Credit_01 -0.026 0.031 -0.040 0.033  0.003 0.025 
Extension_01  0.038 0.035  0.053 0.030*  0.080 0.114 
Log share men’s 
off-farm income 
-0.013 0.009 -0.009 0.011  0.006 0.009 
Log share women’s 
off-farm income 
 0.010 0.008  0.006 0.009 -0.017 0.008** 
Constant  0.540 0.075***  0.561 0.094***  0.217 0.063*** 
Number obs 
F (11, 299) 
R-squared 
 311 
7.76*** 
0.23 
  230 
 7.93*** 
 0.27 
  81 
 7.39*** 
 0.54 
 
***, **,* significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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As can be read from table 3.6, the determinants of technical inefficiency differ greatly from the 
unitary model to the gender-specific models. We can conclude from the unitary model that the 
significant determinant of inefficiency effects for both men and women plot managers are the 
household location or the zone.  
Like the unitary model, the men-specific inefficiency model shows that male plot managers’ 
inefficiency is significantly correlated with the location or zone. In addition, the men-specific 
model shows that men’s inefficiency is also significantly related to separate women’s plots, the 
plot manager’s age, the male labour used, and access to agricultural extension services. In fact, 
being a producer in the north zone decreases the inefficiency effects significantly at the 1% level. 
Plot managers located in the north zone achieve higher efficiency scores compared to those 
located in the centre and south zones. 
Unexpectedly, men’s inefficiency effects increase significantly with the male labour used on the 
plot and their access to extension services. However, without controlling for any household or 
individual characteristic, the effect of extension services on men’s technical inefficiency is 
negative (-0.06) and significant (P=0.04). This confirms several findings elsewhere, by Jamison 
and Lau (1982), Ruben (1997), Audibert (1997), Seidu (2008), Chavas et al. (1997), and Alene et 
al. (2008). In fact, the extension services may provide producers with useful advice regarding the 
choice of adapted seed varieties, depending on the season, the quantity, and the timing of the 
application of inputs like fertilizers. Above all, extension services may also help the producers to 
better control plant diseases, by advising them on the adequate pesticide or biological treatment 
and the required doses. 
While in some households, women and men or husband and wives are managing their plots 
separately, in others, men manage their plots jointly with women. In this latter case, women are 
not the plot managers but often contribute a lot to the various cropping operations. In joint plots, 
men are the plot managers and so dispose of the entire output. When women are really interested 
in horticultural production and want it to become their main source of income, they opt to manage 
their own plots. The results show that men’s inefficiency effects decrease when the men and 
women within a household are managing their own, separate plots. This negative and significant 
relationship corroborates the results of the comparison of the technical efficiency scores of men 
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within a household who manage their plots separately and jointly with their wives. The negative 
effect of separate management on men’s inefficiency can be explained by the fact that even when 
women are managing their separate plots, they still contribute to men’s plots, supplying them 
with their labour force, in particular for time-consuming cropping operations such as 
transplanting, weeding and harvesting. On the other hand, in households where men manage their 
plots jointly with their wives, it is not obvious that the wives work as much as when they are 
managing their separate plots. A moral hazard may arise. In some cases, the wives contribute a 
lot, but in others, they are busy with their off-farm activities, like small trading. As has been well 
analyzed by Fafchamps (1998), commitment failure may arise because in case of joint plots, men 
dispose of the whole output; for this reason, women prefer to divert their time to their own 
income-generating activities. “Inefficiency is expected to be fostered by factors that exacerbate 
commitment failure” (Fafchamps, 1998). To attempt to resolve commitment failure, male 
household heads allocate individual plots and other productive resources (Fafchamps, 1998). The 
findings show that this solution works in horticultural households in Senegal. There is a gain in 
efficiency for male heads of household when they allocate separate plots to their wives. 
Similarly, inefficiency effects decrease with the age of men plot managers. In other words, the 
elder male plot managers exhibit a low inefficiency compared to the younger ones. The 
explanation may be found in the experience they have accumulated. The elder plot managers have 
gained more experience in horticultural production and, consequently, possess more knowledge 
and skills to combine the inputs for a better yield. They may also know more about the best seed 
varieties to use depending on the season. Moreover, their accumulated experience improves their 
managerial capacity to mobilize the household labour, to plan, and to realize on time the cropping 
operations (seeding, transplanting, weeding, fertilizing, and plant treatment) which affect the 
yields. As mentioned by Seidu (2008), rich accumulated experience leads to a greater managerial 
efficiency and consequently, to a greater technical efficiency. 
Furthermore, the women-specific inefficiency model reveals that, like in the men-specific model, 
inefficiency effects are significantly related (at the 1% level) to the zone, the age of the plot 
manager, and male labour. In addition, women’s inefficiency effects are also significantly 
connected to their household head status and the share of their off-farm income. Like the men, the 
women producing in the north zone are more technically efficient than their counterparts of the 
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centre and the south zones. However, contrary to the men-specific model, the women-specific 
model shows that inefficiency effects increase with age and decrease with male labour. The 
younger women are more technically efficient. The explanation may be that the younger women 
have fewer children to care for, which leaves them more time to devote to their production 
activities and makes them more able of executing their cropping operations on time, with a 
positive effect on their yield. 
Contrary to men’s plots, the number of male household members working on women’s plots 
contributes to lessen women’s inefficiency effects. In other words, the greater the number of male 
household members working on women’s plots is, the lower are the inefficiency effects. 
Obviously, with their rich accumulated experience, men’s contribution to women’s plots can only 
be useful. In terms of timing and the dosage of inputs application, men know more and are the 
main decision makers on women’s plots. Some cropping operations, like plant treatment, are 
quite a male speciality. This is another reason why being the female head of a household 
increases women’s inefficiency, as shown by the women-specific model.  This result corroborates 
the results related to the higher technical efficiency scores of wives compared to female heads of 
household. The results show that women living with their husband head of household are more 
able to combine their inputs to obtain as much output as possible. Women heads of their own 
household are in most cases widows. For this reason, they do not have the opportunity to benefit 
from the technical experience and advice of men. Another reason may be the limited financial 
means that keep female, widowed heads of household from buying the best varieties of seeds or 
the required quantity of fertilizer, compared to other women who can benefit from their 
husband’s support. Moreover, female, widowed heads of household may suffer from a shortage 
of labour, which may prevent them from timely cropping operations like transplanting or 
weeding, particularly when their children are very young. Fortunately, there is a solidarity 
network at the community level, which can provide labour support to female, widowed heads of 
household for some time-consuming cropping operations, although it is usually done with some 
delay. 
Another cause of women’s lower inefficiency is the share of women’s off-farm income in their 
total income. The greater the share of women’s off-farm income, the lower women plot 
managers’ inefficiency effects are. The explanation may be that women plot managers involved 
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in addition in off-farm income-generating activities, like small trading, may afford to pay for the 
inputs required for the horticultural production on time, in quantity and in quality.  
Women’s social status within the household (1=first wife) is negatively related to women’s 
inefficiency effects, but the relationship is not significant at the 10% level. This means that being 
a first wife did not significantly decrease women’s inefficiency effects compared to being a 
second or third wife. 
Altogether, neither men nor women plot managers are fully technically efficient. Several factors 
explain the technical inefficiency effects. As shown by the gender-specific models, the 
determinants of technical inefficiency effects vary from male to female plot managers.  
3.7.    Conclusion and policy implications 
This chapter has examined the optimality or allocative efficiency from a household perspective, 
and the appropriateness of using gender-specific models rather than unitary or pooled models 
while investigating the economic performance of men and women plot managers within 
horticultural households in Senegal. This chapter contributes to the gender and economics 
literature, providing empirical evidence on intra-household resource allocation in a specific social 
and cultural context, in which polygamy occurs and husband and his wives manage their plots 
separately.  
Women’s plots are smaller but more input-intensive per hectare and yield more in terms of output 
in value per hectare than men’s plots do. The examination of the output elasticity shows some 
differences that are economically important, supporting the suitability of using gender-specific 
models rather than the unitary model to better capture the gender differential of performance. 
Both the unitary model and the gender-specific models’ predictions show that women plot 
managers are as technically efficient as men plot managers are. Moreover, the simulations made 
indicate that under men’s production conditions, women could be as technically efficient as men 
could be under women’s production conditions. 
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The gender-specific models show that the determinants of technical inefficiency effects present 
some similarities as well as some differences between men and women plot managers. For both 
men and women, inefficiency effects are significantly related to location or zone, their age and 
the male labour used. In addition, men’s inefficiency effects decrease when their wives manage 
their plots separately, while women’s inefficiency effects augment with being head of the 
household and diminish with the share of their off-farm income in their total income. 
Furthermore, based on the gender-specific models, the value of the marginal product of land, 
inputs, labour, and irrigation equipment differs significantly from men’s to women’ plots within 
the same household. The value of the marginal product of inputs, household labour, and hired 
wage labour is higher on men’s plots than it is on women’s plots, while that of land and irrigation 
equipment is higher on women’s plots than it is on men’s plots. Actually, an increase of cropped 
land by one hundred square meters, holding all other inputs constant, will raise the output by fcfa 
21,000 on men’s plots and by three times on women’s plots. Accordingly, while within a 
household, land and irrigation equipment are better valued on women’s plots, labour and others 
inputs are better valued on men’s plots. Moreover, beyond an intra-household context, neither 
men nor women plot managers did achieve absolute allocative efficiency, showing their lack of 
ability to profitably combine inputs in such a way as to equalize the value of their marginal 
products to their unit prices. 
From all these findings, we can conclude that optimality or allocative efficiency from a household 
perspective that corresponds to the situation under which an equality occurs of the value of the 
marginal product of the inputs between men’s and women’s plots within a household, is far from 
being achieved. With regard to the allocation of land, inputs, labour, and capital irrigation 
equipment, for instance, some improvements can be made between men’s and women’s plots, 
allowing for the value of the marginal product. The findings imply that a shift of labour and 
inputs from women’s plots to men’s plots and a shift of land and capital irrigation equipment 
from men’s plots to women’s plots will lead to more output in value per hectare for the 
household. Moreover, neither men nor women are allocatively efficient with respect to land; they 
both need to scale up their cropped land. 
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In terms of policy implications, in spite of having accumulated a rich experience, the horticultural 
households are still not fully technically or allocatively efficient. Policy makers need to develop 
new efforts to provide horticultural households with suitable support that will improve their 
ability to manage their productive resources more efficiently. This requires research institutes and 
extension services to be more operational, working closely with the horticultural households. As 
shown by the findings, access to extension services decreases the inefficiency effects by 0.06. 
Horticultural production is labour–intensive; particularly the irrigation operation is really time-
consuming. Thus, it will be useful to improve the technology of production through a sustainable 
system of credit, which will allow farmers to modernize their production. For instance, making 
accessible the use of improved irrigation equipment will lead to an increase of the scale of 
production, with a positive effect on both productivity and efficiency. 
However, this policy should be gender–sensitive, taking into account the specific problems faced 
by female plot managers. A better access to land and to improved irrigation equipment will be a 
lever to improve women’s economic performance and, consequently, their well-being and the 
whole household’s welfare. Obviously, horticulture is not the only potentially good source of 
poverty alleviation, but it contributes a lot to the agricultural sector and economy. As a 
consequence, more attention should be paid to it. 
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Appendix 3.1. 
From the unitary model can be deduced that, except irrigation equipment cost, all the other 
explanatory variables have a positive and significant effect on the onion output in value per 
hectare at the 5% level. The variable gender is positive and not significant at the 10% level. The 
men-specific model shows that only the variable plot area and cost of input influences positively 
and significantly at the 5% level the output in value per hectare of onion. Contrary, for women 
plot managers, the output of onion in value per hectare is significantly and positively related to 
input and hired labour at the 10% level. The hypothesis of a constant return to scale is rejected for 
the unitary and men-specific model and accepted for the women-specific model. The likelihood 
ratio test shows that, for onion, the estimates of the unitary stochastic frontier production function 
differ significantly from gender-specific ones at the 1% level (table A 3.1). 
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Table A 3.1: Estimates of the parameters of the unitary and gender-specific stochastic frontier 
production functions for onion. 
Onion Dependent variable log 
output in value per ha: 
log(Q) 
Unitary model Men-specific model Women-specific model 
Explanatory variables  Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Log(Plot) 0.748 0.319*** 0.638 0.333** -0.498 4.727 
Log(Input) 0.295 0.093*** 0.456 0.116*** 0.314 0.182* 
Log(Labh)   0.079 0.034** 0.047 0.040 0.114 0.130 
Log(Labo) 0.038 0.015*** 0.026 0.017 0.050 0.030* 
Log(Irreq) 0.030 0.051 -0.047 0.056 -0.007 0.134 
Gender (1=woman) 0.042 0.101     
Seas_01       
Constant 10.176 1.112*** 9.539 1.362*** 10.244 2.998*** 
σ2 1.370  0.585  0.151  
γ =σu2/σ2 0.885   0.759  0.284  
σu
2
 1.213   0.445  0.042  
σv
2
 0.156   0.140  0.108  
Log likelihood -97.53  -69.18  -17.74  
Nb. Obs. (plots) 
Nb. Group (household) 
Obs. per group:      Min 
Avg 
Max 
Wald chi2(6-5) 
149 
80 
1 
1.9 
7 
36.32*** 
 105 
74 
1 
1.4 
4 
23.17*** 
 
39 
29 
1 
1.3 
4 
13.91*** 
 
Wald chi2(1) H0:CRT 5.47*** 3.66** 0.01 
Likelihood-ratio test:                                  
LR chi2(8)                                       
 
21.22*** 
     ***, ** significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Table A 3.2 presents the unitary and gender-specific stochastic frontier production functions 
estimated for cabbage. For the men-specific model, as the number of groups or households is 
almost equal to the number of plots, which means no household fixed effects, the ML for cross-
sectional and panel data could not be used. The ML for non-sectional data was used for the 
estimation. 
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Table A 3.2: Estimates of the parameters of the unitary and gender-specific stochastic frontier 
production functions for cabbage. 
Cabbage Dependent variable log output in 
value per ha: log(Q) Unitary model Men-specific 
model  
Women-specific 
model 
Explanatory variables  Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Log(Plot) -0.568 0.360 -0.787 0.374** 1.106 0.930 
Log(Input) 0.146 0.084* 0.108 0.135 0.181 0.117 
Log(Labh)   -0.008 0.048 0.044 0.064 0.012 0.114 
Log(Labo) -0.009 0.018 -0.009 0.026 -0.012 0.025 
Log(Irreq) 0.080 0.053 -0.033 0.076 0.128 0.080* 
Seas_01 -0.160 0.134 -0.098 0.178 -0.572 0.304* 
Gender (1=female) 0.056 0.101     
Constant 13.095 1.412*** 13.594 1.447*** 12.332 14.335 
σ2 0.202  0.824  0.140  
γ =σu2/σ2 0.336     0.382  
σu
2
 0.068    0.053  
σv
2
 0.134     0.086  
Log likelihood -75.76  -78.36  -15.06  
Nb. Obs. (plots) 
Nb. Group (household) 
Obs. per group:  Min 
                        Avg 
                        Max 
Wald chi2(7-6) 
126 
94 
1 
1.3 
5 
24.77*** 
 92 
92 
1 
1 
1 
14.22** 
 
36 
28 
1 
1.3 
3 
19.41*** 
 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.1.   Introduction 
In Senegal, like in most African countries, horticultural households’ production systems are 
highly labour-intensive with a low capital input. The area of land that a household can crop out of 
the owned land is mainly conditional on the availability of labour. While some households can 
rely only on their household labour, others take recourse to hired labour. This hired labour can be 
based on a sharecropping contract or on a wage contract. 
Sharecropping is a form of tenancy based on an agreement between the landowner and the tenant 
in terms of input contribution and output sharing. Sharecropping has a long, worldwide history, 
but the types of agreement between landowner and tenant vary from one location to another. In 
Senegal, for instance, sharecropping is chiefly used on horticultural crops that are cash crops. The 
agreement is informal, verbal, and hence not written down; it is only witnessed by a third party, 
who can be a parent or a friend of the landowner, or the head of the village. The agreement is for 
one horticultural season and is generally based on the share in two equal parts of the profit of 
production. One part is for the sharecropper, who provides the labour force and expertise required 
for the production. The other part is for the landowner, who provides to the sharecropper the land 
plot as well as all the required inputs (seeds, organic and mineral fertilizers, pesticides, fuel) and 
some facilities, such as housing, feeding, and occasionally health care. 
For hired wage labour, on the other hand, the landowner pays a fixed wage to the worker. 
Usually, the wage is paid at the end of the cropping season rather than monthly, in agreement 
with the worker. The landowner usually provides the same facilities to the hired wage workers as 
is the case in sharecropping contracts, particularly when they come from far away. 
More and more land tenancy based on fixed rent is less observed in Senegal. On the one hand, 
only very rarely are households willing to rent out their land because they fear to lose their land 
rights, due to the land law providing the right to continued occupancy to the person who 
cultivates the land for a couple of consecutive years. On the other hand, the tenants are generally 
not only landless, but they also are so poor that they lack the financial means that would enable 
them to rent in land and to provide the inputs required for the production. Both for the 
households’ landlord and the landless tenants, who have a limited liability, contracting based on 
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sharecropping and wage are the remaining alternatives. A household’s choice between these two 
labour contracts varies in general, depending on the plot size cropped and the level of the 
irrigation equipment. The reasons behind the labour contract choice need to be further 
investigated. While several theoretical and empirical studies have provided valuable information 
about land tenancy, comparing sharecropping to a fixed rent, very few studies have scrutinized 
the choice between a sharecropping and a wage labour contract, in particular in Africa and in a 
context of modernization of the agricultural production systems. 
Are the contracts with hired labour, either as sharecroppers or as wage labourers, comparable to 
household labour in terms of household profit optimization? At the plot level, controlling for 
irrigation equipment, did the household make the efficient labour contract choice, the choice that 
provides a higher optimum profit? Did the household use inputs efficiently across labour 
contract? This chapter tries to answer these research questions through an in-depth investigation 
of plot-level profit optimization over the labour arrangement made. Therefore, after a survey of 
the literature on land tenancy and the specification of the theoretical and empirical models, this 
chapter will focus on a comparative analysis of household profit optimization across plots under 
household labour, a sharecropping labour contact, or a wage labour contract. Then, the chapter 
will provide evidence on the efficiency of the labour contract choice and the inputs used at plot 
level. From the results, a conclusion will be drawn with some policy implications. 
4.2.    A literature review on land tenancy  
In agriculture, a broad assortment of land tenancy forms is practised worldwide. While some land 
lease arrangements are based on sharecropping and a fixed rental, others are in the form of wage 
labour. In fixed rental tenancy, the tenant pays a fixed rent to the landowner, provides all inputs 
and earns the entire output. In share tenancy or sharecropping, the landlord provides the land plot 
and agrees with the tenant the terms of the share of input costs and output, depending on the 
location. These land or labour contracts can be seen as suitable strategies, developed to equate 
land-man ratios over households with different, relative endowments of land and labour. 
Many empirical studies have examined the reasons behind the existence and the continuation of 
sharecropping and its social, economic, and policy implications, especially in Asia and, to a lesser 
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extent, in Africa (Stiglitz, 1989; Ray 1998; Ghatak and Pandey, 2000; Garrett and Xu, 2003; 
Otsuka and Hayami, 1988; Ahmed et al., 2002; Pender et al., 2002; Benin et al., 2005; Reiersen, 
2001; Araujo and Bonjean, 1999; Canjels, 1996). Despite numerous studies done, land tenancy 
still remains an attractive subject of research, as shown by several recent publications by Ahmed 
et al. (2002), Benin et al. (2005), Tesfay (2006), Kassie and Holden (2007), Holden (2007), and 
Braido (2008).  
The existing theories of sharecropping were subject to critical reviews in terms of the general 
theory of agency or principal-agent relations. The advantage of sharecropping was associated 
with its savings in transaction costs, but also with risk sharing (Stiglitz, 1989). As supervision 
costs are part of the transaction costs, obviously, a wage labour contract may involve higher 
transaction costs than sharecropping does (Eswaren and Kotwal, 1985). The supervision of the 
work effort of wage labour is more costly than that pertaining to sharecroppers (Ahmed et al., 
2002). Otsuka and Hayami (1988) have emphasised the importance of supervision and other 
forms of transaction costs for the use of hired wage labour. While in a wage labour contract, the 
supervision is undertaken by the landlord and in a fixed rental contract by the tenant, in a 
sharecropping contract, both tenant and landlord have incentives to self-supervise so as to 
mitigate any moral hazard behaviour (Eswaren and Kotwal, 1985). The supervision time spent by 
the household’s landlord to prevent hired workers from cheating is an important part of the labour 
input, particularly in a wage labour contract. The supervision costs evaluated at the household’s 
off-farm wage rate may have an impact on the profitability and the efficiency of the labour 
contract choice to make. This research intends to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on 
this impact. 
Under uncertain circumstances, the existence of sharecropping can be justified by its role in risk 
sharing with and without any enforcement, as long as both landlord and tenant are risk-averse 
(Ahmed et al., 2002). While in a fixed rental arrangement, the tenant bears the entire risk linked 
to the production, in a wage labour contract, it is the landlord who bears the whole risk, and in a 
sharecropping contract, it is both the landlord and the tenant who share the risk. As demonstrated 
theoretically (Ray, 1998), a sharecropping contract lowers the return to the tenant in a good state 
and raises it in a bad state, comparatively to a fixed rent. Benin et al. (2005) have found that 
factors increasing the production risk are in favour of sharecropping or risk-pooling 
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arrangements, while factors reducing the risk tend to shift land tenancy away from sharecropping 
and in favour of fixed rent leases. All recent models, including that of Pender and Fafchamps 
(2000), incorporate some degree of risk sharing between landlord and tenant. Sharecropping is 
viewed in the literature as a constrained efficient tenancy, which balances incentives and risk 
sharing (Braido, 2008). 
According to the Marshallian argument supported by several authors, share tenancy is inefficient 
because the tenant receives only a share of his own marginal product of labour as marginal 
revenue. Contrary to this standard opinion that criticized sharecropping because it is inefficient 
and dampens incentives and productivity, according to Stiglitz (1989), Ray (1998), Ghatak and 
Pandey (2000), and Garrett and Xu (2003), sharecropping is desirable because it increases 
incentives, particularly compared to a wage labour contract. Benin et al. (2005), Tesfay (2006), 
Braido (2008) and others have provided empirical evidence that challenges the conventional 
wisdom connecting sharecropping to disincentives. In particular with regard to sharecropping in a 
Senegalese context, in which the landlord provides all the inputs, the tenant actually would have 
incentives to work hard in order to maximize his profit, especially in case he does not have any 
other alternative off-farm work or can only work at a low wage rate. It has been demonstrated 
that the Marshallian inefficiency implied in many of the share tenancy models (Binswanger et al., 
1995; Otsuka and Hayami, 1988; Ahmed et al., 2002; Pender et al., 2002;  Reiersen, 2001; and 
Araujo and Bonjean, 1999) was a consequence of a partial or incomplete analysis, in which the 
optimizing behaviour of landlords was neglected, the characteristics of tenants and plots were not 
taken into account, or the range of contract choice was very limited (Otsuka and Hayami, 1988). 
For instance, in Senegal, while the landlords have enough land but suffer from a labour shortage, 
the sharecroppers or tenants are landless because they come from other, dry areas, which are 
inappropriate for any horticultural production. 
Moreover, if the landlord does not have at his/her disposal any information about the tenant’s 
work ability, the landlord would prefer a contract based on a fixed rent rather than on 
sharecropping. At the tenant’s side, if the tenant has the opportunity to make a contract choice, 
the tenant with a high work ability would opt for a fixed rent in order to get his entire marginal 
product, while the tenant with a low work ability would choose sharecropping (Ray, 1998) or a 
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wage contract. This screening theory may somewhat explain the reason for the coexistence of 
sharecropping with other forms of land tenancy (Ray, 1998). 
Another major research agenda is to identify the technological, economic, and institutional 
conditions leading to different choices of land tenancy. As mentioned by Otsuka and Hayami 
(1988), it is evident that no contractual form is universally efficient, and it is not relevant to 
discuss in abstract terms whether sharecropping and wage labour contracts are efficient or not. 
Sharecropping and wage labour contracts can be efficient in specific technical, institutional, and 
socioeconomic environments and can be inefficient in others. Both the sources of efficiency or 
inefficiency and the mechanism of contract choice need to be further examined through in-depth 
investigations into the agricultural production technology, the agrarian community structure, and 
market conditions (Otsuka and Hayami, 1988; Ray, 1998; Ghatak et al., 2000). This shows the 
scientific relevance of this study, which intends to contribute to this research agenda by analysing 
at plot level the efficiency of the labour contract choice made. 
Altogether, the review of the literature shows that, so far, the coexistence of the different forms of 
land tenancy or labour contract have been explained by different theories relative to Marshallian 
inefficiency, incentives, transaction costs, including the supervision costs of labour, moral hazard, 
risk sharing, screening, and eviction. These theories and the empirical evidence have greatly 
contributed to explain the reasons behind land tenancy or labour contract choice. This study 
follows up on this and also intends to take a further step, by focusing particularly on the 
production technologies at plot level and by making thorough use of a theoretical model based on 
household profit optimization, to compare the optimum profit derived from plots based on 
household labour, a sharecropping labour contract, or a wage labour contract. This chapter does 
not take risk behaviour into account, which we will deal with in the next chapter, but focuses 
mainly on supervision costs. This chapter therefore attempts to find out to what extent the 
supervision rate and the opportunity wages ratios of the landlord, the sharecropper, and the wage 
worker may determine the efficiency of the labour contract based on household profit 
optimization. In order to test this efficiency of the labour contract choice, for each plot, 
simulations were made to see whether another labour contract than presently applied would have 
yielded a higher profit to household. In doing so, this research makes a scientific contribution to 
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the theory of land tenancy, providing theoretical and empirical evidence on household profit 
optimization across labour contract, by using data from the Niayes Zone in Senegal. 
4.3.    The theory 
For a better understanding of the land or labour tenancy theory, diagram 4.1 is designed to 
determine for a given plot of land the optimum labour supplied by workers hired under a 
sharecropping contract and a wage contract, in a context of mechanization of the production.  
Although the production is carried out under risky or uncertain circumstances, for simplicity’s 
sake, we did not take into account the risk attitude of the landowner and the worker, which will 
be dealt with in the next chapter.  
Let us consider the case of horticulture in Senegal, where some households still use manual 
irrigation with buckets and ropes to fetch water from the wells and irrigate the plots, while others 
are mechanizing their production by using labour-saving irrigation equipment like a motor pump. 
The labour market is not competitive. Besides farming, the sharecroppers may do off-farm work. 
In the labour market, they may find a wage rate Wo much lower than the wage rate Wh, paid by 
the household landowner to hired wage workers, including supervision costs. The household 
landowner does not have any off-farm work that requires him to hire labour at wage Wo, so he 
only hires for farm work. For a given profit share rate β, usually equal to 1/2, the sharecroppers 
will supply labour up to equalizing their share of the marginal product of labour (βY’) to their 
off-farm opportunity wage rate (Wo). In a wage contract, the landowner will equalize at the 
optimum the marginal product of hired wage workers (Y’) to the wage rate Wh, including 
supervision costs. 
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Figure 4.1: Diagrammatic presentation of the model of labour contract choice over mechanization 
of the production.  
In figure 4.1, sharecroppers’ optimum labour is established at point G on plots without a motor 
pump and at point N on plots with a motor pump, while hired wage workers are employed at 
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points E and K, respectively, on plots without and with a motor pump. Both on plots without and 
with a motor pump, the optimum labour supplied by sharecroppers is higher than that of hired 
wage workers is. Because of the few possibilities of off-farm work and the low off-farm 
opportunity wage, sharecroppers do have incentives to work hard on the farm. Usually, the 
sharecroppers have to be on the field all day. On plots without a motor pump, as can be seen from 
diagram 4.1, the surplus the household landowner receives from plots under a sharecropping 
contact (area BFGC) is higher than that from plots under a hired wage labour contract (area BEJ). 
Consequently, on plots without a motor pump, the household landowner may prefer to hire labour 
based on a sharecropping contract rather than a wage contract, to earn more profit. By allocating 
the same amount of optimum labour to off-farm opportunity employment at wage rate Wo, 
sharecroppers will earn less (area HGXO) than they will earn from farming (area CGXO). This 
means that, for the worker, sharecropping would be preferable to off-farm work. At the wage rate 
paid by a household, including supervision costs Wh, a sharecropping contract provides more 
profit (area CGXO) to the worker than a wage contract does (area JEVO). Thus, the worker 
would prefer to be hired under a sharecropping rather than under a wage contract. Consequently, 
on plots without a motor pump, sharecropping is in the interest of both landowner and worker. 
Without a motor pump, in other words, sharecropping is a feasible contract. 
The entire discussion is based on an assumption with respect to the slopes of the curves without 
and with a motor pump. The curve with a motor pump is steeper than that without a motor pump. 
Actually, with the use of a motor pump, the marginal product of labour rises because irrigation 
becomes less time-consuming and, consequently, the working time decreases. On plots under 
hired wage labour, the household spends time to supervise the workers to prevent them from 
cheating. Thus, the supervision cost is an important transaction cost to include in the wage. On 
plots with a motor pump, the surplus the household realizes on plots under a wage contract (area 
AKJ) is much higher than it is on plots under a sharecropping contract (area AMNP). This means 
that, when a motor pump is used, the household’s preference would be to hire labour under a 
wage contract rather than under a sharecropping contract. Sharecroppers could win the contract 
only if they would bid money for becoming a sharecropper at a plot with a motor pump, or if they 
would settle for a lower share. 
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To sum up: on plots without a motor pump, when the off-farm opportunity wage of workers is 
much lower than the farm wage rate paid, supervision costs included, the household landowner 
would opt to hire labour under a sharecropping contract rather than under a wage contract 
because the surplus is higher. However, on plots with a motor pump, the household landowner’s 
surplus is higher under a wage contract rather than under a sharecropping contract. Consequently, 
with the mechanization of the production, the household would go for hiring labour under a wage 
contract than under sharecropping. The worker earns more under sharecropping than under wage 
labour, both with and without a motor pump. 
If the labour market was competitive in such a way that the sharecroppers opportunity wage Wo 
would equal wage Wh, paid by the household and with supervision costs included, both on plots 
with and without a motor pump, the household landowner would prefer to hire labour under a 
wage contract rather than under a sharecropping contract. The reason is that the surplus from a 
wage contract (areas BEJ and AKJ, respectively, without and with a motor pump) is higher than 
that from sharecropping (areas BDIC and ARLP, respectively, without and with a motor pump). 
For the worker, the preference would be a wage contract on plots without a motor pump (area 
JEVO > area CIQO) and sharecropping on plots with a motor pump (area JKTO < area PLSO). 
4.4.   Household modelling and labour 
 Horticultural production is highly labour-demanding. In Senegal, for most households, 
household labour is not sufficient to crop all the land owned. Instead of leaving the land idle or 
renting it out, households try to use the area of land as much as possible. Therefore, many 
households take recourse to hired labour, some based on sharecropping contracts, while others 
prefer to hire labour based on wage contracts. What are the reasons behind these labour contract 
choices? Observations show that households that have large size farms and more advanced 
irrigation equipment are likely to opt for hired wage labour. Households with a medium size farm 
with relatively less irrigation equipment opt for sharecropping. Households with small farms and 
less equipment have a tendency to limit themselves to their own household labour. 
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Let us consider the problem faced by the household of allocating labour and non-labour inputs to 
a given plot of land. We denote the opportunity cost or wage of household labour by we, of 
sharecroppers by wo, and of hired workers by w. 
Household labour 
Accordingly, in case the household uses only household labour Lh, the profit maximization 
problem can be specified as:  
Max eehxhhyh LwXpXLYp +−= ),(pi                                                               (4.1) 
with respect to Lh and Xh. 
subject to :  
 a time constraint: he LLL +=                                                                    (4.2) 
 a production constraint: γλ hhh XCLY =  
If we specify the production function to be Cobb-Douglas, land-fixed and 1<+ γλ , we have 
Max )( hehxhhyh LLwXpXCLp −+−= γλpi                                                           (4.3) 
First-order conditions (FOC) with respect to Lh, the total household labour used on the plot,  
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and with respect to Xh, the total inputs used on the plot: 
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Knowing Lh* , the optimum household labour, and Xh* , the optimum input, we can derive Yh*, the 
optimum production to supply by household to maximize profit:  
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The optimum household labour Lh* and input Xh* can be expressed as follows, as a function of 
prices and wage: 
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Hired wage labour under supervision 
If the household opts to hire labour based on a wage contract Lw at wage w, we assume that for 
each unit of wage labour, σ units of supervision by the household are needed, at a wage rate of 
household off-farm work we. This is the household’s labour opportunity cost of supervising wage 
labour instead of doing off-farm work. When the household opts for hiring labour based on a 
wage contract, the profit maximization problem is:  
Max wewwxwwyw LwwLXpXLYp σpi −−−= ),(                                               (4.8) 
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subject to production constraint: γλ www XCLY =                                              (4.9) 
Max )( ewwxwwyw wwLXpXCLp σpi γλ +−−=  
This leads to the following expressions for optimal production and inputs: 
γλ
γλγλ
γ
γλ
λ
γλ γ
σ
λ
−−
+−−−−
−−












+
= 1
11
1
1
*
y
xe
w ppww
CY                                                    (4.10) 
γλ
γλ
λ
γλ
λ
γλ
γλ
γλ
γ
γλ
γ
γλ
γ
σ
λ
γ
σ
λ
−−
−−
−
−−
−−
−−
−−−−
−
−−












+
=












+
=
1
11
1
1
1
1
*
1
111
1
1
1
*
y
xe
w
y
xe
w
p
pww
CX
p
pww
CL
 
Compared with the first case of using household labour only, we see that the production and use 
of inputs are lower if w+σwe is greater than we. 
Sharecropping labour 
Instead of hiring labour based on a wage contract, a household may opt to hire labour based on a 
sharecropping contract. In Senegal, under the usual sharecropping contract, the landlord pays for 
all the inputs. These inputs are deducted from the revenue, to obtain the profit that is shared 
between the landlord and the tenant. The usual share is 50%-50%, but to generalize, the share of 
profit received by the tenant is set to β and that received by the landlord to 1-β. 
From a total labour endowment Lt, the tenant or worker can allocate labour Ls to sharecropping 
and Lo to alternative sources of off-farm work at wage wo. So, the tenant’s profit maximizing 
problem is: 
Max oosxssyst LwXpXLYp +−= ]),([βpi                                                           (4.11) 
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subject to :  
 a production constraint: γλ sss XLCY .=                                                   (4.12) 
 a time constraint: ost LLL +=  
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Knowing the optimum sharecropping labour Ls*, the optimum production Ys* can be deduced: 
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The household’s profit maximization problem when opting for a sharecropping labour contract is: 
Max ]),()[1( ** sxsssys XpXLYp −−= βpi                                                            (4.15) 
with respect to Xs, and with  
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FOC with respect to Xs, the total inputs used on a sharecropped plot: 
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Knowing the optimum Xs* , the optimum sharecropping labour Ls* can be expressed as follows as 
a function of prices and wage: 
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and the optimal production is  
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Knowing the optimum production, the optimum labour and the optimum inputs, the maximum 
profits for the household can be deduced and expressed as follows as a function of prices and 
wage: 
 on plots based on household labour,  
 )1(** γλpi −−= hyh Yp                                                                                    (4.19) 
Households Profit Optimization and the Efficiency of Labour Contract Choice 
 130 
 on plots based on a wage labour contract: 
)1(** γλpi −−= wyw Yp                                                                                    (4.20) 
 on plots based on a sharecropping contract: 
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The choice between the three land tenancy regimes is based on which profitability is higher: 
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At the given plot size, the household prefers sharecropping over using hired wage workers if  
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Here, wh may include supervision costs ( eh www σ+= ). For σ=0 (no supervision), wwh =  and 
if ho www == , i.e. the sharecropper could also work as a hired worker. This is the case if the 
profit ratio denoted R0: 
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For β=0.5, this will not be the case for values of λ and γ that sum to less than 1. Figure 4.2 shows 
the values of the profit ratio R0 for γ=0.1 and varying values of λ. It also shows the values of the 
wage ratio ho ww /  at which the profit ratio R is equal to one (equation 4.23). 
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Figure 4.2: Values of the profit ratio R0 (no supervision and the sharecropping opportunity wage 
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pi ) is equal to one for γ=0.1 and varying values of λ. 
Hence, sharecropping would be preferred only if the wages are not equal. If the profit ratio R0 
takes on a value of 0.5 (as the graph shows to be perfectly possible), in order to make 
sharecropping the preferred option for the household, we would require a ratio for the wages to be  
 2)( 10 >−−
−
γλ
λ
hw
w
                                                                                                       (4.25) 
or the sharecropper’s opportunity wage to be far below that of the hired worker plus supervision 
costs ( ho ww 74.1< ). 
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Sharecropping would be preferred, for example, if the supervision costs are 60%, the hired wages 
are the same as the sharecropper’s opportunity costs, and lambda exceeds 0.55. 
High values of λ typically coincide with technologies that are largely based on labour. For in 
these cases, high shares of the revenues would accrue to the factor labour. If λ falls, due to other 
factors of production that demand a share of the revenues, such as land scarcity, other inputs or 
capital (such as motor pumps), the opportunities for sharecroppers fall. Only at very low relative 
wages would sharecropping still be the preferred option for landlords. 
At large plots that would typically show a relatively ample availability of land compared to 
labour, we would expect relatively high values of λ, and more incidence of sharecropping than 
there would be at very small plots. Similarly, with other capital inputs, such as motor pumps, we 
should expect less use of sharecroppers.  
Comparing to household labour, a sharecropping contract would be preferred if: 
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Comparing to household labour, a wage labour contract would be preferred if the hired wage paid 
to hired wage workers, supervision costs included, is lower than the household opportunity cost 
or wage:  
ee www <+ σ                                                                                                               (4.28) 
The household’s efficiency is reflected in its allocation of land to hired wage workers, 
sharecroppers or family workers. As the allocation is done plot by plot, rather than as a 
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continuous function of the size of the farm, we can compare the plot regimes and simulate the 
profits that would arise if another regime would be applied. For each farm, we can simulate 
whether another regime than presently applied would yield higher profits to the household. If so, 
the household should be considered inefficient, as an option for higher profits is not used. 
Another comparison of efficiency can be made at the level of the plots themselves. As the 
optimality conditions show, we should expect the marginal product of hired workers to equal 
their wages plus the costs of supervision, both measured per unit of labour (say an hour). The 
marginal product of the sharecropper’s labour should equal his wage rate divided by the share 
accruing to him:  
( β
ow ).                                                                                                                              (4.29) 
The input of fertilizer follows different laws for hired worker plots and sharecropped plots. On 
the latter plots, the input-output ratio of X in the above formula (equations 4.16 and 4.18) equals 
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whereas on hired-worker plots, it would be only 
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This, too, can be compared on a plot by plot basis, depending on the regime. We will do all these 
tests. 
4.5.   The empirical analysis 
4.5.1. Functional forms and variables 
The technology is assumed to be similar over labour contract. The production function is 
considered as translog instead of a pure Cobb-Douglas function, in order to capture the 
interaction between a number of variables. Preliminary, all the squared variables and interactions 
terms were used, but most of them were dropped because they were not statistically significant at 
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the 10% level and did not improve the model. Finally, the log-linear functional form of the 
production function estimated was specified as follows: 
hichichichic
hichichichichic
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                      (4.32) 
where in household h, on plot i (i=1, 2, ..n) and for crop c ∈{all, onion, cabbage, tomato}, the 
dependent variable logarithm output in value per plot (log Yhic) is a function of logarithm of: 
 Lab, the aggregated working time of household labour or sharecropping labour or wage 
labour, depending on the labour contract, in hours per plot; 
 Plot, plot area cultivated in square meters; 
 Input, the aggregated costs in fcfa per plot of non-labour inputs used, such as mineral 
fertilizers (urea and NPK); 
 Mp_01, dummy variable for a motor pump  (1=motor pump used for plot irrigation, 
0=otherwise), 
 LabMp, the interaction labour and motor pump (logarithm (labour) *dummy motor 
pump);  
 S_01, dummy variable for horticultural season (1= 1st and 2nd seasons, 0 = 3rd season); 
 Soil_01, dummy variable for soil suitability appreciation by the plot manager (1=good or 
medium, 0=bad); 
 εhic ,, error term. 
4.5.2. Endogeneity and the choice of estimator 
In the production function, problems of endogeneity, related to a measurement error or 
simultaneity and reverse causality, may arise particularly with the explanatory variables input 
(fertilizers), labour (household labour, sharecropping labour, or wage labour) and the interaction 
labour-motor pump. This endogeneity may lead to a correlation between these explanatory 
variables with the error terms making the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates biased and 
inconsistent (Verbeek, 2008).  
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To test the potential endogeneity of the variables input, labour, and interaction labour-motor 
pump, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was done. Each of these endogenous right-hand side 
variables was estimated as a function of all exogenous variables to obtain the reduced-form 
equations. The residuals predicted from each reduced-form equation were added to the structural 
form of the production function. The t-test done showed that the residuals were significantly 
different from zero (p=0.05), suggesting a non-zero covariance between the error term and the 
variables input, labour, and interaction labour-motor pump. Consequently, the test confirmed the 
endogeneity of these variables. In such a situation, instrumental variables should be used; the 
Generalized Instrumental Variable (GIVE) known as the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) is one 
of the best alternative estimators. 
Furthermore, the test of parameters done showed that the variables “use of garden hose for 
irrigation”, “use of sprinkler for irrigation”, “sharecropping dummy”, “share of women’s off-farm 
income”, “share of men’s off-farm income”, “log women’s total annual income”, “land owned”, 
“bovine cattle”, “log plot-household distance”, and the interaction terms “share of women’s off-
farm income and motor pump” and “log women’s total annual income and motor pump”,  may be 
considered as strong instruments, because they are significantly correlated with the endogenous 
variables (p=0.001 to p=0.07) in the reduced forms. With the F-statistic greater than 10, following 
the Stock-Watson rule-of-thumb (Verbeek, 2008), these variables can indeed be considered as 
strong instruments. We are careful about the problem of endogeneity and we did our best to 
identify these variables as valuables instruments. However, we are also cautious about the perfect 
exogeneity of some of these instrumental variables16.   
As the data used are cross-sectional, with household as the first sampling unit and plot the second 
one, for the estimation, the option standard errors “clustered robust” is used with household as 
cluster to allow for intra-household correlation, since the observations (plots) are independent 
across households (clusters) but not necessarily within households (repeated plot managers). 
 
                                               
16
 Sprinklers, share of women’s off-farm income, share of men’s off-farm income, women’s total annual income may 
be not perfectly exogenous because of simultaneity or reverse causality with the output in value. We would prefer to 
have better instruments but we could not have them. 
Households Profit Optimization and the Efficiency of Labour Contract Choice 
 136 
4.6.   Empirical results and discussion 
4.6.1. A comparison of plot size, inputs use intensity and output across labour contract 
A cluster analysis based on plot area shows that most of the plots cropped by household labour 
are small-sized (46%) and medium-sized (40%). Few producers are cropping large plots (14%). 
Household labour is pre-dominantly used on small-sized plots, while sharecropping is mostly 
used on medium-sized plots, followed by large-sized plots (table 4.1). In fact, a certain plot size 
and level of irrigation equipment are required to hire labour based on a sharecropping contract. 
As the sharecroppers have limited access to off-farm work and as the off-farm wages are low, 
sharecroppers require a certain plot size, where they can maximize their labour. 
Only households with a large plot size hire labour based on a wage contract. When households 
have large farm with relatively improved irrigation equipment (a motor pump, sprinklers, a drip 
system), they usually opt for hiring labour based on a wage contract rather than a sharecropping 
contract to complement the household labour. As can be read from table 4.1, on average, plots 
based on wage labour are much larger than plots based on sharecropping and household labour; 
the differences are significant at the 1% level. 
Table 4.1: The distribution of labour across clusters, based on plot size cropped  
Clusters 
Variables 
Small plot size Medium plot size Large plot size 
Plot area (ha) 0.03 0.16 0.63 
Plots under household labour (%) 0.86 0.45 0.30 
Plots under sharecropping (%) 0.13 0.47 0.39 
Plots under wage labour (%) 0.01 0.07 0.30 
Observations (number of plots)  183 161 56 
The intensity of the use of labour and other inputs, like mineral fertilizers, as well as the output in 
value per hectare are compared across labour contract. Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics 
of inputs and output on plots under household labour, sharecropping labour, and wage labour 
contracts. Horticultural production is highly labour-intensive, particularly when the irrigation is 
done manually, as is the case in most of the households. Plots based on household labour are 
much more labour-intensive than plots under a sharecropping or wage labour contract. These 
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differences are significant at the 1% level. Even when labour is hired under sharecropping, 
household labour contributes to the time-consuming cropping operations such as transplanting, 
weeding and harvesting. Wage labour is usually hired to complement household labour; with 
wage labour, much more supervision is required compared to sharecropping. For these reasons, 
the time spent by household labour on plots under wage labour is greater than that on plots under 
sharecropping labour is. The difference is significant at the 10% level. 
The time spent per hectare by sharecropping labour is much higher than that by wage labour. 
Hired wage workers work less than sharecroppers. This may be explained by their difference 
regarding involvement and risk, but also by the difference in the level of irrigation equipment of 
the plots. Sharecroppers have more incentives and commitment to work well, and share the risk 
because they earn half the profit. Hired wage workers, on the other hand, have a fixed wage, 
whatever the results of the production may be, and this may dampen their incentives to work 
harder. As underlined by Ahmed et al. (2002), hired wage labour should have weaker work 
incentives compared to tenants under sharecropping. Wage labourers do not share any risk, even 
if their working performance may somewhat determine the chances of their working contract 
being renewed. In most of the contracts, the working time is predefined. The enforcement 
mechanism used by the landlord consists of being present on the field, in order to be able to 
observe and supervise the wage labour work. The fact that the payment is usually made only after 
the harvest is also a contributing factor. 
Plots based on wage labour are significantly better equipped than those based on household 
labour and sharecropping labour. Motor pumps are most often used for irrigation on plots under a 
wage labour contract. Plots based on household labour or a sharecropping contract are more 
intensive in inputs, such as mineral fertilizers, compared to plots under a wage contract. The 
crossed differences are significant at the 10% level. The output in value per hectare is lower on 
plots under a wage labour contract, compared to plots under household labour or a sharecropping 
contract; the difference is significant at the 10% level. However, there is no significant difference 
of output in value per hectare between plots under household labour or sharecropping labour. 
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Table 4.2: A comparison of input use intensity and output across labour. 
Labour type 
Household labour  Sharecropping labour Wage labour Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Plot area (ha)  
Household labour (hr/ha)  
Sharecropping labour (hr/ha)  
Wage labour (hr/ha) 
Input cost (fcfa/ha)  
Motor pump_01 (1=pump) 
0.10 
22,273 
0 
0 
222,385 
0.13 
0.17 
27,683 
0 
0 
223,539 
0.33 
0.22 
1,369 
6,986 
0 
194,301 
0.17 
0.20 
1,653 
6,477 
0 
157,492 
0.38 
0.47 
2,061 
0 
1,547 
151,807 
0.34 
0.30 
2,227 
0 
1,669 
103,508 
0.48 
Output (fcfa/ha) 4,272,630 2,922,235 4,135,407 3,012,896 3,297,387 1,841,990 
Observations (plots) 249 124 29 
4.6.2. An estimation of the production functions 
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the production functions 
estimation. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the plot level, crop-specific production 
functions estimation. 
Overall crops Onion Cabbage Tomato Variables 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Output value (fcfa) 601,693 93,318 772,039 1,112,354 432,843 717,881 288,213 345,348 
Labour (hour)  
Input (fcfa)  
Plot area (m2) 
Motor pump_01 
Season_01  
Soil suitability_01 
955 
27,290 
1,720 
0.15 
0.94 
0.98 
1,456 
43,055 
2,204 
0.36 
0.23 
0.10 
1,480 
32,247 
1,696 
0.01 
1 
0.98 
2,119 
51,018 
1,960 
0.13 
0 
0.11 
619 
21,141 
1,404 
0.22 
0.88 
1.00 
533 
31,396 
2,008 
0.41 
0.31 
0.00 
518 
71,345 
1,081 
0.21 
0.90 
0.96 
283 
14,834 
1,264 
0.41 
0.29 
0.17 
Garden hose_01 
Sprinkler_01 
Sharecropping_01 
Share of women’s off-
farm income (%) 
Share of men’s off-farm 
income (%) 
Women’s annual 
income (fcfa) 
Land owned (ha) 
Bovine cattle  
Distance house-plot 
(km) 
0.18 
0.08 
0.29 
32.78 
 
20.77 
 
342,803 
 
4.03 
4.60 
1.37 
0.38 
0.27 
0.45 
38.18 
 
23.74 
 
493,124 
 
3.78 
8.76 
1.19 
0.01 
0.006 
0.43 
21.33 
 
23.66 
 
290,446 
 
3.69 
5.88 
1.16 
0.11 
0.07 
0.49 
30.84 
 
21.65 
 
315,905 
 
3.88 
10.32 
0.96 
0.16 
0.04 
0.23 
34.41 
 
19.44 
 
415,695 
 
4.18 
3.65 
1.57 
0.37 
0.21 
0.42 
38.26 
 
24.85 
 
579,432 
 
3.46 
7.48 
1.32 
0.24 
0 
0.27 
39.61 
 
18.52 
 
330,759 
 
4.09 
4.56 
1.46 
0.43 
0 
0.45 
40.00 
 
23.51 
 
646,992 
 
3.01 
8.99 
1.37 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the 2SLS and OLS estimations of the production functions for 
overall horticultural crops and for the dominant specific crops, such as onion, cabbage and 
tomato, using data at the plot level. For other horticultural crops, such as potato and green bean, 
the limited number of observations (respectively 9 and 11) did not allow the estimation of their 
crop-specific production functions, particularly when 2SLS is used. The results of the estimation 
differ from those of the previous chapter, because of the difference of the variables controlled in 
the production function and the estimation procedure. In the previous chapter, the stochastic 
frontier production functions were estimated with a maximum likelihood for cross-sectional data, 
in order to derive the efficiency scores. Here, mean production functions are estimated rather than 
frontier production functions.   
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The estimates of the 2SLS differ from those of the OLS. Since OLS is supposed to be biased and 
inconsistent because of the endogenous variables input, labour, and labour*pump, the analysis 
focuses on the 2SLS estimates. As the production functions estimated are log-linear models, the 
coefficients of the different inputs used can be interpreted as elasticities. Thus, the coefficients 
are also equivalent to the percentage change in the output in value, resulting from a one percent 
change in the explanatory variables. Regarding overall crops, except the variable motor pump and 
its interaction with labour and variable soil suitability, all other variables are significant at least at 
the 5% level. In terms of elasticity, the coefficients show that a one percent (1%) increase in 
labour time, whether household labour or sharecropping or wage labour, leads to an increase by 
0.39% of the output in value per plot if there is no motor pump, and only by 0.09% if there is a 
motor pump. The output in value is significantly responsive to input (mineral fertilizers), with an 
elasticity of 0.53%. A one percent increase in plot area cropped also results in an increase of 
0.36% of the output in value per plot. The seasonal effect is significant and negative, which 
means that it is increasing from the first and second seasons (November-February and March-
June, respectively) to the third season (July-October). This seasonal effect reflects the higher 
output prices observed in the third season. 
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Table 4.4: The Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) and Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) estimation 
for plot level crop-specific production functions (robust clusters in households). 
Overall crops Onion Cabbage Tomato Dependent 
variable: 
Log output in 
value (fcfa) 
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
Log Labour (hr)  
 
Log Input (fcfa)  
 
Log Plot area (m2) 
 
Motor pump_01 
 
Log labour* 
Pump_01 
Season_01  
 
Soil suitability_01 
 
Constant  
0.39** 
(0.19) 
0.53** 
(0.23) 
0.36** 
(0.17) 
1.51 
(2.33) 
-0.30 
(0.36) 
-.65*** 
(0.20) 
-0.08 
(0.28) 
3.19*** 
(1.06) 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.69*** 
(0.07) 
0.82 
(0.85) 
-0.17 
 (0.12) 
-0.47 
(0.14) 
-0.08*** 
(0.19) 
5.25*** 
(0.37) 
0.56 
(0.40) 
0.38* 
(0.23) 
0.33 
(0.30) 
 
 
-0.23 
(0.29) 
 
 
0.59** 
(0.26) 
2.33 
(1.87) 
0.36*** 
(.07) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.71*** 
(0.08) 
14.11*** 
(5.14) 
-2.09*** 
(0.81) 
 
 
0.25  
(0.18) 
4.66*** 
0.33 
0.43 
0.35 
0.52** 
0.24 
0.34* 
0.19 
2.08 
2.78 
-0.34 
0.43 
-0.42*** 
0.18 
 
 
2.88 
2.40 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.70*** 
(0.06) 
0.93 
(1.05) 
-0.13 
(0.16) 
-0.40*** 
(0.16) 
 
 
5.73*** 
(0.65) 
0.61* 
0.35 
0.36*** 
0.12 
0.54*** 
0.09 
2.73 
3.87 
-0.54 
0.62 
-0.94*** 
0.35 
-0.46 
0.33 
3.05* 
1.63 
0.33* 
(0.17) 
0.48** 
(0.20) 
0.46*** 
(0.16) 
0.64 
(3.29) 
-0.25 
(0.51) 
-1.02*** 
(0.42) 
-0.31 
(0.37) 
4.04 
(1.07) 
N (plots) 
Cluster (household) 
R2 
Wald Chi2 or F 
336 
140 
0.72 
1302*** 
382 
169 
0.77 
317*** 
141 
72 
0.74 
3937*** 
156 
81 
0.86 
390*** 
134 
94 
0.72 
632*** 
138 
98 
0.79 
138*** 
53 
46 
0.71 
179*** 
63 
56 
0.59 
22*** 
Instrumented Log Input (fcfa), Log labour, Log labour*pump_01 
Additional 
instruments 
Garden hose_01, sprinkler_01, sharecropping_01, land, bovine cattle, share of women’s 
off-farm income, share men’s off-farm income, log plot-household distance, log women’s 
annual income, share of women’s off-farm work*motor pump, log women’s annual 
income*motor pump 
Test of 
endogeneity: 
Robust F 
 
2.40*  
 
5.23***  
 
1.52  
 
0.63 
Test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions: Chi2 
 
 
2.03 (p=0.84) 
 
 
1.71 (p=0.42) 
 
 
1.89 (p=0.86) 
 
 
2.81 (p=0.72) 
***, **, * significant respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level; robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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The effect of the use of a motor pump is positive (as long as log labour is lower than 5), while the 
interaction labour-motor pump is negative, showing a decrease of labour working time when a 
motor pump is used. As shown previously in the descriptive chapter, irrigation is the most time-
costly cropping operation, particularly when it is done manually, with 75% and 85% of the total 
time, respectively, on men’s and women’s plots. Thus, it is important to understand the effect of a 
motor pump on the reduction of the working time, even if it is statistically not significant at the 
10% level. Soil suitability appreciation is negatively related to the output in value, but not 
significant at the 10% level as well. With an R-squared of 0.72, the model shows a high goodness 
of fit for such cross-sectional data. The robust test of endogeneity is significant at the 10% level, 
confirming that the variables input, labour, and interaction labour-motor pump are indeed 
endogenous. The test of overidentifying restrictions is not significant (p=0.84), suggesting the 
validity of all the instruments used and the well-correct specification of the model. However, we 
are suspicious about the high coefficients of the variable input (fertilizer). This may be due to the 
instruments used or the variable input may capture other effects, such as the managerial capacity 
of the producers. 
As can be read from table 4.4, crop-specific production functions present a great difference. The 
responsiveness of the variables differs from one crop to the other, as shown by the difference in 
terms of magnitude and significance of the coefficients. While the onion output is significantly 
responsive (at the 10% level) to inputs and soil suitability, the cabbage output is responsive to 
input and plot area, and tomato to input, plot area, and labour. As for overall crops, the seasonal 
effect is significant for cabbage and tomato. One percent increase in mineral fertilizers input leads 
to an increase of 0.36%, 0.38% and 0.52% of output in value respectively for tomato, onion and 
cabbage. So, cabbage is more responsive to fertilizers than the other crops. The high values of the 
R-squared (0.71 - 0.74) signal a goodness of fit of the crop-specific production functions. 
Variables such as a motor pump, the season, and soil suitability are dropped on the onion 
production function because they are quite invariant. The same goes for the variable soil 
suitability in the cabbage production function. 
The technology shows an increasing return to scale, with a total elasticity of land, labour and 
input greater than one on plots without a motor pump. This means that scaling up all inputs by 
one unit may lead to an increase of the output in value by more than one unit for all crops as well 
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as for each crop. Thus, plots without a motor pump are smaller than the optimal size. Contrary, on 
plots irrigated with a motor pump, the technology displays a constant return to scale, with a total 
elasticity close to one (table 4.5). 
Table 4.5: The return to scale, controlling for crop and irrigation equipment 
Plots  All crops Onion Cabbage Tomato 
Without a motor pump 1.28 1.27 1.29 1.51 
With a motor pump 0.98 1.04 0.95 0.97 
4.6.3. Household profit optimization across plots under a sharecropping labour contract 
and a wage labour contract  
For each plot under a wage labour contract, we collected the time spent by household labour and 
wage workers. For each plot, the ratio time spent by household labour and time spent by hired 
wage workers was computed. The result shows that, for all crops, for each unit of wage labour 
working time, a household spent on average 0.96 units of time supervising hired workers and 
working, since wage labour is generally hired in order to complement household labour. 
According to households hiring wage labour and the agricultural technicians working on the 
extension services, the supervision itself represents on average a quarter of the time spent by 
household members. For each unit of wage labour working time, a household spent on average 
0.96 units of time, of which 0.24 was for supervision and 0.72 for a contribution to cropping 
operations. The supervision rate varies greatly from one household to another and from one crop 
to another. As can also be seen from the kernel density (figure 4.3), most of the household 
members spent about 0.20 of their time supervising the wage labour, while very few spent more 
than 0.30 for each unit of wage labour working time.  
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of the supervision rate of wage labour.  
As defined in the household model (equation 4.23), the profit derived by the household from a 
plot under a sharecropping contract is higher than that from a plot under a wage contract if the 
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with wh= w+σ we 
where :  
 β is the share of profit paid to sharecroppers, equal to 0.5; 
 λ is the production elasticity of labour: λ=λ1 + λ2 *motor pump_01. For each plot, λ was 
calculated.  
 γ is the production elasticity of other inputs (mineral fertilizers); 
 σ is the supervision rate of wage labour; 
 wo is the sharecropper’s opportunity cost or wage for farm or off-farm work; 
 we is the household opportunity cost or off-farm wage; 
 w is the wage paid to hired wage labour by the household;  
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 wh is the wage paid by the household to wage labour, including the supervision cost σ we. 
As expected, it can be deduced from the production function estimated (table 4.4) that higher 
values of λ are obtained without a motor pump (λ=0.39 for overall crops, 0.56 for onion, 0.43 for 
cabbage, and 0.61 for tomato). When a motor pump is used, the production elasticity of labour 
falls (λ=0.09 for overall crops, 0.33 for onion, 0.09 for cabbage, and 0.07 for tomato) because the 
irrigation equipment takes a share of the revenue or output in value. Consequently, it is 
hypothesized that when a motor pump is used, producers would not prefer to hire labour based on 
sharecropping so much because it is less profitable.  
Given β and the estimates λ and γ of the production function (table 4.4), simulations were made 
at plot level to calculate the optimum profit ratio pis*/piw* above (equation 4.23): 
 first, by setting the opportunity cost of sharecropping equal to the wage paid to wage 
workers by the household, including supervision costs: wo=wh or wo/wh =1;   
 second, by setting the opportunity cost of sharecropping lower than the wage paid to wage 
workers by the household, including supervision costs (wo< wh), but equalizing hired 
wages for household plot managers, sharecroppers, and wage labourers (we=wo=w) and 
varying the supervision costs of wage labour (σ). This means varying wo/wh (figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4: A comparison of the average optimum profit derived by the household from plots 
under a sharecropping contract and a wage labour contract and controlling for a motor pump. 
Figure 4.4 is based on the estimates of the production function and shows the variation of the 
average profit ratio pis*/piw* (equation 4.23), varying the wage ratio wo/wh and the supervision rate 
σ. As can be read from figure 4.4, the results of the simulations of the profit ratio pis*/piw* show 
that if the opportunity cost or wage of sharecroppers equals the wage paid by the household to 
hired wage labour plus their supervision cost (wo=wh or wo/wh =1), for overall crops, the 
optimum profit derived by the household from a sharecropping contract is lower than that from a 
wage labour contract (profit ratio pis*/piw*<1). This is the case whether a motor pump is used for 
irrigation on the plot or not. Consequently, at equal wages, for overall horticultural crops, the 
household would prefer to hire labour based on a wage contract rather than a sharecropping 
contract to maximize profit. This conclusion also holds for onion, cabbage and tomato. 
The production elasticity of labour (λ) falls when a motor pump is used for irrigation, and as can 
be observed from graph 4.4, the profit ratio pis*/piw* (equation 4.23) is much lower, making 
sharecropping less profitable compared to the same case without a motor pump. When the ratio 
Chapter 4 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 147 
opportunity cost or the wage of the sharecroppers and the wage paid by the household to hired 
wage labour, supervisions cost (wo/wh) included, decreases, or the other way round, when the 
wage paid by the household to hired wage labour becomes much higher (due to a higher 
supervision rate) than the opportunity cost of the sharecroppers (wh>wo), the profit ratio pis*/piw* 
increases. When wo/wh is equal to 0.9, corresponding to a supervision rate (σ) of about 10%, the 
profit ratio pis*/piw* becomes greater than one and, consequently, the profit derived by the 
household from plots under a sharecropping contract is higher than that from a wage labour 
contract (pis*>piw*). This applies to plots without a motor pump, whereas for plots irrigated with a 
motor pump, a wage labour contract would be more profitable. 
Considering the average rate of the supervision of wage labour applied by a household, which is 
24%, the ratio opportunity cost or the wage of sharecroppers and the wage paid by the household 
to hired wage labour (wo/wh) is equal to 0.81, while the profit ratio pis*/piw* is equal to 2.10 for 
plots without a motor pump and 0.56 for plots irrigated with a motor pump. Consequently, on 
average, the profit ratio pis*/piw* is greater than one on plots without a motor pump, contrary to 
plots with a motor pump. This result suggests that, on average, on plots without motor pumps, a 
sharecropping contract provides to the household a higher optimum profit than a wage contract 
does. However, on average, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, a wage labour contract leads to 
more optimum profit than a sharecropping contract does. On these plots with a motor pump, the 
simulations show that even when the wage paid by the household is two times greater than the 
wage of a sharecropper (wo/wh=1/2), corresponding to a supervision rate of 100%, the household 
would still prefer to hire labour based on a wage labour contract rather than on sharecropping. 
Definitively, on plots equipped with a motor pump, hiring labour based on a wage contract is 
always more profitable for the household than that based on a sharecropping contract. 
For crops like onion, cabbage and tomato, and without a motor pump, a sharecropping contract 
leads to a higher optimum profit for the household (profit ratio pis*/piw*>1) compared to wage 
contract, at the average rate of supervision applied by the household (σ=24%), corresponding to a 
wage ratio of wo/wh, equal to 0.81. When plots are irrigated with a motor pump, at this average 
rate of supervision, hiring labour based on a wage contract is more profitable for the household 
(profit ratio pis*/piw* <1). 
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Graph 4.5 provides a better illustration of the optimization of the household’s profit under a 
labour contract, controlling for crop and motor pump. As can be seen from the graph, the profit 
optimization from plots equipped with a motor pump differs from that without a motor pump. 
While cabbage and onion present the same profit optimization, there is a great difference 
regarding tomato. To sum up, without a motor pump, for all crops together as well as for each 
crop, sharecropping becomes the most profitable labour choice when the wage ratio wo/wh 
decreases corresponding to an increase of the supervision costs of wage labour. However, when 
plots are equipped with a motor pump, sharecropping is not the optimum choice, either at 0% or 
at 100% of the supervision cost for overall crops and for most of the crops. 
 
Figure 4.5: A comparison of the average optimum profit derived by the household from plots 
under a sharecropping contract and a wage labour contract, and controlling for crop and motor 
pump. 
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4.6.4. An efficiency test of the labour contract choice based on optimum profit: the 
sharecropping labour contract versus the wage labour contract 
The test was done for overall crops as well as for cabbage and tomato. Due to limited 
observations under a wage labour contract, the test was not done for onion. Figure 4.6 presents 
the results of the simulations of the ratios by labour contract. 
 
Figure 4.6: An efficiency test of labour contract choice based on optimum profit and varying 
supervision rate or wage ratio: sharecropping labour contract versus wage labour contract. 
For overall crops, on plots based on household labour, sharecropping labour and wage labour, 
when wo/wh is equal to 0.9, corresponding to a supervision rate (σ) of about 10%, the profit ratio 
pis
*/piw* becomes greater than one, implying that the optimum profit derived from a sharecropping 
contract is higher than that derived from wage contract. Consequently, from 10% of the 
supervision rate, the labour choice is efficient on plots based on sharecropping labour and is not 
efficient on plots based on a wage contract.  
Overall crops across labour
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
σ=0% σ=5% σ=10% σ=24% σ=50%
1 0.95 0.91 0.81 0.67
Wage Ratio: Wo/Wh
Pr
o
fit
 
Ra
tio
: 
π
s/
π
w
household labour
sharecropping labour
wage labour
WS pipi >
Sharecropping efficient 
Households Profit Optimization and the Efficiency of Labour Contract Choice 
 150 
Considering the average rate of supervision of wage labour (σ=24%) applied by the household 
and corresponding to a wage ratio wo/wh equal to 0.81, the profit ratio pis*/piw* is greater than one 
on plots without a motor pump, whether under sharecropping, a wage contract or household 
labour, and for overall crops as well as for each crop. These findings mean that, on average, the 
labour choice is efficient on plots without a motor pump and under sharecropping labour, because 
this choice provides the highest optimum profit to the household. Contrary, on average, the labour 
choice is not efficient on plots without a motor pump and under wage labour. Inversely, when a 
motor pump is used for irrigation, the profit ratio pis*/piw* is always lower than one suggesting that 
a higher optimum profit would be derived from a wage labour contract. Accordingly, wage labour 
would be the efficient labour choice for plots equipped with a motor pump. 
The analysis of the data shows that the labour choice is efficient on 82% of the plots under 
sharecropping labour and on 34% of the plots under a wage labour contract. Many plots without a 
motor pump under a wage labour contract would be under a sharecropping contract for household 
profit optimization. Altogether, plot managers made the right labour choice on 73% of the plots 
under a sharecropping or a wage labour contract (table 4.6). 
Table 4.6: Plots with an efficient labour contract choice 
Plots 
Plots with an efficient 
labour contract choice Labour 
Total 
Without a 
motor pump 
With a motor 
pump 
Frequency 
(plots) 
Percent 
Sharecropping labour 
contract 
124 102 22 102 82 
Wage labour contract 29 19 10 10 34 
Total 153 121 32 112 73 
On plots without a motor pump and based on household labour, simulations of the profit ratio 
pis
*/piw*, considering the average supervision rate, indicate that a sharecropping contract would 
provide more optimum profit than a wage contract would, for overall crops and for each crop. 
Nevertheless, a further comparison is required to conclude about the efficiency of choosing 
household labour rather than hired labour, as is done in the following section. 
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4.6.5. An efficiency test  of the labour contract choice based on optimum profit: household 
labour versus the sharecropping labour contract 
Compared to household labour, a sharecropping contract is the efficient labour choice that 
maximizes the household’s optimum profit for a given plot if, as shown in the model (equation 
4.27): 
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                                                              (4.27) 
where wo  and we respectively stand for the opportunity cost or the wage of the sharecropper and 
the household. 
 The ratio of the right-hand side of the equation 4.27 was calculated for each plot, controlling for 
crop, motor pump and labour. Table 4.7 presents the results of the estimation. 
Table 4.7: Comparison of the optimum profit derived from a sharecropping labour contract (pis) 
and household labour (pih) for a given plot and controlling for crop, irrigation equipment, and 
labour. 
pis > pih if wo /we < 
Plots 
Observations 
(plots) Overall 
crops 
Onion Cabbage Tomato 
Without a motor pump  356 0.93 0.88 0.97 0.88 Motor 
pump With a motor pump  66 0.07  0.06 0.004 
Household labour 249 0.82 0.88 0.81 0.76 
Sharecropping contract  124 0.78 0.88 0.69 0.54 Labour 
Wage labour contract  29 0.64  0.64 0.70 
As can be read from table 4.7, the wage ratio presents a great difference, whether the plots are 
equipped with a motor pump or not. When plots are not equipped with a motor pump, 
sharecropping leads to a higher profit than household labour does, if the sharecropper’s wage is 
nearly equal to the household wage (wo/we =0.9). However, when plots are irrigated with a motor 
pump, the wage ratios wo/we should be lower for overall crops and for each crop to justify 
sharecropping. Accordingly, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, sharecropping can provide a 
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higher profit than household labour could, if the household wage is several times (14 times) 
higher than the sharecropper’s wage. 
Moreover, controlling for labour and crop, as can be read from table 4.7, the results show that the 
wage ratio wo /we should on average be lower than one for all crops and for each crop, to make 
sharecropping more profitable than household labour would be. In other words, on average, the 
household would prefer to hire labour based on a sharecropping contract rather than using 
household labour if the household’s wage is higher than the sharecropper’s wage. 
In terms of efficiency implications, the labour choice will be efficient on plots based on 
household labour if the profit derived from plots based on household labour is higher than that 
from sharecropping (pih  > pis ). This is equivalent to the wage ratio wo/we, higher than the values 
indicated on table 4.7. Inversely, the labour choice will be efficient on plots based on 
sharecropping (pis > pih ) if the wage ratio wo /we is lower than the values indicated on table 4.8. At 
equal wages (wo=we), the labour choice would be efficient on plots based on household labour, 
whereas it would be inefficient on plots based on sharecropping labour for overall crops and for 
each crop. 
4.6.6. An efficiency test  of the labour contract choice based on optimum profit: household 
labour versus the wage labour contract  
The wage rate (w) paid by the household to hired wage labour varies from fcfa 68 to fcfa 833, 
with an average of fcfa 310 per hour for overall crops and plots. The hourly wage varies greatly 
from one household to another, from one crop to another, and whether the plot is equipped with a 
motor pump or not. It is lower on plots with a motor pump than on plots without a motor pump, 
where the irrigation is more demanding. The explanation may be that with a motor pump the 
irrigation work becomes easier. Table 4.8 presents the wage paid across plots, crops, and motor 
pump. 
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Table 4.8 Descriptive statistics of the wage paid by the household to hired wage labour across 
plots, crops, and motor pump (fcfa/hr). 
Wage w paid by the household to hired wage labour (fcfa/hr) 
Overall crops Cabbage Tomato 
Plots 
Mean Min Max Mean Mean 
Overall plots 310 68 833 272 331 
Plots without a motor pump  323 68 833 276 380 
Plots a with motor pump  266 183 397 247 183 
As shown in the household model, compared to household labour, a wage labour contract would 
provide a higher profit to the household if: ee www <+ σ . 
Knowing w, the wage paid per hour by the household to hired wage labour, and σ, the 
supervision rate, it is possible to estimate the household wage we, at which a wage labour contract 
is more profitable than household labour. If household members spend more time on the plot than 
wage labourers, supervising the hired labour (σ>1), the ratio will be negative, so this case has not 
to be considered and is even unrealistic. Only the other case is considered (σ<1). Table 4.9 
presents the results of the estimation. 
Table 4.9: A comparison of the optimum profit derived from a wage labour contract (piw) and 
household labour (pih) for a given plot and controlling for crop and irrigation equipment. 
w/(1- σ) in FCFA/hr 
(piw > pih if we > w/(1- σ) ) Plots 
Overall crops Cabbage Tomato 
Overall plots 378 349 435 
Plots without a motor pump  393 332 507 
Plots with a motor pump  318 451 219 
As can be read from table 4.10, the optimum profit derived from plots based on a wage labour 
contract (piw ) would be higher than that from plots based on household labour (pih ) if the 
household wage (we) is greater than fcfa 378 per hour for overall crops and plots. When the plot 
is equipped with a motor pump, the household wage above which hiring wage labour is more 
profitable than using only household labour is lower. This is also the case for tomato, while it is 
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the opposite for cabbage. Thus, controlling for crop and motor pump, some difference appears 
with regard to the wage above which hiring labour is more profitable than using household 
labour. 
In general, on the labour market, household members and sharecroppers may find a wage varying 
from fcfa 1,000 to 2,000 per working day of 7 hours (9h-16h). This is an hourly wage varying 
from fcfa 142 to 285. At these wage rates, on average, the optimum profit derived from plots 
under a wage labour contract is lower than that from plots based on household labour. This may 
explain the reason why so very few households (7%) are hiring labour based on a wage contract. 
Accordingly, horticultural households would have incentives to hire wage labour if they could 
find a better wage rate on the labour market (about fcfa 2500-3000 per day). 
4.6.7. An efficiency test of inputs use based on household profit optimization across labour 
contracts 
The ratios cost of the non-labour input (mineral fertilizers) and the output value were computed 
and compared with the efficient ratios on plots under different labour contracts and irrigation 
equipments (table 4.10). As shown in the household model, the efficient input/output ratios were 
derived from the optimum conditions and differ from plots under a sharecropping contract to 
plots under a wage labour contract (equations 4.30 and 4.31). The estimates corresponding to the 
efficient input/output ratios are apparently very high. This may be due to the 2SLS estimator used 
(instrumental variables), or the variable “input fertilizers” may also capture some other effects, 
such as the managerial capacity of the producers. 
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Table 4.10: The efficiency of the use of inputs based on household profit optimization across 
labour contract and crops. 
Crops Labour 
Ratio 
Input/Output 
(R) 
Efficient Ratio 
Input/Output 
(ER) 
Efficiency 
score (R/ER) 
Household labour 0.08 (0.14) 0.53 0.15 
Sharecropping labour 0.06 (0.06) 0.81 0.07 Overall 
crops 
Wage labour 0.07 (0.09) 0.53 0.13 
Household labour 0.06 (0.06) 0.38 0.16 
Onion 
Sharecropping labour 0.05 (0.04) 0.86 0.06 
Household labour 0.07 (0.09) 0.52 0.13 
Sharecropping labour 0.07 (0.09) 0.80 0.09 Cabbage 
Wage labour 0.12 (0.13) 0.50 0.24 
Household labour 0.12 (0.28) 0.36 0.33 
Sharecropping labour 0.08 (0.07) 0.71 0.11 Tomato 
Wage labour 0.03 (0.03) 0.36 0.08 
Note: standard deviation in parentheses. 
As can be read from table 4.10, controlling for crop and labour, the ratios input/output are much 
lower than the efficient ratios, indicating that the input fertilizer is not used efficiently. The 
efficient ratio over the input/output ratio gives the efficiency scores, which are rather far below 
one controlling for crop and labour contract, thus showing the low efficiency. In fact, for overall 
crops, it requires an increase by one percent of the input cost to efficiently increase the output 
value by 0.53% on plots under household labour or a wage labour contract, and by 0.81% on 
plots under a sharecropping contract. Evidently, the efficient ratios look very high and need to be 
taken “cautiously”. However, even with the OLS estimates, the efficient input/output ratios (0.18 
on sharecropped plots and 0.14 on others) are lower than the efficient ratios. The expenditure in 
fertilizer input is on average less than 10% of the output in value for overall crops and for each 
crop, except for cabbage, on plots under a wage labour contract, and for tomato on plots based on 
household labour. The ratio input/output does not significantly differ (at the 10% level) across 
labour contract for overall crops and for each crop. Controlling for irrigation equipment and 
particularly for a motor pump, the same conclusion on low efficiency holds on plots without a 
motor pump as well as on plots with a motor pump for overall crops. However, although the 
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ratios input/output are always lower than the efficient ratios, they are significantly higher (at the 
1% level) on plots irrigated with a motor pump than they are on plots without a motor pump, and 
particularly on plots under household labour or a sharecropping contract. 
4.7.    Conclusion and policy implications 
In Senegal, labour contracts are used by horticultural households’ landowners as suitable 
strategies to overcome their labour deficit. They are also convenient arrangements for the tenants, 
who are landless because they come from areas that are inappropriate for horticulture. This 
chapter provides theoretical and empirical evidence by designing and testing a model based on 
household profit optimization, to compare the optimum profit derived from plots based on 
household labour, a sharecropping labour contract and a wage labour contract, while controlling 
for irrigation equipment. In doing so, this research makes a scientific contribution to the theory of 
land tenancy, using data from Senegal’s Niayes Zone.  
As expected, the estimation of the production function shows that the production elasticity of 
labour falls when improved irrigation equipment like a motor pump is used. The technology 
displays an increasing return to scale on plots without a motor pump and a constant return to scale 
on plots irrigated with a motor pump. This means that average plots without a motor pump are 
smaller than the optimal size. The findings suggest that when a motor pump is used, producers 
would prefer much less to hire labour based on a sharecropping contract instead of labour based 
on a wage contract. 
The results of the simulations show that if the opportunity cost or wage of sharecroppers (wo) 
equals the wage paid by the household to hired wage labour plus their supervision cost (wh), 
controlling for crop (all crops, onion, cabbage and tomato) and for plot irrigation equipment, the 
optimum profit derived by the household on plots under a sharecropping contract is lower than 
that under a wage labour contract. Consequently, at equal wages, the household would prefer to 
hire labour based on a wage contract rather than a sharecropping contract to maximize profit. 
However, when the wage ratio wo/wh decreases, corresponding to an increase of the supervision 
costs of wage labour, sharecropping becomes the most profitable labour choice, but only without 
a motor pump. Considering the average rate of supervision of wage labour applied by the 
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household which is estimated at 24%, the results suggest that, on average, on plots without motor 
pumps, a sharecropping contract provides to the household a higher optimum profit than a wage 
contract does. However, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, even if the wage paid by the 
household is two times higher than the wage of a sharecropper (wo/wh =1/2), corresponding to a 
supervision rate of 100%, the household would still prefer to hire labour based on a wage labour 
contract rather than on sharecropping. Consequently, we can conclude from this finding that the 
use of a motor pump drives out the sharecropping contract in favour of the wage labour contract. 
In terms of the efficiency implication, the test of the labour contract choice based on optimum 
profit suggests that, at the average rate of the supervision of wage labour applied by the 
household (24%), without a motor pump, the labour choice is efficient on plots under 
sharecropping labour, because this choice provides the highest optimum profit to the household. 
However, on plots equipped with a motor pump, wage labour would be the efficient labour 
choice. Altogether, plot managers made the efficient labour choice on 73% of the plots under a 
sharecropping or a wage labour contract. Most of the households would like to have a motor 
pump but some of them cannot afford it because of lack of capital and limited access to credit. In 
that sense, in the short term the use of the motor pump may be considered as exogenous, but it 
may be endogenous in the long term. Actually, the households who have already a motor pump 
may choose to buy an additional one based on the expected returns.  
A comparison of the sharecropping contract and household labour shows that when plots are not 
equipped with a motor pump, sharecropping leads to a higher profit than household labour does if 
the sharecropper’s wage is nearly equal to the household wage. When plots are irrigated with a 
motor pump, sharecropping can provide a higher profit than household labour does, but only if 
the household wage is much higher than the sharecropper’s wage. 
Considering the average market wage rate for unskilled workers, the finding suggests that the 
optimum profit derived from plots under a wage labour contract is lower than that under 
household labour. However, the household wage above which hiring wage labour is more 
profitable than using only household labour, is lower when the plot is equipped with a motor 
pump. This means that horticultural households would have more incentives to hire wage labour 
if they could find a higher wage on the labour market and if they were better equipped. 
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The test of the efficiency of the inputs indicates that, on average, controlling for crop, the input 
fertilizer is used inefficiently, both on plots without a motor pump and those with a motor pump, 
although the latter generally exhibit higher efficiency scores. Controlling for crop and labour, the 
findings also suggest that the input is used as inefficiently on plots under household labour as on 
plots under a sharecropping contract or a wage labour contract. Consequently, this empirical 
evidence challenges the Marshallian common wisdom that connects sharecropping to 
inefficiency. 
To sum up, these findings provide a better understanding of the reasons behind the existence and 
perpetuation of sharecropping over time and over developing countries like Senegal. The findings 
sketch the trend or the dynamic of the labour contract in a context of mechanization of the 
production. With the use of the motor pump, the future of the sharecropping arrangement is 
threatened in favour of the wage labour contract, unless the sharing terms for the landowner 
change. These findings complement the existing knowledge on labour arrangements provided by 
many empirical studies (Stiglitz, 1989; Ray 1998; Ghatak and Pandey, 2000; Otsuka and Hayami, 
1988; Canjels, 1996). These findings call for some policy implications. Most of all, an 
improvement of irrigation equipment is urgently required, not only to make the production 
system less labour-intensive, but also to enable large-scale production and to improve the 
economic performance. Actually, the plots, and particularly those under household labour, are 
mostly very small. They often are under the optimum size, mainly because of labour and water 
constraints rather than land availability. Good agricultural programmes should be able to address 
these constraints and to lead to key achievements if designed and implemented successfully. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Risk can be defined as uncertain consequences or an exposure to potentially unfavourable 
circumstances (Smith et al., 1999). By definition, risk is something undesirable (Smith et al., 
1999). Risk is different from uncertainty, which reflects an imperfection in knowledge without 
any particular value assessment about the consequences. While the probability of the distribution 
of outcomes related to risky prospects is known, that related to uncertain prospects is unknown 
and unquantifiable, unless subjectively. Risk is related to an action and is the chance of winning 
or losing, usually measured in terms of probability or variance (Roumasset et al., 1979). 
Agricultural production typically constitutes a risky business. Farm households face a variety of 
risks. Among them, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) have distinguished two main categories: 
 A production risk due to weather variability, pests and diseases, other environmental 
hazards such as inundation, drought, hurricanes, frost, et cetera; 
 A price risk, particularly regarding the output price, which impacts upon the producer’s 
decision making and income. 
Most agricultural economists would agree that the producers’ attitude towards risk determines 
their decision making, particularly in developing countries characterized by a high risk, a low 
income, and few risk-spreading options (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). Not only is the risk higher 
in poor rural economies, affecting farm households in several and profound ways, but poor farm 
households also lack the possibilities to deal with risk (Fafchamps, 2003). With limited access to 
credit and insurance markets, it becomes difficult to manage or cope with risk efficiently. While 
some wealthy households can find strategies to cope with risk and its consequences, like income 
volatility, through the use of their savings or through borrowing money, poor farm households 
only have recourse to defensive portfolio strategies to smooth their income and assets (van den 
Berg et al., 2009). 
Attitudes towards risk may not only be caused by poverty, but may contribute to maintain and 
emphasize poverty as well. As analysed by Morduch (1994), households may sacrifice their 
expected income in order to cope with risk through, for instance, a diversification of their crops 
or activities even if these are less profitable, but at least more free of risk. Such coping strategies 
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provide short-term protection at a long-term cost (Abreha, 2007). To cope with risk, low-income 
households would opt for satisfying their current consumption by selling their productive assets 
and, consequently, by forgoing their expected future income. Such inappropriate or inefficient 
risk-coping strategies may lead to chronic or persistent poverty and an increase in the households’ 
vulnerability. A producer’s attitude toward risk and coping strategies should be a serious concern 
for poverty alleviation and economic development, particularly in developing countries. 
Extensive research has shown that farmers are risk averse (Binswanger, 1980; Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger, 1993; Smith et al., 1999; Senkondo, 2000; Kumbhakar, 2002; Gomez-Limon et al., 
2002; Fafchamps, 2003; Just and Pope, 2003; Wick et al., 2004; Brons, 2005; Simtowe, 2006; 
Abreha, 2007; van den Berg et al., 2009). These studies attempted to explain risk attitudes from 
individual socio-economic characteristics, such as wealth or income, family size, education, age, 
and gender. There is a mixture of evidence on the relationship between risk behaviour and these 
variables. Especially with regard to gender, while Binswanger (1980), Senkondo (2000), Simtowe 
(2006), and Cramer et al. (2002) have found that it does not significantly affect risk attitude, other 
authors (Wick et al., 2004; Brons, 2005; Senkondo, 2000; Croson and Gneezy, 2008; and 
Borghans et al., 2009) have found that women are more risk averse than men. Croson and Gneezy 
(2008) have tried to explain the gender difference in risk behaviour by the gender dissimilarity in 
emotional reaction, in overconfidence, and in the interpretation of the risk as a challenge or a 
threat. Accordingly, gender and risk aversion remain an interesting research issue. 
Methodologies used to provide empirical evidence of individuals’ risk attitudes can be classified 
into two main categories: econometric and experimental approaches. The econometric approach, 
mainly based on utility function or expected utility maximization, is criticized for overestimating 
risk aversion, confounding risk behaviour with other determinants, such as the resource 
constraints faced by decision makers (Wick et al., 2004; Just and Pope, 2005). This is particularly 
important in developing countries that are characterised by imperfect markets and, as a result, by 
the non-separability of production and consumption decisions (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; 
Wick et al., 2004). For these reasons, in this study, we adopted the experimental approach to 
elicit the producer’s attitude toward risk. The experimental approach is rooted in hypothetical 
questions regarding risk alternatives or risky games with or without real monetary payoffs 
(Binswanger, 1980; Wick et al., 2004; Brons, 2005). Obviously, for any approach, one must be 
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careful about interpreting agricultural choices or decision making as strong evidence that risk 
aversion is the primary explanation. To better understand the magnitude and implications of risk 
aversion, attention must be paid to the technical, physical, social, and financial structure of 
agricultural production and the inter-temporal dependence of income shocks and marginal 
utilities (Just and Pope, 2003). 
In sum, attitudes toward risk are an important issue associated with farm households’ behaviour, 
and may affect farm performance. Particularly in Senegal, for horticultural households, the 
market or output price is a major risk due to its high volatility. Although there is extensive 
theoretical literature on output price risk, the empirical evidence is relatively scarce (contrary to 
that regarding production risk, which is the subject of many empirical studies, (Kumbahar, 
2002)). Furthermore, risk attitude may be considered as an individual characteristic. Within a 
household, the risk attitude may differ between the husband and wives who are managers of their 
separate plots, and this may have consequences for the efficient distribution of inputs among 
them. In addition, the optimal choices of input levels may differ, even if the underlying 
technology would be the same. In terms of labour, while some horticultural households rely on 
household labour, others have recourse to hired labour based on a sharecropping contract or a 
wage contract. The decision making with regard to the labour choice may be determined by risk 
attitudes. 
As mentioned by Fafchamps (2003), in the context of developing countries, theory on risk 
behaviour is much more advanced than empirical work is. The scientific significance of this 
research is not only to contribute to the body of empirical evidence, but also to contribute to the 
reinforcement of the theoretical literature about risk attitudes. For this reason, this research aims 
to provide both theoretical and empirical evidence of measures and effects of risk attitudes, 
distinguished by gender. More precisely, this research endeavours to investigate the causal 
relationship between producers’ risk attitude, the indicators of performance, and the decisions 
made regarding the choice of input and labour contracts, controlling for other exogenous 
characteristics such as age, education, gender, wealth, location, et cetera. 
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We will use an experimental method to address the following research questions: 
 Do risk preferences differ between husband and wives, and between male and female 
heads of the household? 
 If so, how are they related to individual characteristics, and what are the consequences for 
the household’s economic performance, and particularly for the allocative efficiency of 
input choice? 
 What are the effects of the risk attitude on the choice of labour contracts? 
The results show that, on average, men and women producers display absolute risk aversion 
towards the output market price, and that women are as risk averse as men. As expected, and in 
line with the theoretical model, the empirical evidence shows that the allocative inefficiency in 
the use of inputs increases with risk aversion. Moreover, the empirical evidence confirms the 
theoretical model’s assumption that if producers are more risk averse, they will prefer to hire 
labour based on a sharecropping contract rather than on a wage contract. 
After the presentation of the background, the research objectives and questions, and the main 
findings through this introduction, the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next 
section will present the methodology and more specifically the experimental procedure and the 
theoretical models used to measure risk aversion. We will also discuss the effects of risk aversion 
on the choice of inputs and labour contract. Then the empirical results and the discussion will 
follow. Finally, the conclusion and policy implications will ensue. 
5.2. The experimental design and procedure 
The research method is based on a large survey and the implementation of an experiment to 
measure the risk attitude of men and women or husband and wives plot managers within the same 
household. A total of 285 plot managers, including 186 men and 99 women from 203 households, 
have been surveyed in Senegal’s Niayes Zone. The survey was conducted through a gender 
approach including both men and women and through a procedure, including: 
1) the identification and classification of different types of risk faced by men and women 
plot managers within horticultural households; 
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2) the measurement of the incidence of each source of risk, using an index measure of 
incidence developed by Smith et al. (1999) to capture the breadth of the risk, or the 
proportion affected within the sample of horticultural households under study; 
3) an assessment of the severity of the risks (Smith et al., 1999) confronting horticultural 
households by using a ranking; 
4) the setting of the probability of occurrence of each risk or the number of horticultural 
seasons for which the risk occurs and its consequences for horticultural households; 
5) an appreciation of the predictability of the output market prices and of the possibility to 
make predictions for next month, given the current output market price. 
After the completion of the questionnaire, the experimental game of the measurement of risk 
attitude towards the output market price was implemented separately for each man and woman 
plot manager within the household, to avoid any influence between household members. Given 
the current range of output market prices in the village or surrounding zone, and given the 
horticultural crop currently in production in the field, we presented a “risky market A” with 
uncertain output prices of PA1 and PA2. PA1 is the low uncertain output price and PA2 the high one; 
each output price has a probability of occurrence of 50%, like a standard gamble. This was 
explained to the respondents as being similar to tossing a coin (head or tail). Another alternative 
“risk-free market B” was defined, with a certain price of PBi, varying between PA1 and PA2 (PA1 < 
PBi < PA2). Then, we asked the producers on which of the two markets they would prefer to sell 
their production if they were to harvest it today. The game started with either a high or a low 
price PBi and accordingly, the certain price PBi was gradually lowered or increased until the plot 
manager became indifferent or switched from risky market A (uncertain prices PA1 and PA2) to 
risk-free market B (certain price PBi), or the other way round. The output price PBi at which the 
producer becomes indifferent or switches from one market to another corresponds to the certainty 
equivalent price PE of the respondent.  
The objective was to implement a real game with real payment, but due to the limited research 
budget, this was not possible. Nevertheless, lots of efforts were made to bring producers to 
imagining themselves as being in a real situation, so that one could suppose the same results 
would come up if there would be any real payment. The producers showed great interest and 
understanding; they thoroughly enjoyed the experiment, which they found very innovative. 
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5.3. The theoretical model 
5.3.1. Modelling risk attitude 
Within horticultural households, men and women plot managers face an output market price risk. 
When producing, neither the men nor the women can predict perfectly at what price they will sell 
their crop after harvesting. The market price fluctuates a lot and impacts upon the horticultural 
revenue. Even if the yield per hectare achieved is high, if the output market price is low, the 
revenue derived from the production will be low, too. 
Considering the experiment we did with two alternative markets:  
 Risky market A with uncertain output prices PA1, with a probability of occurrence 1- α 
and output prices PA2, with a probability of occurrence α  
 Market B, free of risk, with a certain output price PB with a probability of occurrence 1. 
Following the method of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and Cramer et al. (2002), the expected 
utility of the producer when choosing certain market B or uncertain market A is given as: 
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where U is the utility function of wealth and PA2 - PB is the additional benefit won when the 
producer chose to sell the production on risky market A and was lucky to get the high output 
price PA2, whereas  PB - PA1 is the loss when the producer got the low price PA1. 
The second-order Taylor series approximation gives: 
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At the equivalent output price PE from which the producer is willing to shift from uncertain 
market A to certain market B or vice-versa, the expected utility of the uncertain output market 
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price E(UA) is equal to the utility of the certain or risk-free output market price U(PE), so that 
equation 5.2 becomes: 
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So, 
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As defined by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964), two types of risk can be distinguished: absolute 
risk aversion (RA) and relative risk aversion (RR), defined as follows: 
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where PE is the certainty equivalent price. Considering the experiment, α was set to ½, then the 
risk aversion scores can be deduced as follows: 
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The first hypothesis tested is whether or not men and women horticultural plot managers within 
the household behave differently towards the output market price risk. The review of the 
literature shows controversial evidence about gender and risk attitude. 
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5.3.2. Modelling the effect of risk on the efficiency of the choice of inputs and labour  
Suppose that the choice of the level of input used for production is a function of the attitude 
toward risk. When producing, the input price is known but such is not the case for the output 
price. Producers then use the input, given the uncertainty of the output market price. In this way, 
it might turn out that producers with a higher risk aversion use less input than less risk averse 
producers. Accordingly, risk aversion may have an effect on the marginal value product of the 
input, which should equal to the input price if allocative efficiency holds. Therefore, we 
conjecture that more risk averse producers are less allocatively efficient. 
Based on the conventional concept of allocative efficiency, there is a non-risky efficient level of 
input use or an optimal level of input use for a risk-neutral landowner and this is considered as 
the benchmark for efficiency. However, it may be also optimal for risk averse producers to use 
less input when the output market prices fluctuate. Some economists would argue that these risk 
averse producers who choose to use less inputs are efficient, too. The traditional concept of 
allocative efficiency assumes certainty. Under uncertainty, the traditional measure may no longer 
be appropriate. We may posit that allocative efficiency should reflect risk aversion.  
Consider a male or female producer with a profit π derived from horticultural production, 
specified as follows: 
XPwLLXfP XY −−= ),(θpi                                                                               (5.6) 
Where PY is the output price, f is the output, which is a function of input X and labour L, w is the 
household labour opportunity cost, PX is the input price, and θ is the random variable associated 
with the output price risk, with an expected value one and variance σ2 (Eθ=1 and Varθ= σ2). 
The objective of the producer is to maximize the expected utility of profit EU(π), defined as: 
 Max ]),([ XPwLLXfPEU XY −−θ                                                                     (5.7) 
The producer has to optimize production, by choosing an amount of input X, so that: 
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As PX, PY and fX’ are non-random, the equation becomes: 
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The left-hand side of the equation corresponds to the ratio marginal value product of input X and 
its price, and this corresponds to the measured indicator of allocative efficiency. The right-hand 
side is the ratio of the expected marginal utility of the profit over the expected marginal utility of 
the random profit. So, the equation establishes the relationships between the producer’s allocative 
efficiency and the marginal utility of the expected random profit. 
Furthermore, by a first-order approximation of θ around 1, it follows: 
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With the variance σ2 equal to: 
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Then 
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Knowing EU’(π) and EU’(π)θ, equation 5.9 can be written as: 
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Knowing the producer’s risk attitude, defined by the absolute risk aversion score RA: 
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Replacing U” by its value gives: 
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As the relative risk aversion RR is related to the random part of the revenues only, it is: 
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This equation suggests that an allocative efficiency of inputs is a function of the producer’s risk 
aversion and the variance σθ2 of the random variable θ associated with output market price risk.  
If 
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then, producers choose the input in such a way that its marginal value product over input price, 
which corresponds to the efficiency rate is equal to unity. This means that, in this case, producers 
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are fully allocatively efficient. The marginal product of input is equal to the ratio input price over 
output price. This means that producers choose the optimum amount of input X*.  
For the risk averse producers, RA and RR are positive. In addition, if the expected utility function 
U(π) is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U’’(π)<0, and σθ2 is positive, then it 
follows: 
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Consequently, risk averse producers are allocatively inefficient, which means they use sub-
optimally low levels of input. When RA or RR increases, the allocative inefficiency increases as 
well. In other words, the greater the risk aversion score is, the greater the allocative inefficiency 
is, too. On the other hand, for producers who are risk lovers, RA and RR are negative. In that case, 
it follows that they are allocatively inefficient and they overuse the input, which means that they 
use it at a level greater than the optimum one. Only risk-neutral producers (RA and RR are equal 
to zero) are fully allocatively efficient. They use the input at the optimum level to equalize the 
marginal value product to the unit input price. 
The same theory holds for the labour input, for which the relationships between allocative 
efficiency and risk aversion can be specified as follows: 
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The second hypothesis tested is that more risk averse producers allocate their inputs (fertilizers, 
seeds, pesticides) and labour less efficiently. 
5.3.3. Modelling the effect of risk on the choice of labour contract 
We suppose that men and women producers who are risk averse are more willing to hire labour 
based on a sharecropping contract than labour based on a wage contract, or to use household 
labour. The terms of the sharecropping contract and particularly the sharing rules are fixed and 
defined before the start of the production. On a contract based on wage labour, the wage to pay is 
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known at the beginning of the production. The wage rate is fixed whatever the result of the 
production and, consequently, whatever the output market price (which is uncertain). Contrary, 
under a sharecropping contract, the producer landowner has to pay a share of the expected profit 
to the tenant, given the uncertainty of the output market price. Thus, both the landlord and the 
tenant share the output market price risk. 
Under a sharecropping contract, the producer/landlord’s expected profit can be specified as: 
]),()[1( ** sXsssYs XPXLfP −−= θβpi                                                                         (5.17) 
while the tenant’s or sharecropper’s expected profit is: 
oosXsssYt LwXPXLfP +−= ]),([θβpi  subject to os LLL +=                                    (5.18) 
where 1-β and β stand for the respective share of the profit expected by the producer/landlord and 
the tenant, fs is the expected production, which is a function of the input Xs and labour Ls, PY is 
the expected output market price, PX is the input price, and L is the tenant’s total labour 
endowment, with Ls being labour allocated to sharecropping, and Lo being labour allocated to 
other off-farm work at a wage rate wo. 
The sharecropper’s objective is to maximize his expected utility of profit, in order to equate the 
marginal utility of the extra income (given by β times the marginal value product) to the marginal 
utility of the wage rate in alternative employment. His objective can be defined as follows: 
)]}(]),([[{)( sosXsssYt LLwXPXLfPUMaxEMaxEU −+−= θβpi                           (5.19) 
The first-order conditions with respect to labour Ls are: 
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Rt is the relative risk aversion coefficient of the sharecropper. 
When the landowner/manager hires labour under sharecropping, given the uncertainty of the 
output market price, he/she would decide on providing the inputs X so as to maximize the 
expected utility of profit EU(pis), which is defined as follows: 
]]}),()[1[({)( sXsssYs XPXLfPUMaxEMaxEU −−= θβpi                                          (5.21) 
In this process, the responses of the sharecropper to changes in X are taken into account. The 
optimal levels depend, therefore, on the sensitivity of the worker’s marginal product to changes in 
X, which is given by the cross-derivative of fs with respect to Ls and X.  
The first-order condition for the optimal input of X is 
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The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) shows the adjustment of the price by the risk factor: 
the higher the plot manager’s relative risk aversion (RS), the higher the effective price that the 
marginal value product is compared with. The second term shows the effect of the worker’s 
adjustment to more inputs. Typically, this term is negative, thus inducing a lower optimal value 
for the marginal product of X and more use of X. 
We elaborate this for the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. Dropping the suffix s, this 
function is:  
γλ XaLXLff == ),(                                                                                                     (5.23) 
The optimal input of a sharecropper’s time, as a function of X, is then 
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and the plot manager’s optimization problem )])*,()(1[(max XPXLfPEU XY −− θβ  has as first-
order condition for X 
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where R is the plot manager’s relative risk aversion coefficient. In the Cobb-Douglas case, and 
with the above expression for L, this leads to an optimal use of X given by 
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The expression shows how the effective price of X is increased by risk aversion, but ‘decreased’ 
by the effect on the sharecropper’s labour input, given by the factor )1( λ− . The sharecropper’s 
effective wage is enhanced by risk aversion and by the share β. 
To simplify the expression, denote: 
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With the optimal input of X, and the concomitant input of L by the sharecropper, the expected 
level of profits is given by the following expression. 
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To show how the choice for sharecropping depends on risk aversion, we can compare this level of 
expected profits with the level for wage labour contracts. 
Under a wage labour contract, when paying a wage rate w to the hired labourer, the producer 
would expect a profit πw, defined as: 
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]),([ wwXwwwYw wLXPXLfP −−= θpi                                                                          (5.28) 
Given the uncertainty of the output market price, when hiring wage labour, the producer 
maximizes the expected utility of profit EU(piw), defined as 
]}),([{)( wwXwwwYw wLXPXLfPUMaxEMaxEU −−= θpi                                            (5.29) 
The optimal choice of labour and inputs leads to the following expression for the expected profits 
under a wage labour contract  
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The differences between (5.30) and (5.27) are in the roles of vs and vw, which differ by a factor 
(1-λ) in the effective wages (w/vw for wage workers, and w0/β/vt for sharecroppers) and in the 
overall reduction factors. 
The question now is how any choice between hiring workers as sharecroppers or as wage workers 
depends on the risk aversion of the plot manager. Note that the plot manager’s risk aversion has 
an impact on the amount of labour hired under the wage contract, but not under the sharecropping 
contract, as in this case the choice is made by the sharecropper. In both cases, the choice of the 
inputs X is dependent on the risk aversion, and in the case of sharecropping, this effect is 
mitigated by the indirect effect on the sharecropper’s labour input. This is why we defined the vs, 
incorporating the factor (1-λ), in the denominator. 
Relative levels of profit under both types of contract will depend on the behaviour of the 
sharecropper (his opportunity costs and risk aversion), on the share, and on the parameters. The 
effect of a change in the plot manager’s risk aversion on the choice of labour contract can 
therefore not be directly seen from the profit functions themselves. 
We can, however, derive the effect by looking at how profit levels respond to changes in the plot 
manager’s relative risk aversion R, holding constant the sharecropper’s risk aversion Rt. If one 
type of profit is more responsive to changes in R than another type, we can expect there to be an 
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effect on the choice of labour contract. For, if the variables would make the two profits equal, a 
change in risk aversion will tilt the balance in favour of one of them. In general, the effect of R on 
profits is negative: more risk aversion leads to lower profits. Thus, if an increase in R lowers the 
profits of wage contracts by more than profits under sharecropping contracts, this would mean 
that managers with a higher risk aversion are more inclined to go for sharecropping than for wage 
contracts. 
The two expressions for the derivatives of profits with respect to R are: 
for sharecropping: 
λ
σ
γ
γpipi θ
−






−
−−=
11
11 2
ss
s
s
vnvdR
d
                                                                                        (5.31) 
and for wage contracts: 
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                                                                        (5.32) 
Figure 5.1 shows the behaviour of the two expressions over the profit for λ=0.5, γ=0.2 and 
2
θσ =0.2.  
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Figure 5.1:  The fall in profits for unit changes in relative risk aversion coefficients. 
As shown in figure 5.1, the (downward) sensitivity of the profits to an increase in risk aversion is 
greater under a wage contract than it is under a sharecropping contract. This result also holds for 
lower and higher values of λ or γ. 
The conclusion is, therefore, that higher levels of risk aversion of the plot manager would favour 
a choice for sharecropping rather than wage contracts. This is the third hypothesis to be tested. 
Both under sharecropping and wage contracts, the choice of inputs X is dependent on the risk 
aversion. However, in the case of sharecropping, this effect is mitigated by the fact that the risk is 
shared between the plot manager/landowner and the sharecropper. For this reason, the plot 
manager may provide more inputs under a sharecropping arrangement than under a wage 
contract. 
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5.4. The empirical model and estimation 
Modelling the effect of risk on the choice of inputs and labour  
Following Zellner et al. (1966), as quoted by Kumbhakar (2002), we assume that the expected 
output price YP  is equal to the observed output price PY, expressed as: 
YYYYY PEPPEPP ==⇔= )()( θθ  if E(θ)=1 and Var(θ)=σ.                                        (5.33) 
Based on this assumption, knowing the producer’s allocative inefficiency of inputs (derived from 
the gender-specific production functions of the previous Chapter 4), the effect of the output price 
risk on it can be tested, using the following function: 
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where: 
 M is the risk perception measured in terms of the appreciation of market price 
predictability;   
 S is a vector of status, including the producer’s socio-economic characteristics, such as the 
status of the head of household, the gender, age, education, number of wives, the women’s 
status (first wife, second wife, et cetera), the access to credit and extension services, et 
cetera; 
 W is a vector of wealth, including the men’s annual income, the women’s annual income, 
the share of the men’s off-farm income, the share of the women’s off-farm income, the 
household’s labour endowment (or household size), the household’s land endowment, the 
plot area cropped, et cetera;  
 L is a vector of location: the north, centre, or south zone of Niayes. 
Fully allocatively efficient producers choose the input in such a way that its marginal value 
product divided by input price, which corresponds to the efficiency rate is equal to one. Thus, the 
Chapter 5 
 178 
marginal value product of inputs divided by input price minus one (the left-hand side of equation 
5.34) is used to capture the allocative inefficiency of inputs. 
Modelling the effect of risk on the choice of labour contract 
We used the binary choice (or univariate dichotomous) models to test the hypothesis that 
producers using sharecropping should have a higher risk aversion score compared to producers 
using wage labour or household labour,. These models describe the probability of choosing a 
sharecropping contract (Sh=1) rather than a wage contract or household labour (Sh=0), and also 
the probability of choosing a wage labour contract (Wg=1) instead of the alternative choices 
(Wg=0), depending on the man’s or woman’s risk attitude (RA) and other individual 
characteristics (X). These models can be expressed as follows:  
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                                                                              (5.35) 
where α and χ are the parameters to be estimated associated with risk attitude, respectively on the 
sharecropping contract and wage contract binary choice models, while β and δ are vectors of 
parameters associated with vectors of individual characteristics (X), hypothesized to affect the 
labour choice. 
5.5. The empirical results  
5.5.1. The identification of different risks and classification by order of severity 
Risks faced by rural households in developing countries can be classified in four types:  
 environmental hazards like drought, inundation, hurricanes, an earthquake, fire, a pest; 
 the disease and death of people or livestock; 
 business shocks like a change in the input and output prices, or an economic crisis; 
 policy shocks like a conflict, a putsch, or war. 
For men and women plot managers, the different risks faced in their horticultural activities were 
identified and prioritized by order of severity. The examination of the results shows that the first 
risk identified as the most severe by men and women plot managers is the output market price. 
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About 96% of the men and women identified the output market price as the most important risk 
they face. With the high fluctuation of the horticultural output market price, which is responsive 
to the supply and demand, when producing, male and female plot managers can never know for 
certain at which price they will be able to sell their production later on, after harvesting. 
Furthermore, the output price is one of the foremost key determinants of revenue. Therefore, one 
could understand why both men and women found the output market price the most severe risk 
they face when producing, since it can gravely decrease their revenue. With the free market, men 
and women plot managers are price-takers. Moreover, as horticultural products quickly perish, 
the absence of any means of storage and conservation, often immediately after harvesting, forces 
producers to sell their production automatically, whatever the market prices. If they have found a 
good output market price, they are lucky to achieve a good revenue and profit, but otherwise, the 
revenue will be low whatever the high level of yield realised. 
The second most severe risk is the productivity (mainly of land and seed) identified and classified 
by 95% of the men and women plot managers. The third important risk is parasitism (plant 
diseases, locust invasions), identified by 57 % of the men and 42% of the women plot managers. 
A gender analysis shows that, for both men and women, the first three risks are the same. A 
gender difference occurs in the other risks identified. While women plot managers identified as 
other, secondary risks the irregularity of the water provision (for those connected to the Water 
Corporation - SDE) and wandering cattle, men found five other risks in addition, such as the 
climate (inundations due to an excess of rain), the perishable nature of horticultural product, the 
selling means (the availability of transport means such as freight for export), the crop choice, and 
the availability of sharecroppers. Table 5.1 presents the different risk identified and ranked by 
order of severity by men and women plot managers. 
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Table 5.1: The identification and prioritization, by order of severity, of different risks faced by 
plot managers across gender     
Risk ranking by order of severity 
1st risk 2nd risk 3rd risk 4th risk Identified risks Gender 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Output market 
price 
Men 
Women 
161 
74 
96.99 
96.10 
3 
3 
1.83 
4.05 
2 
0 
7.14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Productivity Men 
Women 
2 
2 
1.20 
2.60 
157 
71 
95.73 
95.95 
5 
1 
17.86 
14.29 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Parasitism Men 
Women 
0 
1 
0 
1.30 
1 
0 
0.61 
0 
16 
3 
57.14 
42.86 
1 
0 
50 
0 
Water provision Men 
Women 
3 
0 
1.81 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
28.57 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Perishable product Men 
Women 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0.61 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Selling means Men 
Women 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0.61 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Crop choice Men 
Women 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0.61 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Climate Men 
Women 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
14.29 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Sharecroppers’ 
availability 
Men 
Women 
0 
.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3.57 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Wandering cattle  Men 
Women 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
14.29 
1 
0 
50 
0 
Total  Men 
Women 
Overall 
166 
77 
243 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
164 
74 
238 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
28 
7 
35 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
2 
0 
2 
100.00 
0.00 
100.00 
5.5.2. Measurement of risk occurrence 
The risk occurrence is the number of horticultural seasons for which the risk occurs out of 10 
seasons. For each risk, the occurrence was evaluated by male and female plot managers. The 
results are presented in table 5.2. The chance of an occurrence of the output market price risk 
varies from one to ten out of ten horticultural seasons. On average, for both men and women, the 
high volatility of output market price occurs seriously in 6 out of 10 seasons. The chance of an 
occurrence of the productivity risk is set to 3 by men and to 4 by women; it is almost similar to 
that of the parasitism risk (table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2: The chance of an occurrence of risk across gender 
Chance of risk occurring  
(number of seasons out of 10 ) Types of risk Plot manager’s gender 
 Mean Min Max 
1. Output market price 
Overall 
Men 
Women  
5.97 
6.10 
5.70 
1 
1 
1 
10 
10 
9 
2. Productivity 
Overall 
Men 
Women  
3.61 
3.40 
4.08 
1 
1 
1 
9 
8 
9 
3. Parasitism 
Overall 
Men 
Women  
3.16 
2.83 
4.28 
0 
0 
1 
7 
7 
7 
5.5.3. Measurement of the perception of the output market price risk  
To measure the perception of the output market price risk, we asked men and women plot 
managers a series of questions about the predictability of the output market price and the 
annoyance caused by the output market price volatility. 
Output market price predictability and annoyance 
To the question “How do you assess the predictability of the market price?”, about 80% of the 
men and 90% of the women replied “unpredictable” (table 5.3). This means that a vast majority 
of men and women perceived the output market price as a real risk. No woman found the output 
market price predictable, while more than 2% of the men found it predictable. Also, more men 
than women found the market price quite or a little bit predictable. Therefore, some gender 
difference can be noticed in terms of the appreciation of the output market price predictability 
and, subsequently, in terms of its perception as a real risk.  
Table 5.3: The appreciation of the output market predictability by men and women plot managers  
Frequency Percent Output market price predictability 
Men  Women  Overall  Men  Women  Overall  
Predictable  4 0 4 2.44 0 1.66 
Quite predictable 30 8 38 18.29 10.39 15.77 
Unpredictable  130 69 199 79.27 89.61 82.57 
Total  164 77 241 100 100 100 
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Similarly, the vast majority of men and women strongly agreed that it is annoying, the way in 
which output prices can fluctuate. The percentages of men and women who strongly agreed are 
quite equivalent to those who found the output market price unpredictable (table 5.4). This shows 
again that the output market price is truly perceived as a risk. A pairwise correlation between the 
appreciation of the output market price predictability and the appreciation of the annoying output 
price fluctuation shows a coefficient of 0.13, significant at the 5% level. 
Table 5.4: The annoying output market price fluctuation 
Frequency Percent Annoying output price fluctuation? 
Men  Women  Overall  Men  Women  Overall  
Totally disagree  5 1 6 3 1 3 
Disagree 9 0 9 5 0 4 
Don’t care 9 4 13 6 5 5 
Agree 10 5 15 6 7 6 
Strongly agree  130 67 197 80 87 82 
Total  163 77 240 100 100 100 
The probability of predictions of the output market price  
The results of the predictions of the output market price for next month, given the current market 
price (P), show that women are more optimistic (table 5.5). Women predict a higher probability 
of an increase of the output price (69%) compared to men (46%). The predictions change over 
time and crops. While from August to November, an increase in the output market price is 
predicted most often, from December to January, the probability of a decrease is greater. These 
predictions are realistic because the first period corresponds to the third horticultural season and 
coincides with the rainy season, in which the supply of horticultural products is very limited due 
to the unfavorable production conditions. The second period corresponds to the best season and, 
consequently, to market saturation and a low price. Except for November, the tendencies of the 
predictions of the output market price over time are roughly similar across gender. 
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Table 5.5: Next month’s predicted output price probability across gender and given the current 
output market price (P). 
Next month’s predicted price probability (%) 17  Plot 
manager’s 
gender 
Next 
month’s 
price 
predicted 
Overall August 2006 
September 
2006 
October 
2006 
November 
2006 
December 
2006 
January 
2007 
0.50 P 23 0 0 3 4 42 60 
0.75 P 18 0 1 4 18 37 32 
P 13 0 7 17 15 21 3 
1.25 P 19 58 28 33 25 0 1 
1.50 P 19 42 31 30 31 0 3 
2 P 8 0 33 13 7 0 1 
Men 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
0.50 P 13  0 3 0 37 63 
0.75 P 8  0 2 0 22 31 
P 10  6 9 10 33 6 
1.25 P 27  14 39 17 8 0 
1.50 P 26  23 30 67 0 0 
2 P 16  57 17 7 0 0 
Women 
Total  100  100 100 100 100 100 
Note: P=current output market price.  
The series of graphs 5.2 shows the current market prices of horticultural crops and the predictions 
over time and gender. From the graphs, the high volatility of the output current market price can 
be seen from one month to the next. The predictions for the next month, given the current market 
price, vary also over months and gender. The graph reflects the difficulty to predict prices for 
next month. A gender comparison shows that, for overall crops, the curves of predictions made 
by women are closer to the current observed prices than those made by men. However, 
controlling for cabbage, the gender difference in predictions becomes small. Altogether, women 
seem to have a better ability to make price predictions than men have, although it remains hard 
for both. Because of their off-farm activity of small trading, women are more present in the 
market. 
                                               
17
 The table shows the average predictions for all crops (mainly cabbage, tomato and turnip) which have similar 
output market prices. These crops are grown both by the men and the women. 
Chapter 5 
 184 
Price predictions
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
August September October November December January February
Pr
ic
e
 
(fc
fa
/k
g)
actual price men's predictions women's predictions
 
Change predicted
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
August September October November December January February
C
ha
n
ge
 
in
 
pr
ic
e
 
(fc
fa
/k
g)
actual change men's predictions women's predictions
 
Risk Attitude and its Effects on Resource Allocation 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 185 
Cabbage
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Aug-
06
Sep-
06
Oct-06 Nov-
06
Dec-
06
Jan-
07
Aug-
06
Sep-
06
Oct-06 Dec-
06
Jan-
07
Men Women
Pr
ic
e
 
(fc
fa
/k
g)
Observed prices Minimum price predicted Maximum price predicted
 
Figure 5.2: All crops and cabbage, observed market prices, average, minimum and maximum 
market prices predicted for next month, given the current prices. 
5.5.4. Measurement of the risk attitude toward the output market price across gender 
Certainty equivalent prices 
An experimental game was implemented to measure men’s and women’s attitude toward the 
output market price risk, as described in detail in section 5.2. The output market price at which 
the producer becomes indifferent or switches from one market to another corresponds to the 
certainty equivalent price PE of the respondent. The uncertain prices range on average from 208 
to 400 fcfa/kg for men and from 221 to 422 fcfa/kg for women. The average equivalent prices of 
men and women are close and are, respectively, 277 and 307 fcfa/kg. Graph 5.3 depicts over 
gender the modified minimum and maximum prices of the risky market and the modified 
certainty equivalent price, measured in deviation of the mean of the minimum, maximum, and 
equivalent prices. For both men and women plot managers, some of the certainty equivalent 
prices show up below the X axis and others above it, showing a difference in risk attitude. The 
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more risk averse have their certainty equivalent prices below the X axis and close to the 
minimum prices. 
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Figure 5.3: Modified minimum and maximum prices of the risky market and modified certainty 
equivalent prices over gender.  
Risk aversion scores across gender 
The absolute risk aversion scores (RA) and relative risk aversion scores (RR), derived from the 
equations 5.5, are presented in table 5.6. The results show that, on average, both men and women 
producers are risk averse, as shown by their positive risk aversion scores. The standard deviations 
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are high, suggesting that absolute and relative risk aversion scores vary among men and women. 
Surprisingly, the men’s risk aversion scores are greater than the women’s, but the two groups’ 
mean comparison t-test indicates that the difference is not significant even at the 10% level. This 
finding should not be too surprising. Indeed, women involved in horticultural production are used 
to going to the market to sell their own production, or through the small trading they are engaged 
in as an off-farm activity. For these reasons, women have as much knowledge about how the 
market operates as men have, and even more knowledge than men who sell their products at the 
field gate. This may explain why women are as risk averse as men towards the output market 
price. 
This finding is in line with findings by Binswanger (1980) in India, Senkondo (2000) in 
Tanzania, and Van den Berg et al. (2008) in Nicaragua. They found no significant effect of 
gender on risk attitude, although these studies dealt with other types of risks, like risks in 
agroforestry decision-making, wealth, and environmental hazards. However, this finding 
challenges several authors, such as Kochar (1999), Byrnes et al. (1999), Wick et al. (2004), Brons 
(2005), Dohmen et al. (2005), Cohen et al. (2007), Croson and Gneezy (2008), and Borghans et 
al. (2009), who found that women are more risk averse than men. Croson and Gneezy (2008) 
have reviewed the experimental economics studies on the impact of gender on risk preference and 
have concluded that men are more risk-taking than women do. However, the studies reviewed by 
these authors are based on experiments realized mainly with students or a university population, 
carried out in European countries. Moreover, Croson and Gneezy (2008) have found from their 
review that managers and professional business persons are the exception to the rule that men 
take more risk than women do (quoting Atkinson et al. (2003), Johnson and Powell (1994), 
Master and Meier (1988)). From all these evidences we can conclude that there is no clear-cut 
relation between gender and risk attitude; the type of risk and the cultural, social, and economic 
context do matter a lot indeed.  
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Table 5.6: Risk aversion scores across gender. 
Absolute risk aversion 
scores (RA) 
Relative risk aversion 
scores (RR) Gender Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Men  160 0.0015 0.0110 0.082 2.806 
Women  77 0.0002 0.0107 0.067 2.480 
Combined 237 0.0011 0.0109 0.077 2.703 
Difference (Men – Women)  0.0012  0.015  
t-statistic (H0 : diff. =0)     0.827 (P=0.40) 0.038 (P=0.96) 
The distribution of the risk aversion class across gender 
The analysis of the distribution of the risk aversion scores reveals that more than half of the 
producers are risk averse, with positive absolute and relative risk aversion scores. More than 33% 
of the producers exhibit risk-loving or risk-preferring behaviour, as indicated by their negative 
risk aversion scores. Only very few producers are risk-neutral, with a risk aversion score equal to 
zero. The gender comparison shows the same tendency of the distribution of the risk aversion 
scores. However, the percentage of men ruling out risk-loving attitudes is lower than that of 
women, about 7%. As a result, 4% more of the men are risk averse with respect to output market 
price volatility in comparison to the women. Nevertheless, the differences remain statistically not 
significant even at the 10% level. Table 5.7 and the series of graphs 5.4 and 5.5 tell more about 
the distribution of the risk aversion scores and classes across gender. 
Table 5.7: The distribution of risk aversion classes across gender. 
Men Women Overall Risk aversion class 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Risk averse (RA>0) 91 57 41 53 132 56 
Risk neutral (RA= 0) 12 7 3 4 15 6 
Risk loving (RA<0) 57 36 33 43 90 38 
Total 160 100 77 100 237 100 
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Figure 5.4: Kernel density estimation of the distribution of risk aversion scores across gender. 
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Figure 5.5: Histogram of the distribution of risk aversion classes across gender. 
The correlation between risk attitude and risk perception 
The pairwise correlation between men and women producers’ risk attitude and risk perception, 
measured in terms of the appreciation of the annoyance about the output market price volatility, 
suggests a positive and significant relationship at the 5% level. This implies that when men and 
women producers are bothered by the price fluctuations, they are more likely to behave in a risk 
averse way. Moreover, the risk perception measured through the ratio maximum and minimum 
price predicted for next month, given the current market price, is positively correlated to men’s 
and women’s risk aversion, but the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level. Disaggregated 
by gender, the ratio maximum and minimum price predicted is significantly correlated to 
women’s risk attitude at the 5% level. This suggests that the higher women’s risk perception is, as 
reflected by the variability of the predictions or the ratio, the higher is their risk aversion toward 
the output market price. Contrary, risk perception measured in terms of the appreciation of 
predictability of the output market price is negatively correlated with risk attitude, but the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero, even at the 10% level. Table 5.8 presents the 
pairwise comparisons. 
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Table 5.8: The pairwise correlation of risk perception and risk attitude across gender. 
Overall Men Women Risk perception measured in terms of Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value 
Annoying output price fluctuation 
(1=annoying) 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.03 
Predictability of the output price 
(1=unpredictable) -0.08 0.18 -0.07 0.32 -0.08 0.46 
Ratio Max / Min price predicted for 
next month, given current price 0.07 0.26 -0.01 0.83 0.24 0.03 
Risk attitude, individual and household characteristics 
Table 5.9 presents the results of the regression of men’s and women’s absolute and relative risk 
attitude, controlling for all individual and household characteristics together. The results suggest 
that the significant determinant of risk attitude at the 5% level is only the household’s land 
ownership. Unexpectedly, the household’s land ownership has a positive effect on men’s and 
women’s risk attitude. The more a household or its men (since they are the main owners) possess 
land, the more risk averse men and women are. The explanation may be the land abundant 
households have more crops to sell, and therefore are more sensitive or careful to fluctuating 
prices18. This finding contradicts the decreasing effect of wealth on risk aversion, but is 
somewhat in line with findings elsewhere by Senkondo (2000) in Tanzania, and Cohen and Einav 
(2007) in Israel. However, as risk aversion is widely considered to be decreasing with wealth, this 
finding contradicts several evidences, found by Binswanger (1980) in India, Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger (1993) in India, Senkondo (2000) in Tanzania, Gomez-Limon et al. (2002) in Spain, 
Wik et al. (2004) in Zambia, Abreha (2007) in Ethiopia, and Van den Berg et al. (2009) in Peru. 
Other variables that are supposed to capture the wealth effects, such as the household size, 
measured in terms of the number of members, and the size of the cropped area, are negatively 
related to risk attitude but are not significant at the 10% level. All the other socio-economic 
characteristics, such as the plot manager’s gender and age, the household head’s gender, separate 
female plots, and the location or zone, are positively related to attitude toward risk, but are not 
                                               
18
 The same game was implemeted for each male and female plot manager within the household. We specified not 
only a “risky market A” with uncertain output prices of PA1 and PA2, and a “risk-free market B” with a certain price 
of PBi, varying between PA1 and PA2 (PA1 < PBi < PA2) but also a quantity to be traded. See section 5.2 for more 
details. 
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significant even at the 10% level. The variable education was also not significant, with a very low 
coefficient, the reason for which it was dropped from the regression (table 5.9). 
Table 5.9: Risk attitude, individual and household characteristics (robust cluster in the 
household). 
Absolute risk aversion 
(RA *100) 
Relative risk aversion  
(RR ) Dependent variable: risk aversion score 
of plot manager Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Plot manager’s gender_01 (1=female) -0.366 0.228 -0.927 0.600 
Household head’s gender (1=female) .221 0.386 0.214 1.161 
Plot manager’s age (years) 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.019 
Household size (members) -0.007 0.015 -0.006 0.043 
Household land endowment (ha) 0.042** 0.022 0.104* 0.062 
Cropped plot size (ha) -0.354 0.413 0.093 1.048 
Separate female plots (1=yes) .121 0.196 0.354 0.490 
Location or zone_01 (1=Zone Nord) 0.003 0.155 0.076 0.402 
Constant 0.010 0.398 -0.525 1.064 
Observations (plot managers) 
Clusters (households) 
F (8, 162) 
R-squared 
211 
163 
0.85 
0.02 
 208 
160 
0.61 
0.03 
 
Note: **, * significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
5.5.5. The effect of risk attitude on the allocative efficiency of inputs  
As risk behaviour determines decision making, it may have an effect on producers’ economic 
performance and particularly on their efficiency. For this reason, the hypothesis tested is whether 
more risk averse plot managers and allocate their inputs (seed, fertilizers and pesticides) less 
efficiently. To empirically test this hypothesis, gender-specific allocative inefficiency models are 
used for risk averse plot managers (RA>0 or RR>0).  
As expected and in line with the theoretical model, the regression of the allocative inefficiency of 
inputs shows a positive relationship with plot manager’s absolute risk aversion score for both the 
men and women who are behaving as risk averse producers. This suggests that without 
controlling for any characteristic, the allocative inefficiency increases with risk aversion. The 
more men and women plot managers are risk averse, the more they are likely to use fewer inputs 
than the optimum amount given the output market price risk. The analysis of the coefficients of 
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the regression indicates that a one unit increase in risk aversion score times 100 (RA*100) leads to 
an increase by 0.79 of men’s inefficiency (P=0.08) and by 0.12 of women’s inefficiency 
(P=0.59).  
Controlling for risk perception, the plot managers’ socio-economic characteristics, and location, 
the estimation suggests that the allocative inefficiency is positively related at the 10% level to the 
absolute risk aversion scores of men and women who rule out risk averse behaviour (table 5.10). 
The effects of risk averse behaviour on the allocative efficiency are statistically significant at the 
1% level for men and the 10% level for women. This means that the more men’s and women’s 
risk aversion scores are closer to zero (risk-neutral), the more they are allocatively efficient. This 
behaviour corresponds to the theoretical model’s predictions, since the risk-neutral, allocatively 
efficient producers are the benchmark.  
Moreover, for men, risk perception measured in terms of the appreciation of the predictability of 
the output market price is positively related to the allocative inefficiency. Perceiving the output 
market price as unpredictable and accordingly as a real risk, increases the allocative inefficiency, 
although the effect is not significant at the 10% level. For women, the effect of risk perception 
could not be measured because they have an almost similar perception. 
In addition, the results indicate that among the variables controlled, those having a significant 
effect (10% level) on the inefficiency are age and location for risk averse men. The allocative 
inefficiency increases with the age of male plot managers. Accordingly, the younger risk averse 
men are more allocatively efficient than the elder men. The negative and significant correlation of 
the dummy variable centre zone indicates that male producers located in the centre zone of 
Niayes allocate their inputs more efficiently compared to those in the north and the south. 
Producers located in the centre and south of the Niayes Zone have more marketing opportunity 
because they are surrounded by big daily and weekly rural horticultural markets and are also 
closer to Dakar. These marketing advantages may impact positively on their output in value and, 
consequently, on their marginal value product and their efficiency. 
Other variables such as household education, the number of wives, and access to credit have the 
expected negative sign for risk averse men, but do not significantly influence their allocative 
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inefficiency. Similarly, the interaction risk aversion score and women’s status as first, second or 
third wife is negatively related to inefficiency, but the effect is not significant at the 10% level 
(table 5.10). 
On the other hand, considering relative risk aversion scores, the estimates present some similarity 
in terms of sign and magnitude (table 5.10). 
Table 5.10: Estimation results of the effects of the producer’s risk attitude on the allocative 
inefficiency of inputs over gender.   
Absolute risk averse 
(RA *100>0) 
Relative risk averse 
(RR >0) Allocative inefficiency 
 
Men Women Men Women 
Risk aversion score of plot 
manager (RA *100 or RR) 
1.22*** 
(0.49) 
0.28*  
(0.15) 
0.55  
(0.24) 
2.36  
(2.69) 
Predictability of output price_01 
(1=unpredictable) 
0.56  
(0.60) 
 0.53  
(0.62) 
 
Age of plot manager (years) 0.04* 
(0.02) 
 0.04*  
(0.02) 
 
Household head‘s education_01 
 (1=educated) 
-0.22 
(0.75) 
 -0.20  
(0.78) 
 
Number of wives -0.44  
(0.29) 
 -0.42  
(0.31) 
 
Risk aversion * Women’s 
status_01 (1=first wife)  
 -0.04  
(0.24) 
 -1.22  
(1.34) 
Access to credit_01 (1=access) -0.64  
(0.51) 
 -0.64  
(0.53) 
 
Plot size (ha) 0.36  
(1.04) 
4.79  
(3.26) 
0.25  
(1.08) 
-0.20  
(8.97) 
Centre zone_01 (1=Center) -1.06*  
(0.58) 
 -0.51  
(0.61) 
 
South zone_01 (1=South)  0.27  
(0.46) 
 -0.69  
(1.63) 
Constant -1.45  
(1.37) 
-0.29  
(0.24) 
-0.60  
(1.43) 
-1.89  
(2.40) 
Observations (plot managers) 
F  
R-squared 
85 
1.88* 
0.16 
24 
1.02 
0.07 
85 
1.03 
0.09 
22 
0.53 
0.11 
Note: ***, **, * significant respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level; standard errors in 
parentheses, and for women or wives, robust standards errors adjusted for clusters in households 
to allow for an intra-household correlation (1-3 wives per household). 
Risk Attitude and its Effects on Resource Allocation 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 195 
Furthermore, the husband decides on the seed variety to use for 17% of the women plot 
managers, while he decides on the quantity and timing of mineral fertilizers and organic 
fertilizers to apply for 30% and 11% of the women plot managers, respectively. Accordingly, the 
decision maker, whether it is the woman plot manager herself or her husband and his/her risk 
attitude, may have an effect on women’s allocative inefficiency in the choice of inputs. To test 
this hypothesis, the allocative inefficiency of the inputs used by women is regressed first on the 
dummy variable decision maker on inputs (1=women, 0=husband), second on the risk attitude of 
the decision maker, controlling for women’s risk aversion scores or not. The dummy variable 
decision maker turns out not significant at the 10% level, either controlling for women’s risk 
attitude or not. The same result holds for the decision maker’s risk attitude. Accordingly, this 
finding shows that even if for some women, the husband decides on the use of inputs, it is likely 
that women always have their say and their risk attitude significantly affects their allocative 
inefficiency, as shown in table 5.10. 
5.5.6. The effects of risk attitude on the choice of labour contract 
The two groups’ mean comparison test, with unequal variance done, showed that men and 
women producers hiring labour under a sharecropping contract exhibited a higher absolute risk 
aversion score than those hiring labour based on a wage contract or using household labour. 
Considering the relative risk aversion scores, producers hiring labour under a sharecropping 
contract are on average risk averse, while those using wage labour or household labour are risk-
takers, as shown by their negative average scores. As can be read from table 5.11, the differences 
are significant at the 5% level, for the absolute risk aversion scores. 
Table 5.11: Risk aversion scores across labour contract choice  
Absolute risk aversion 
scores (RA) 
Relative risk aversion 
scores (RR) Labour Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Sharecropping labour  75 0.0030 0.0098 0.407 2.21 
Household and wage labour  162 0.0002 0.0113 -0.080 2.90 
Combined 237 0.0011 0.0109 0.077 2.63 
Difference   -0.0028  -0.487  
t-statistic (H0 : difference = 0)    -1.946** -1.27 
Note: ** significant at the 5% level. 
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Moreover, the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model estimated indicates, as expected, a 
positive and significant relationship (at the 10% level) between the choice of a sharecropping 
labour contract and the producer’s risk aversion score. Meanwhile, the choice of labour based on 
a wage contract is negatively related to the producer’s risk aversion score, although the effect is 
significant only at the 14% level. As expected, more risk averse producers are likely to choose a 
sharecropping labour contract rather than a wage labour contract. The likelihood ratio test of Rho 
is significant at the 1% level, indicating an efficiency gain estimating a bivariate probit rather 
than two single probit models (table 5.12). 
Table 5.12: The choice of labour contract and the producer’s risk attitude: a seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probit estimation.  
Absolute risk 
(RA*100) Relative risk (RR) Dependent variables Explanatory 
variables Coef. Std Err Coef. 
Std 
Err 
Sharecropping contract_01 
(1=sharecropping) 
Risk aversion score  
Constant 
 0.147* 
-0.500*** 
0.079 
0.086 
 0.056* 
-0.473*** 
0.029 
0.085 
Wage contract_01 
(1=wage) 
Risk aversion score  
Constant 
-0.154 
-1.379*** 
0.106 
0.118 
-0.046 
-1.400*** 
0.034 
0.120 
 Rho 
LR Chi2(1) 
-0.509 
 8.540*** 
0.156 -0.511 
 8.635*** 
0.156 
Note: ***, * significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
Furthermore, controlling for individual and household socio-economic and institutional 
characteristics as well as for location, the estimation of the binary choice model again suggests a 
positive and significant effect at the 5% level, of the producer’s risk attitude on the choice of a 
sharecropping contract (table 5.13). We can conclude from the analysis of the marginal effect that 
an increase by one unit of the producer’s risk aversion score times 100 (RA*100) raises by 0.05 
the probability of opting for a sharecropping contract rather than a wage labour contract or 
household labour. This means that more risk averse producers would prefer to hire labour based 
on a sharecropping contract. As mentioned by several authors (Stiglitz, 1989; Pender and 
Fafchamps, 2000; Braido, 2008), one of the main advantages of sharecropping was associated 
with its risk-sharing between the producer/landowner and the tenant. This finding may be 
important for three reasons. First, the object of risk is the output market price, which is subject to 
high fluctuations over time and even from one day to another. Second, the crops studied are 
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horticultural crops (mainly vegetables) and are easily perishable. Third, producers lack the 
necessary means of storage and conservation, and have only very limited access to the foreign 
market to export their production. 
Besides, the probit estimation with robust clusters in households indicates that, in addition to the 
producer’s risk attitude, some other variables may significantly affect the choice of a 
sharecropping contract (table 5.13). Being a female producer decreases the probability of hiring 
labour under a sharecropping contract by 0.45. Thus, women are more likely to rely on household 
labour, mainly because of the small size of their plots and their limited access to improved 
irrigation equipment. Obviously, sharecroppers require a certain level of plot size (1000 m2 on 
average) and irrigation equipment. Household size in terms of the number of members has a 
negative and significant effect at the 10% level on the probability of going for sharecropping. 
This can be explained by the fact that the greater the household size is, the greater is the labour 
availability and the less is the need to take recourse to sharecropping labour.  
The number of wives of the household head is positively and significantly related at the 1% level 
to the choice of sharecropping contract. Having an additional wife increases the probability of the 
male producer hiring labour based on a sharecropping contract by 0.13. An explanation may be 
the need to crop more in order to satisfy the needs of additional wives and children, which require 
more labour and, consequently, the recourse to sharecroppers. Access to credit also has a positive 
and significant effect on the probability of choosing a sharecropping contract. The reason is that 
sharecroppers require from producers/landowners to have at their disposal, in the right quantity 
and on time, all the inputs necessary for production. Consequently, households who have better 
access to credit may be able to afford more hired labour based on a sharecropping contract, 
compared to others.  
Access to extension services significantly decreases at the 1% level the probability that the 
producer will opt for a sharecropping contract. The location has a positive and significant effect 
on the probability of choosing sharecropping. Especially being located in the north zone increases 
the probability of hiring labour based on a sharecropping contract by 0.30. Producers located in 
the northern zone of Niayes are more likely to choose a sharecropping contract compared to those 
in the centre and the south, who have a relatively larger plot size and are better equipped. For 
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these reasons, they more often prefer to hire labour based on a wage contract in case the available 
household labour is not sufficient. 
Other variables like the producer’s age, the household head’s status, the education, the plot size, 
women’s annual income, and the centre zone dummy were initially included in the model, but 
were removed later on because they are not significant even at the 10% level. Controlling for the 
relative risk aversion score rather than the absolute risk aversion score, the marginal effect of risk 
becomes equal to 0.02, while the marginal effects of all the other explanatory variables remain 
the same. 
Table 5.13: Probit estimation results and marginal effects of producer risk attitude on choice of 
sharecropping contract (robust cluster in household)  
Sharecropping_01 Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Marginal Effect 
Risk aversion score of plot manager (RA *100) 0.178 0.089** 0.051** 
Producer’s gender_01 (female=1) -2.387 0.450*** -0.447*** 
Wives 0.461 0.133*** 0.133*** 
Household size (members) -0.048 0.027* -0.013* 
Credit_01 (1=access) 0.547 0.226*** 0.159*** 
Extension_01 (1=access) -0.804 0.311*** -0.178*** 
Zone Nord_01 (1=Nord) 0.996 0.266*** 0.305*** 
Constant  -1.024 0.290***  
Observations (plot managers) 
Clusters (households) 
Wald chi2(7) 
Pseudo R2 
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
218 
159 
44.35*** 
0.28 
-96.86 
  
Note: ***, **,* significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
5.6. Conclusion and policy implications 
Agricultural production is typically a risky business. Farm households have to tackle several 
risks. For this reason, farm households’ risk attitude is an important issue connected with their 
decision-making and may greatly affect their economic performance. Particularly in Senegal, for 
horticultural households, the output market price is one of the foremost risks, due to its high 
volatility. During the production, a household can never be completely certain at which price they 
will be able to sell their produce later on, after harvesting. Moreover, within the same household, 
the husband and wives may behave differently towards risk. This research has provided 
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theoretical and empirical evidence of the measures and effects of risk attitude across gender on 
economic performance and on the choice of inputs. More precisely, based on an experimental 
game implemented in Senegal’s Niayes Zone, this chapter has investigated the gender dimension 
of risk attitude and the causal relationship between risk attitude, the allocative inefficiency of the 
choice of inputs, and the decisions made regarding the choice of labour contract, controlling for 
other exogenous characteristics. 
The results showed that, on average, men and women producers are absolutely risk averse 
towards the output market price. In addition, men are as risk averse as women are. The reason for 
this is that women horticultural producers are used to going to the market to sell their own 
produce or to engage in small trading as an off-farm activity. Consequently, women know a lot 
about how the market operates, at least as much as men know. This finding is in line with some 
other findings elsewhere, but challenges the common finding that women are more risk averse 
than men are. Finally, we can conclude that, depending on the type of risk measured, the 
knowledge or the experience about the risk and the cultural, social, and economic context, women 
may behave as risk aversely as men do, or even less.  
Controlling for individual and household characteristics together showed that the only significant 
determinant at the 5% level of men’s and women’s risk attitude is household land ownership. The 
more the household or its men (since they are the main owners) possess land, the more risk averse 
men and women are toward the output market price. This finding challenges the common 
decreasing effect of wealth on risk aversion, but is somewhat in line with findings elsewhere. 
As expected and in line with the theoretical model, the empirical evidence shows that over gender 
and risk-behaving group, and controlling for individual socio-economic characteristics and 
location, the attitude towards the output market price risk significantly affects men’s and 
women’s allocative inefficiency in the use of inputs (seed, fertilizers and pesticides). Specifically, 
the results suggest that the more risk averse men and women plot managers are, the more they 
allocate their inputs inefficiently. This means that the more men and women producers are risk 
averse, the more they are likely to use a suboptimum amount of inputs, given the output market 
price risk. A one unit increase in the risk aversion score times 100 of men and women with risk 
averse behaviour, leads to an increase by 1.22 and 0.28 of their allocative inefficiency, 
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respectively, controlling for location and individual characteristics. In addition, the estimation 
shows that other variables having a significant effect on the allocative inefficiency of inputs are 
age and location. The allocative inefficiency increases with the age. Producing in the centre zone 
of Niayes, significantly decreases the allocative inefficiency; this may be due to more marketing 
opportunities. 
Furthermore, the estimation of the binary choice model suggested a positive and significant effect 
at the 5% level of the producer’s risk attitude on the choice of a sharecropping contract. Thus, the 
empirical evidence confirms the theoretical model that the more producers are risk averse, the 
more they would prefer to hire labour based on a sharecropping contract rather than a wage 
contract. From the analysis of the marginal effect, it can be concluded that an increase by one unit 
of the producer’s risk aversion score times 100 raises by 0.05 the probability of opting for a 
sharecropping contract instead of a wage labour contract or household labour, controlling for 
location, individual and household socio-economic characteristics, and institutional 
characteristics. All the other variables controlled, like the plot manager’s gender, household size, 
the number of wives, the household’s annual income, location, and access to credit and extension, 
also significantly affect the choice of a sharecropping contract. While the probability of opting for 
sharecropping decreases with being a female plot manager, the household’s size and its access to 
extension, it rises with the household’s annual income, location, access to credit, and the number 
of wives. 
The findings resulted in a number of recommendations to policy decision makers, in terms of 
strategies that may help to dampen down men and women producers’ risk aversion towards the 
output market price and its repercussions on their efficiency. Such strategies should aim at 
reducing and tackling, or coping with, the output market price risk. 
Furthermore we can conclude, basing ourselves indirectly on the research outcomes and directly 
on the field observations, that to cope better with the output market price risk, men and women 
producers need to have access to adequate means of storage and conservation of horticultural 
products, which by nature are easily perishable. Being able to conserve their production may 
allow producers to delay and to spread the selling over time, in order to avoid an oversaturation 
of the market and its repercussions. Training in postharvest technologies is an important 
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prerequisite to increase the ability of producers to preserve the quality and the freshness of the 
produce for a longer time. Research institutes and extension services have a lot to do to attain an 
efficient transference of postharvest technologies to producers. However, these measures may 
only have a significant effect if they are coupled with access to a suitable system of microcredit 
for personal consumption, which will allow producers to be not constrained to sell off their 
production. 
At the community level, horticultural producers should be better organized in order to have more 
market power in relation to the middlemen traders, who used to impose their price. Some efforts 
should be oriented toward the reinforcement of the organization of horticultural producers. 
Making horticultural production zones more reachable through an improvement of the roads may 
facilitate producers’ access to diverse markets. An efficient and daily updated system of 
information about the market price, accessible to producers and based on the new technology of 
communication (the mobile phone, for instance) may be helpful to deal with the market price risk. 
A smart policy of market protection may produce significant effects on the regulation of the 
market for some products, like onion, during the period of overproduction, while preserving the 
consumers’ interests, too. This set of strategies needs some empirical evidence and may be a good 
agenda for future research. 
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6.1. Introduction 
In agriculture-based economies like Sub-Saharan African countries where the majority of the 
population derive their food and livelihoods from agriculture, getting agriculture to move forward 
should be high on the development agenda. Moreover, the drastic changes in 2007-09 in the 
world food situation which affects Africa more than any other region call for policy decision 
makers to pay much more attention to the supply side of agriculture both at the local and the 
global level in order to achieve a sustainable productivity growth (de Janvry, 2009). This 
attention should be paid to food crops as well as to market-oriented or cash crops. In fact, cash 
crops combined with high-added value products like horticultural crops offer opportunities to 
boost agricultural growth in developing countries like Senegal where horticulture is a key element 
of the agricultural sector. Accordingly, more than ever, there is a need to examine the economic 
performance of the agricultural producers, and particularly the efficiency of the use of scarce 
resources in order to confront the challenges ahead. However, the key role of women in the 
agricultural sector in many parts of the world, and particularly in agriculture-based countries like 
African countries, calls for more gender-sensitive approaches and policies allowing for gender 
identity. Together, all these reasons widely justify the relevance of this research thesis which 
aims at investigating the economic performance of horticultural households in Senegal by using 
efficiency as a main indicator and adopting a gender perspective. 
Efficiency is assessed in a specific social, cultural, economic, and institutional context, in which 
polygamy occurs and husband and wives usually manage their plots separately. Also, next to 
household labour, the labour market offers possibilities to hire labour under two common forms 
of contract, based on either sharecropping or wage. In addition, with the high volatility of the 
prices of horticultural products, the market risk is challenging. Therefore, from this context 
emerge four main research questions we have addressed in this thesis, related to (i) the efficiency 
of the allocation of household resources over men and women, (ii) the efficiency of contracts 
with hired workers, either as wage labourers or as sharecroppers, for household profit 
optimization, (iii) risk behaviour across gender, and (iv) its effects on the economic performance 
and the choice of labour contracts. Three chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) have provided 
theoretical and empirical evidence on these research questions, preceded by two chapters 
(Chapters 1 and 2) in which we have expounded the purpose and background of this research. 
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This concluding chapter will present the synthesis and discuss the main findings from the 
different chapters. Overall, this chapter will answer the fifth research question and come up with 
policy recommendations, by examining the suitable strategies leading to an improvement of the 
economic performance of horticultural households. The remainder of this concluding chapter will 
proceed as follows. The next section 6.2 will summarize and discuss the main findings and their 
scientific relevance with respect to the general body of the literature on efficiency, gender, land or 
labour tenancy, and risk behaviour. Section 6.3 will deal with the policy implications and 
relevance of the findings. Finally, section 6.4 will present the main limitations of the study and 
puts forward the outlook for future or further research. 
6.2. Summary and discussion of the main findings 
The efficiency of the allocation of resources over husband and wives 
Research question 1: is the household’s allocation of resources over men and women or husband 
and wives efficient? 
The objective of Chapter 3 was to address this first research question by examining the efficiency 
of the distribution of resources within horticultural households in Senegal. To do so, we estimated 
and compared unitary or pooled models with gender as explanatory variable and gender-specific 
stochastic frontier production functions. From these models, we derived the technical and 
allocative efficiency, the inefficiency component, and its relationship with other individual and 
household socio-economic characteristics. 
Preliminary results of the gender comparison of inputs and output show that women’s plots are 
more input-intensive and yield 17% more in terms of output in value per hectare than men’s plots 
do. However, with an average of 460 m2, women’s plots are 4.7 times smaller than men’s plots 
are. The likelihood ratio test shows that all the estimates of the unitary and gender-specific 
models are significantly different at the 10% level. Consequently, men’s stochastic frontier 
production function differs significantly from that of women, indicating some difference in the 
technology used. 
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Moreover, the examination of the coefficients of the stochastic frontier production functions 
corresponding to the output elasticity shows some economically important differences. This 
supports the suitability of using gender-specific models rather than the unitary model, when the 
aim is to better capture the gender differential of performance. For instance, according to gender-
specific models, an increase by one percent of inputs leads to an increase by 0.31% of output in 
value per hectare on men’s plots and by 0.16% on women’s plots. Capital irrigation equipment 
provides another example, with an output elasticity of 13% on women’s plots and -11% on men’s 
plots. Including a gender dummy variable as explanatory variable in the unitary model, as is 
usually done, is not enough because the gender variable comes out not significant. In order to 
capture such a gender difference, the alternative of the gender-specific models should rather be to 
interact each of the explanatory variables with the gender dummy and add the interaction 
variables to the unitary model. The test of parameters confirmed, too, that the variables interacted 
with gender jointly are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Both the unitary model and the gender-specific models predictions show that women plot 
managers are as technically efficient as men plot managers are. Moreover, the gender-specific 
models show that the determinants of technical inefficiency effects present some similarities as 
well as some differences between male and female plot managers. For both men and women, 
inefficiency effects are significantly related to the location or zone, and the age and number of 
men working on the plot. However, contrary to the men, the women’s inefficiency effects 
increase with age and decrease with male labour. The elder male plot managers exhibit a low 
inefficiency compared to the younger ones because they have more experience in horticultural 
production and, consequently, more knowledge to choose the appropriate varieties, and more skill 
to combine the inputs for a better yield. Moreover, their accumulated experience improves their 
managerial capacity to mobilize the household labour, to schedule and to carry out in a well-
timed way the cropping operations that affect the yields. Contrary to the men, the younger women 
are more technically efficient than the elder ones. The explanation may be that the younger 
women have less children to care for, are stronger, and have to do demanding tasks. Thus, 
younger women have more time to devote to their production activities and can manage better to 
carry out their cropping operations timely, with a positive effect on their yield. 
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Contrary to men’s plots, the number of male household members working on women’s plots 
contributes to lessen women’s inefficiency effects. Actually, in terms of timing and dosage of 
inputs application, men are more experienced and are mostly the advisers or decision makers on 
women’s plots. In addition, men’s inefficiency effects decrease when their wives manage their 
plots separately, while women inefficiency effects augment with being head of the household and 
diminish with the share of women’s off-farm income in their total income. Altogether, such 
determinants of inefficiency over gender should be considered in the formulation of strategies 
aimed at the improvement of men’s and women’s technical efficiency. For instance, particular 
attention should be paid to female household heads and young male household heads for any 
intervention providing technical advice. 
Furthermore, based on gender-specific models, the value of the marginal product of land, inputs, 
labour, and irrigation equipment differs significantly from men’s to women’ plots within a 
household. Consequently, in addition to the gender difference in the technology used, the gender 
distribution of the resources within household has implications for the allocative efficiency. The 
value of the marginal product of land is higher on women’s plots than it is on men’s plots. 
Actually, an increase of land cropped by one hundred square meters, holding all other inputs 
constant, will rise by fcfa 21,000 and 63,000 the output on men’s and women’s plots, 
respectively. The value of the marginal product of inputs is 72% higher on men’s plots than it is 
on women’s plots. Likewise, the values of the marginal products of household labour and hired 
wage labour are, respectively, 5 and 4 times higher on men’s plots than they are on women’s 
plots. However, the value of the marginal product of irrigation equipment is higher on women’s 
plots than it is on men’s plots. Accordingly, while within a household, land and irrigation 
equipment are better valued on women’s plots, labour and others inputs are better valued on 
men’s plots. Moreover, beyond an intra-household context, neither male nor female plot 
managers achieved absolute allocative efficiency for any inputs, showing their lack of ability to 
combine inputs profitably in such a way as to equalize the value of their marginal products to 
their unit prices. 
From these findings, we conclude that, optimality or allocative efficiency from a household 
perspective that corresponds to an equality of the value of the marginal product of the inputs 
between men’s and women’s plots within the household, is far from being achieved. In the 
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allocation of land, inputs, labour, and capital irrigation equipment, for instance, some 
improvements can be made by shifting labour and inputs from women’s plots to men’s plots, and 
shifting land and capital equipment from men’s plots to women’s plots. However, given that both 
men and women are allocatively inefficient for land, labour, equipment, and other inputs, rather 
than shifting, it may be better to scale up these inputs to reduce the inefficiency. Given that 
households are cropping on average 59% of their available land, there are some possibilities or 
potentialities to widen the cropped area, but this is conditional on a better access to labour-saving 
irrigation equipment. 
Altogether, these findings confirm the findings by Udry (1996) and cast doubt on many 
household models implicitly assuming efficiency regarding the allocation of resources within the 
household. However, contrary to Udry (1996) who found that women’s plots yield less than 
men’s plots because of lower levels of input use on women’s plots, we found that women’s plots 
are more input-intensive and yield 17% more in terms of output in value per hectare than men’s 
plots do. In addition, the value of the marginal product of land is higher on women’s plots than it 
is on men’s plots within the same household, suggesting a reallocation of land in favour of 
women that is contrary to Udry’s findings. In terms of efficiency, men are as efficient as women 
are, but neither men nor women are fully efficient either technically or allocatively. This finding 
is consistent with findings elsewhere in Africa, as has recently been shown by Alena et al. (2008) 
in Kenya and, before that, by Adesina and Djato (1996) in Côte d’Ivoire. 
The efficiency of labour contract choice for household profit optimization 
Research question 2: are the contracts with hired workers, hired either as wage labourers or as 
sharecroppers, efficient for household profit optimization, also after accounting for the irrigation 
equipment of the farm? 
We have addressed this second research question in Chapter 4. In agriculture, the coexistence of 
different forms of land tenancy or labour contract have been explained so far by theories related 
to Marshallian inefficiency, incentives, risk sharing, and transaction costs, including supervision 
costs. These theories and the empirical evidence have greatly contributed to explain the reasons 
behind land tenancy or labour contract choice. This study goes a step further, by focusing 
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especially on production technologies at the plot level. This study provides theoretical and 
empirical evidence by designing and testing a model based on household profit optimization, (i) 
to compare the optimum profit derived from plots under household labour, a sharecropping 
labour contract and a wage labour contract, and (ii) to test the efficiency of the labour choice 
made, controlling for irrigation equipment used on the plot. The model does not account for risk 
behaviour, but focuses mainly on the supervision costs of labour under a wage contract and on 
opportunity wage ratios of sharecropper and wage worker, of sharecropper and landlord, and of 
wage worker and landlord. In order to test the efficiency of the labour contract choice, for each 
plot, simulations were made to see if another labour contract than the one presently applied would 
yield a higher profit to the household.  
Considering that the average rate of the supervision of wage labour applied by a household is 
estimated at 24%, it comes out that, on average, on plots without motor pumps, a sharecropping 
contract provides a higher optimum profit to a household than a wage contract does. However, on 
plots irrigated with a motor pump, even if the wage paid by a household is two times greater than 
the opportunity wage of a sharecropper, corresponding to a supervision rate of 100%, this 
household would still prefer to hire labour based on a wage contract rather than a sharecropping 
contract to maximize its profit. All in all, on plots equipped with a motor pump, hiring labour 
based on a wage contract is always more profitable for the household than hiring labour based on 
a sharecropping contract. Many plots without a motor pump under a wage labour contract (66%) 
should be under a sharecropping contract if they were to achieve household profit optimization. 
Also, 18% of the plots with a motor pump under a sharecropping contract should be under a wage 
labour contract if they were to achieve household profit optimization. Altogether, plot managers 
made the efficient or right labour choice, which maximizes their profit for 73% of the plots under 
sharecropping as well as wage labour contracts.  
The test of efficiency of input use indicated that, on average, controlling for crop, fertilizer is 
used inefficiently both on plots without a motor pump and on plots irrigated with a motor pump, 
although the latter exhibit generally higher efficiency scores.  The inefficiency may persist over 
time mainly because of institutional constraints such as the limited access to credit, the 
expensiveness of the fertilizers which are rarely subsidized, and the lack of technical advice from 
agricultural research and extension services for an adequate dosage and timing of application of 
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fertilizers. The persistence of the inefficiency casts doubt on the quality of the fertilizers used. In 
addition, controlling for crop and labour, the findings suggest that the input is used as 
inefficiently on plots under household labour as on plots under a sharecropping contract or a 
wage labour contract. Consequently, this empirical evidence challenges the Marshallian common 
knowledge connecting sharecropping to inefficiency and corroborates recent findings elsewhere. 
To conclude, these findings help us to better understand the reasons behind the existence and the 
perpetuation of sharecropping over time and over developing countries, like Senegal. While on 
plots without a motor pump, a sharecropping contract is the efficient labour contract choice, 
leading to a higher optimum profit for the household, on plots irrigated with a motor pump, a 
wage contract is the best labour contract choice. Consequently, this finding indicates that, with 
the use of improved labour-saving equipment or technologies, or more broadly with the 
modernization of production, the future of the sharecropping contract is threatened, in favour of 
household labour and the wage labour contract. Unless the sharing rules commonly applied, 
based on a 50-50 distribution of the profit, change to a greater share for the landowner, 
households will be less and less willing to hire labour under a sharecropping contract with the 
growing use of labour-saving technologies. 
Measures and effects of risk attitudes across gender 
Research questions 3 and 4: do risk preferences differ between husband and wives, and between 
male and female heads of the household? If so, how are they related to individual characteristics, 
and what are the effects on their performance and choice of labour contracts? 
 In Chapter 5, we have investigated these research questions theoretically and empirically. 
Agricultural production is typically a risky business. When producing, farm households have to 
tackle several risks and for this reason, the way they behave towards risk may be connected with 
their decision-making and may affect their economic performance. Particularly in Senegal, for 
horticultural households, the output market price is one of the foremost risks, because of its high 
volatility. Chapter 5 provided theoretical and empirical evidence of the measures and effects of 
risk attitude on economic performance and on the choice of inputs. We examined these issues 
across gender. More precisely, based on an experimental game implemented in Senegal, Chapter 
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5 scrutinized the gender dimension of risk attitude and the causal relationship between risk 
attitude, the allocative inefficiency of the choice of inputs, and the decisions made regarding the 
choice of labour contract, controlling for other exogenous characteristics. 
The results show that, on average, both men and women producers display an absolute risk 
aversion towards the output market price. In addition, women are as risk-averse as men are. The 
reason is that female horticultural producers used to go to the market, selling their own produce 
or engaging in small trading as off-farm activity. Consequently, women know as much about how 
markets operate as men do, or know even more in comparison to men who sell their produce at 
the field gate. This finding is in line with some other findings elsewhere, but challenges the 
common finding that women are more risk-averse than men are. It can be concluded that, 
depending on the type of risk measured, the knowledge or the experience about the risk, and the 
cultural, social and economic context, women may behave as risk-averse as men do or are even 
less averse to taking risks. 
Controlling for individual and household characteristics together, the significant determinant of 
men’s and women’s risk attitude mainly is household land ownership. The more a household or 
men (since they are the main owners) possess land, the more men and women are risk-averse 
toward the output market price. This finding challenges the common decreasing effect of wealth 
on risk aversion but is consistent with some findings elsewhere. 
As expected and in harmony with the theoretical model, the empirical evidence shows that over 
risk-behaving group and gender, the attitude towards the output market price significantly affects 
men’s and women’s allocative inefficiency in the use of inputs. The finding suggests that the 
more men and women plot managers are risk-averse, the more they allocate their inputs 
inefficiently, because they are likely to use a suboptimum amount of inputs given the output 
market price risk. Moreover, the estimation shows that other variables having a significant effect 
on allocative inefficiency are age, and location. Actually, allocative inefficiency increases with 
age. In addition, producing in the centre zone of Niayes significantly reduces the allocative 
inefficiency. This location effect may be due to more marketing opportunity, caused by the 
proximity to Dakar, the capital city, and the several big rural horticultural markets surrounding 
the south and the centre of the Niayes Zone, compared to the north zone of Niayes. 
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Furthermore, the empirical evidence confirms the theoretical model’s assumption that the more 
producers are risk-averse, the more they would prefer to hire labour based on a sharecropping 
contract rather than a wage contract. The other variables controlled for, like the plot manager’s 
gender, the household size, and the access to extension, both significantly and negatively affect 
the choice of sharecropping contract, while the number of wives, the location (the north zone of 
Niayes), and access to credit both significantly and positively affect the choice of sharecropping 
contract. Innovatively, this finding reinforces the theory about sharecropping and risk and brings 
new empirical evidence on the reasons behind the choice for sharecropping and therefore 
complements Chapter 4.  
We can conclude from all these findings that men are as risk-averse as women are toward the 
output market price. Their risk attitude prevents them from achieving allocative efficiency in the 
use of inputs and so reduces their economic performance. Given that men’s and women’s risk 
aversion behaviour explains their inefficiency, the conventional measure of allocative efficiency, 
which implicitly assumes certainty, is not appropriate any more under risky environmental 
circumstances unless there is a risk insurance market to cover the risk. Otherwise, the evidence 
implies that a producer’s risk behaviour should be integrated directly in the production function 
used to derive allocative efficiency. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that the decision-making on labour choice is driven by the 
producer’s risk attitude. To be more risk-averse leads to a choice for a sharecropping contract 
rather than a wage contract. This may have implications for producer’s economic performance, if 
sharecropping is not the efficient choice with an eye to providing a higher optimum profit. All in 
all, the findings illustrate that the producers’ risk behaviour is an important issue, which affects 
their choice and economic performance. Although there is quite extensive theoretical literature on 
the output price risk, the empirical evidence is rather thin (Kumbahar, 2002). As pointed out by 
Fafchamps (2003), in the context of developing countries, theory on risk behaviour is much more 
advanced than empirical work is. Accordingly, this research provides a contribution to the 
literature about risk behaviour, both by reinforcing the theory and by providing new empirical 
evidence. 
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6.3. Policy implications 
Accurate and updated information about the efficiency of male and female producers is important 
in the development of strategies aimed at getting agriculture to move forward by increasing 
productivity and improving resource use. Therefore, by providing a complete picture of men and 
women producers’ efficiency, findings from this research may be helpful for designing 
appropriate agricultural development programmes that are also more gender-sensitive. Findings 
from Chapter 3 show that, in spite of the long experience of men and women producers within 
horticultural households, they are still not fully technically or allocatively efficient. These 
findings call for more efforts from policy decision makers to provide horticultural households 
with the suitable support to improve their ability to manage their productive resources more 
efficiently. This requires from research institutes and extension services, especially, to become 
more operative and to work more closely with the horticultural households. As shown by the 
findings, access to extension services decreases inefficiency effects.  
Some cultural factors may impede the enhancement of the efficiency. Fundamentally, the position 
of women in the society and explicitly, the customary norms preventing rural women from land 
ownership, need to be addressed for a better economic performance. Despite some improvements 
made on the gender equity regarding land use and ownership rights, customs and a lack of 
information still prevent women from getting access to land. Consequently, a better awareness 
and information may be helpful to make more effective the legislation related to land use and 
ownership rights in order to attain a better gender equity.  
Moreover, horticultural production is labour-intensive; in particular the irrigation operation is 
really time-consuming. Hence, an improvement of the technology of production through a 
sustainable system of credit, or a smart policy of subsidy that will allow producers to modernize 
their production will be useful. For instance, making accessible the use of improved irrigation 
equipment will lead to an increase of the scale of production, with a positive effect on efficiency. 
However, such a policy should be gender-sensitive, taking into account the specific problems 
faced by women plot managers. The findings show that land is better valued on women’s plots 
than it is on men’s plots, but neither men nor women are allocatively efficient with respect to 
land, implying an underuse of land. Consequently, men as well as women need to scale up their 
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cropped land. A better access to land with a right of ownership combined with a better access to 
improved labour-saving irrigation equipment will be a lever to improve women’s economic 
performance and, consequently, their well-being and the whole household’s welfare, too.  
The empirical evidence of Chapter 4 shows that the best labour choice, leading to higher 
optimum profit for a household, is a sharecropping contract on plots without a motor pump and a 
wage contract on plots equipped with a motor pump. These findings provide evidence that if there 
will be more improved irrigation equipment, then we would predict less sharecropping and more 
wage labour, but the overall employment effects are arguably negative. Moreover, the 
improvement of the irrigation equipment, not only will make the production system less labour-
intensive, but also will enable large-scale production. This is a tradeoff, from a short-term rural 
development perspective.  
The findings of Chapter 5 result in some recommendations to policy decision makers, in terms of 
strategies that may be useful to lessen men and women producers’ risk aversion towards the 
output market price and its repercussions on their efficiency. Such strategies should reduce the 
output market price risk. As an indirect result of the findings and straight from the field 
observations, we have suggested certain strategies aimed at reducing the impact of the existing 
price variability or/and lowering the price variability. First of all, to better cope with the output 
market price risk, men and women producers need to have access to adequate means of storage 
and conservation of their horticultural products, which are naturally easily perishable. Being able 
to conserve their production may allow producers to delay and spread sales over time to avoid 
oversaturation of the market and its consequences. Training in postharvest technologies is a great 
requirement to strengthen producers’ ability to keep the quality and the freshness of their 
horticultural production for a longer time. Research institutes and extension services have a lot to 
do for an efficient transfer of postharvest technologies to producers. However, these measures 
may have significant effects only if they are coupled with access to a suitable system of micro-
credit for consumption to allow producers to be not constrained to sell off their production. 
An efficient and daily updated system of information about the market price accessible to 
producers, based on the new communication technology (the mobile phone) may be helpful to 
deal with the market price risk. At the community level, to reduce price volatility, horticultural 
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producers should be better organized to have more market power in relation to the middlemen 
traders, who used to impose their price. Some efforts should focus on the reinforcement of the 
organization of horticultural producers. Making horticultural production zones more reachable 
through an improvement of the roads may facilitate producers’ access to diverse markets, 
enabling them to cope better with the output market price. The development of adapted 
agricultural insurance market may have positive effects on the producers’ risk behaviour and on 
their efficiency. However, as this last set of strategies is mainly based on field observations and 
only indirectly derived from the findings, a further investigation may be needed to colllect more 
empirical evidence, which can thus be added to the future research agenda. 
6.4. Main limitations and the future research agenda  
From the diverse theoretical models, the empirical findings, the conclusions and policy 
implications emerge some limitations and a number of issues that require further investigation. 
Together, they form a good research agenda for the future. 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 3, dealing with efficiency, is based on an approach using the 
stochastic frontier production function proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). This approach 
allows for the cross-sectional nature of the data, with the household as the first sampling unit and 
the plot as the second one. In combination with the within estimation method (household fixed 
effects) used, which is based on maximum likelihood, it is interesting because controls for 
household heterogeneity and, therefore, the consistency of the estimates, do not require any 
assumption about the correlation between the explanatory variables and the inefficiency effects. 
However, the drawback is that the empirical specification of the production functions is mainly 
based on inputs and output in value per hectare. Consequently, the timing of the application of the 
inputs and the cropping operations are not accounted for, while such factors are important 
elements in the farming system and may have effects on efficiency. Future research on efficiency 
may address this issue by integrating in the stochastic frontier production function variables 
related to the timing of the application of each input (organic and mineral fertilizers, pesticides, 
biological treatment, et cetera) and of each cropping operation (irrigation, transplanting, 
weeding). 
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Also, since the evidence shows that risk attitude is related to inefficiency, a producer’s risk 
behaviour should be integrated directly in the production function used to measure allocative 
efficiency. Moreover, as the outcome is sensitive to methods, using several efficiency estimation 
methods simultaneously (such as profit function, data envelopment analysis – DEA -, et cetera) 
would provide an opportunity to make a comparison of the results and to better confirm their 
validity and reliability. Beyond social and economic variables, other cultural factors may explain 
the producers’ efficiency and require further investigations. More interdisciplinary research team 
including economists and anthropologists should explore these cultural issues. Also, a 
comparison of the efficiency of horticultural households and agro-business firms remains an 
interesting research issue in need of investigation, particularly in Senegal, where both co-exist. 
Such a study may help to gain a better understanding of the non-durability or short-lived 
character of agro-business firms, which often operate just for a short time compared to 
horticultural households, which manage to carry on the production and to survive permanently, 
despite all.   
Chapter 4 provided theoretical and empirical evidence on the efficiency of the labour contract 
choice, controlling for the irrigation equipment used on the plot. Because of the limited number 
of female plot managers hiring labour in the data set, this chapter did not capture, as intended, the 
gender dimension of the labour contract choice for household profit optimization. This is an 
interesting issue to put on the future research agenda, but it does require enough gender-
disaggregated data over labour contract. 
As mentioned in the policy implications drawn from Chapter 5, which provided insights on risk, 
some of the proposed strategies to better cope with the output market price risk need more 
empirical underpinning. Specifically, a better organization of horticultural producers for more 
market power, an improvement of the roads to facilitate the producers’ access to diverse markets, 
an efficient and daily updated system of information about the output market price accessible to 
the producers, a smart policy of market protection, and the producers’ own coping strategies, are 
of particular interest for any further investigation that includes a gender perspective. 
Furthermore, this research has provided some empirical evidence for the efficiency and risk 
behaviour of men who manage their plots separately from their wives, compared with men who 
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manage their plots jointly with their wives. Yet, further theoretical and empirical research may 
help to better understand the reasons behind the land allocation by the husband to his wives 
within a household as well as the economic implications of this allocation. All in all, the relation 
between gender and economics remains an appealing research agenda. 
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Summary 
Women play an important role in agricultural production, particularly in Africa, by managing 
their own farm and by providing their labour to their husband’s fields. Regardless of the 
predominance of a gender bias with regard to their access to resource, women constitute a vital 
force in the development of agriculture. Throughout the world, gender issues in the development 
of agriculture and women’s role and contribution to agriculture continue to be a great subject of 
debate. Despite the wide range of literature available, the importance of agriculture to the 
economic development in Africa and the critical role that rural women play within this sector still 
constitute an attractive research agenda. 
In Sub-Saharan African countries, where the majority of the population derives its food and 
livelihood from agriculture, a strong growth in agriculture is vital for the process of economic 
development. Agriculture must be the leading sector for overall growth, poverty alleviation, and 
the reduction of income disparities. In such a context, getting agriculture to move forward is 
crucial. Particularly with the drastic changes in the world food situation, which affect Africa more 
than any other region, much more attention should be paid to the supply side of agriculture, both 
for food crops and market-oriented crops. In fact, cash crops, with high added value products like 
horticultural products, offer opportunities to boost the agricultural growth in developing countries 
like Senegal, where horticulture is a key element of the agricultural sector. 
Accordingly, with the recent world-wide food trouble, there is a need, more than ever, to examine 
the economic performance of the agricultural producers, and especially the efficiency of the use 
of scarce resources, to confront the challenges ahead. However, the key role of women in the 
agricultural sector in many parts of the world, and particularly in agriculture-based countries like 
African countries, calls for more gender-sensitive approaches and for policies that take people’s 
gender identity into account. Jointly, all these reasons widely justify the relevance of this research 
thesis, which aims to investigate the economic performance of horticultural households in 
Senegal, using efficiency and profitability as main indicators and adopting a gender perspective. 
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Efficiency is assessed in a specific social, cultural, economic, and institutional context, in which 
polygamy occurs and husband and wives usually manage their plots separately. In this context, 
next to household labour, the labour market offers possibilities to hire labour under two common 
forms of contract, based on sharecropping or wage. In addition, with the high volatility of the 
price of horticultural products, the market risk is challenging. Therefore, from this context 
emerge four main research questions addressed in this thesis, related to (i) the efficiency of the 
allocation of household resource over men and women, (ii) the efficiency of contracts with hired 
workers, either as wage labourers or as sharecroppers for household profit optimization, (iii) risk 
behaviour across gender, and (iv) its effects on the economic performance and the choice of 
labour contracts. Three chapters (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) provide theoretical and empirical evidence 
on these research questions, preceded by two chapters (Chapters 1 and 2) setting out the purpose 
and background of this research. 
Chapter 2 describes horticultural households from a gender standpoint, using data collected from 
a survey of 203 horticultural households in the Niayes Zone in Senegal. We surveyed a total of 
422 horticultural plots, managed by 279 producers, of which 190 are men and 89 are women. The 
households grow a diversity of horticultural crops during the three main seasons. We surveyed 
five of the most cultivated crops, such as onion, cabbage, tomato, green bean, and potato. All 
these crops are destined for the national and subregional market. Only green bean is exported to 
European countries, mainly to France.  
This descriptive chapter shows that a household homes 3 to 26 members, with an average of 10. 
Horticultural households derive their income essentially from horticulture, with a share of 77% of 
men’s total annual income and 60% of women’s income. Women provide 15% of the household’s 
total annual income, estimated on average at fcfa 2.1 million. With a daily income per capita of 
fcfa 575, or 1.3 US dollars, horticultural household members are living slightly above the national 
poverty line of fcfa 497 and the new extreme poverty threshold of 1.25 US dollars in developing 
economies. 
Household land ownership varies from 0 to 20 hectares, with a median of 3. A great gender gap 
occurs in particular with regard to the allocation of resource and assets, access to land, and 
irrigation equipment. Men are the main owners of land and irrigation equipment within the 
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household. In 60% of the households, women are deeply involved in horticulture, managing their 
own piece of land that has usually been allocated to them by their husband. However, even when 
they manage their own plots, women and men often work on each other’s plots to carry out hard 
or time-consuming farming operations. With an average of 460 m2, women’s plots are 4.7 times 
smaller than men’s plots are. However, regarding the physical conditions of the plot, no major 
gender discrimination is noticed. With this small plot size, the intensity of the inputs used is 
higher on women’s plots than it is on men’s plots. As a result, women’s plots yield 17% more in 
terms of output in value per hectare and 40% more in terms of profit per hectare than men’s plots 
do.  
Horticultural production is so labour-intensive that household labour is not always sufficient and 
some households take recourse to hired labour. However, while some households hire labour 
based on a sharecropping contract (31%), others hire labour based on a wage contract (7%). The 
return per season to sharecropping for a sharecropper is higher on average than the seasonal wage 
paid by the household to a wage worker. Moreover, the most time-consuming cropping operation 
is irrigation, which takes 75% and 85% of the total working time of household members on 
men’s plots and women’s plots, respectively. The time-share of irrigation is on average higher on 
women’s plots than it is on men’s plots, because women do not have access to improved 
irrigation equipment like a motor pump. The horticultural marketing context is characterized by a 
high variability of the output price, which is a major risk. For the same plot and crop, the selling 
price of the production varies greatly from one harvesting sequence to the next one, which takes 
just a few days. Altogether, the descriptive chapter brings to light the research issues addressed in 
the following chapters. 
Chapter 3 replies to the first research question by examining the efficiency of household resource 
allocation. It furthermore deals with the appropriateness of using gender-specific models rather 
than a unitary model while investigating the economic performance of male and female managers 
of separate plots within horticultural households. Therefore, chapter 3 contributes to the gender 
and economics literature, providing empirical evidence regarding intra-household resource 
allocation in a polygamous context in which husband and wives manage their plots separately. 
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Both the unitary and gender-specific stochastic frontier production functions show that women 
plot managers are as technically efficient as men plot managers are, but neither the men nor the 
women are fully technically or allocatively efficient. The determinants of technical inefficiency 
effects present some similarities as well as some differences between men and women plot 
managers. Furthermore, based on gender-specific models, the value of the marginal product of 
land and irrigation equipment is higher on the women’s plots than it is on the men’s plots, while 
the value of the marginal product of inputs and labour is higher on the men’s plots than it is on 
the women’s plots within the same household. 
We can conclude from the findings that optimality or allocative efficiency from a household 
perspective is far from being achieved for all the inputs. Some improvements can be made by 
shifting land and irrigation equipment from men to women and by shifting inputs and labour from 
women to men. However, given that both men and women are allocatively inefficient in the use 
of inputs, rather than to shift, it is better to scale up the inputs used in order to reduce the 
inefficiency. Since households are cropping on average 59% of their available land, there are 
some possibilities or potentialities to scale up the cropped area, but this is conditional on a better 
access to labour-saving irrigation equipment. This suggests some policy implications, which must 
be more gender-sensitive, to improve both men’s and women’s ability to manage their productive 
resource more efficiently. A better access of women to land and to improved irrigation equipment 
will be a lever to improve women’s economic performance and, consequently, both their own 
well-being and the whole household’s welfare. 
The second research question is addressed in Chapter 4. In agriculture, the coexistence of 
different forms of land tenancy or labour contract have so far been explained by theories related 
to Marshallian inefficiency, incentives, risk sharing, and transaction costs, including the costs of 
supervision. These theories and the empirical evidence have greatly contributed to explain the 
reasons behind land tenancy or labour contract choice. This study goes a step further by focusing 
particularly on production technologies at plot level. This study provides theoretical and 
empirical evidence by designing and testing a model based on household profit optimization (i) to 
compare the optimum profit derived from plots under household labour, a sharecropping labour 
contract, or a wage labour contract, and (ii) to test the efficiency of the labour choice made, 
controlling for the irrigation equipment used on the plot. The model does not account for risk 
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behaviour, but focuses mainly on the supervision costs of labour under a wage contract, and on 
opportunity wages ratios of the sharecropper and the wage worker, of the sharecropper and the 
landlord, and of the wage worker and the landlord. In order to test the efficiency of the labour 
contract choice, for each plot, simulations were made to see if another labour contract than 
presently applied would yield a higher profit to the household. 
As expected, the results show that the production elasticity of labour decreases when improved 
irrigation equipment like a motor pump is used. The technology displays an increasing return to 
scale on plots without a motor pump and a constant return to scale on plots irrigated with a motor 
pump. While on plots without a motor pump a sharecropping contract is the efficient labour 
contract choice, leading to a higher optimum profit for household, on plots irrigated with a motor 
pump, a wage contract is the best labour contract choice. Consequently, we can conclude from 
this finding that the use of a motor pump drives out the sharecropping contract in favour of 
household labour and the wage labour contract. Unless the commonly applied sharing rules, 50-
50 of the profit, change with a greater share for the landowner, with the increasing use of labour-
saving technologies, households will be less and less willing to hire labour under a sharecropping 
contract. 
Chapter 5 theoretically and empirically investigates the risk issues. Agricultural production is 
typically a risky business. Farm households have to tackle several risks. For this reason, farm 
households’ risk attitude is an important issue connected with decision making and greatly affects 
their economic performance. In Senegal, for horticultural households, the output market price is 
one of the foremost risks. Moreover, within the household, husband and wives may behave 
differently towards risk. This research provides theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the 
measures and effects of risk attitude on economic performance and on the choice of inputs across 
gender. More precisely, based on an experimental game implemented in the Senegalese Niayes 
Zone, this chapter investigates the gender dimension of risk attitude and the causal relationship 
between risk attitude, allocative inefficiency of the choice of inputs, and decisions regarding the 
choice of labour contract. 
The results show that, on average, men and women producers display an absolute risk aversion 
towards the output market price, and that women are as risk averse as men. As expected, and in 
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line with the theoretical model, the empirical evidence shows that allocative inefficiency in the 
use of inputs increases with risk aversion. Moreover, the empirical evidence confirms the 
theoretical model propounding that if producers are more risk averse, they prefer to hire labour 
based on a sharecropping contract rather than on a wage contract. We identify recommendations 
for policy decision makers in terms of strategies that may help to make men and women 
producers more risk-neutral towards the output market price and to dampen the repercussions of 
risk for efficiency. 
All in all, this thesis innovatively provides theoretical and empirical evidence to add to the body 
of the literature of the economics of household resource allocation, with a special focus on 
gender, labour and risk. In addition to its scientific contribution, the thesis puts forward to 
decision makers a number of recommendations for a better economic performance of 
horticultural households with women playing a leading role, as  this is in favour of household 
welfare. Although agricultural growth driven by horticulture is a challenge for economic growth 
and poverty alleviation, it is potentially achievable.   
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Résumé (Summary in French) 
Les femmes jouent un rôle important dans la production agricole, particulièrement en Afrique, 
en gérant leur propre ferme et en contribuant aux travaux champêtres de leur mari. En dépit de la 
prédominance d'un biais lié au genre au regard de l’accès aux ressources, les femmes constituent 
une force vitale pour le développement de l'agriculture. Partout dans le monde, les questions de 
genre dans le développement de l'agriculture et ainsi que le rôle et la contribution des femmes à 
l'agriculture continuent d'être un grand sujet de débat. Malgré le large éventail de littérature 
disponible, l'importance de l'agriculture au développement économique de l’Afrique et le rôle 
essentiel que les femmes rurales jouent dans ce secteur constituent toujours un agenda de 
recherche attractif.  
Dans les pays d'Afrique Sub-saharienne où la majorité de la population tire leur alimentation et 
leur revenu de l'agriculture, une forte croissance de l'agriculture est vitale pour le processus de 
développement économique. L'agriculture doit être le secteur leader pour la croissance 
économique, la lutte contre la pauvreté et la réduction des disparités de revenus. Dans un tel 
contexte, il est crucial de faire progresser l'agriculture. En particulier, avec les récents 
changements drastiques dans la situation alimentaire mondiale, qui affectent l'Afrique plus que 
toute autre région, beaucoup plus d'attention devrait être accordée à l'offre de produits agricoles, 
tant pour les cultures vivrières que pour les cultures orientées vers le marché. En effet, les 
cultures commerciales à haute valeur ajoutée comme les produits horticoles, offrent des 
possibilités de stimuler la croissance agricole dans les pays en développement comme le Sénégal 
où l'horticulture est un élément clé du secteur agricole.  
Ainsi, avec la récente crise alimentaire mondiale, il est plus que jamais nécessaire, d'examiner la 
performance économique des producteurs agricoles et en particulier l'efficacité de l'utilisation des 
ressources limitées, pour affronter les défis qui nous interpellent. Cependant, le rôle essentiel des 
femmes dans le secteur agricole dans de nombreuses régions du monde et en particulier dans les 
pays à économie basée sur l'agriculture comme les pays d'Afrique, appelle à des approches plus 
sensibles au genre et des politiques qui tiennent compte de l’identité genre. Conjointement, toutes 
Résumé   
 236 
ces raisons justifient largement la pertinence de cette thèse de recherche qui vise à étudier la 
performance économique des ménages horticoles au Sénégal, en utilisant l'efficacité et la 
rentabilité comme indicateurs principaux et en adoptant une perspective de genre. 
L'efficacité est évaluée dans un contexte social, culturel, économique et institutionnel spécifique 
dans lequel la polygamie est de mise et le mari et ses épouses gèrent généralement leurs parcelles 
séparément. Dans ce contexte aussi, à côté de la main-d’œuvre familiale, le marché du travail 
offre aux ménages des possibilités d’embaucher sous deux formes courantes de contrat basées sur 
le métayage ou le salariat. En outre, avec la grande volatilité du prix des produits horticoles, le 
risque de marché est un challenge. Ainsi, de ce contexte émergent quatre principales questions de 
recherche abordées dans cette thèse et relatives à (i) l'efficacité de l'allocation des ressources du 
ménage entre les hommes et les femmes, (ii) l'efficacité des contrats avec les travailleurs 
embauchés comme main-d’œuvre salariale ou métayère pour l'optimisation des profits du 
ménage, (iii) l’attitude des hommes et des femmes envers le risque du marché et (iv) ses effets sur 
la performance économique et le choix des contrats de travail. Trois chapitres (chapitres 3, 4 et 5) 
fournissent l’évidence théorique et empirique sur ces questions de recherche, précédés de deux 
chapitres (chapitres 1 et 2) précisant l'objet et le contexte de cette recherche. 
Le chapitre 2 décrit les ménages horticoles à travers une approche genre à l'aide des données 
recueillies à partir d'enquêtes réalisées auprès de 203 ménages horticoles  dans la zone des Niayes 
du Sénégal. Nous avons enquêté un total de 422 parcelles horticoles gérées par 279 producteurs 
dont 190 sont des hommes et 89 sont des femmes. Les ménages produisent une diversité 
d’espèces horticoles pendant les trois saisons principales. Les enquêtes ont porté sur les cinq 
espèces les plus cultivées à savoir l'oignon, le chou, la tomate, l’haricot vert et la pomme de terre. 
Toutes ces cultures sont destinées au marché national et sous-régional. Uniquement l’haricot vert 
est exporté vers les pays d'Europe et surtout en France.   
Ce chapitre descriptif révèle que le ménage compte 3 à 26 membres avec une moyenne de 10. Les 
ménages horticoles tirent leur revenu essentiellement de l’horticulture qui constitue 77% du 
revenu total annuel des hommes et 60% de celui des femmes. Les femmes fournissent 15% du 
revenu annuel total du ménage, estimé en moyenne à 2,1 millions de fcfa. Avec un revenu 
quotidien par membre de 575 fcfa ou 1,3 dollars US, les membres des ménages horticoles vivent 
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légèrement au-dessus du seuil de pauvreté nationale estimé à 497 fcfa et le nouveau seuil de 
pauvreté extrême de 1,25 dollars dans les économies en développement. 
La propriété foncière du ménage varie de 0 à 20 hectares, avec une médiane de 3. Il existe un 
grand écart de genre particulière au regard de l'allocation des ressources et des biens tels que 
l’accès à la terre et au matériel d'irrigation. Les hommes sont les principaux propriétaires de la 
terre et de l'équipement d’irrigation au sein du ménage. Dans 60 % des ménages, les femmes sont 
largement impliquées dans l’horticulture et gèrent leur propre lopin de terre généralement alloué 
par leur mari. Toutefois, même lorsqu'ils gèrent séparément leurs propres parcelles, les hommes 
et les femmes s’aident mutuellement pour les opérations agricoles fastidieuses ou exigeantes en 
temps. Avec une moyenne de 460 m2, les parcelles des femmes sont 4,7 fois plus petites que 
celles des hommes. Cependant, concernant les conditions physiques de la parcelle, aucune 
discrimination majeure fondée sur le genre n'est notée. Avec cette petite taille des parcelles, les 
intrants sont utilisés plus intensément dans les parcelles des femmes que dans celles des hommes. 
En conséquence, les parcelles des femmes rapportent 17% plus de rendement en valeur par 
hectare et 40% plus de profit par hectare comparées aux parcelles des hommes. 
La production horticole est tellement intensive en main-d’œuvre que la main-d’œuvre du ménage 
n'est pas toujours suffisante et certains ménages sont obligés d’embaucher. Cependant, quand 
certains ménages embauchent sur la base d’un contrat de métayage (31%), d'autres embauchent 
sur la base d’un contrat de travail salarial (7%). Le revenu par saison du métayage pour un 
métayer est en moyenne plus élevé que le salaire saisonnier payé par les ménages à un ouvrier 
agricole salarier. En outre, l'opération culturale la plus longue ou exigeante en temps est 
l'irrigation qui prend les 75% et 85% de la durée totale de travail des membres du ménage sur les 
parcelles des hommes et sur celles des femmes, respectivement. La part de temps de l'irrigation 
est donc en moyenne plus élevée sur les parcelles des femmes que sur celles des hommes parce 
que les femmes n'ont pas accès à l'équipement d'irrigation améliorée telles que la motopompe. Le 
contexte de commercialisation des produits horticoles est caractérisé par une grande variabilité du 
prix qui est un risque majeur. Pour la même parcelle et la même culture, le prix de vente de la 
production varie considérablement d'une séquence de récolte à la suivante qui prend juste 
quelques jours. En tout, le chapitre descriptif met en lumière les problèmes de recherche abordés 
dans les chapitres suivants. 
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Chapitre 3 répond à la première question de recherche en examinant l'efficacité de l'allocation des 
ressources du ménage. Il traite en outre l'opportunité d'utiliser des modèles spécifiques de genre 
plutôt qu’un modèle unitaire pour l’analyse de la performance économique des hommes et des 
femmes gestionnaires de parcelles distinctes au sein des ménages horticoles. Par conséquent, le 
chapitre 3 contribue à la littérature sur l'économie du genre en fournissant une évidence 
empirique concernant l'allocation des ressources au sein du ménage dans un contexte polygame 
dans lequel le mari et ses épouses gèrent leurs parcelles séparément. 
Tant les fonctions de production de frontière stochastique unitaire que celles spécifiques de genre 
montrent que femmes gestionnaires de parcelles sont aussi techniquement efficaces que les 
hommes. Cependant, ni les hommes, ni les femmes sont entièrement efficaces ni du point de vue 
technique, ni du point de vue allocation des ressources. Les déterminants des effets de 
l'inefficacité technique présentent certaines similitudes ainsi que certaines différences entre les 
hommes et les femmes gestionnaires de parcelles. En outre, les résultats des modèles spécifiques 
de genre montrent que la valeur du produit marginal de la terre et de l'équipement d'irrigation est 
plus élevée sur les parcelles des femmes que sur celles des hommes alors que la valeur du produit 
marginal des intrants et de la main-d’œuvre est plus élevée sur les parcelles des hommes que sur 
celles des femmes au sein du ménage. 
Nous pouvons conclure à partir des résultats que selon une perspective ménage, l’optimalité ou 
l’efficacité de l’allocation des ressources est loin d'être atteinte pour tous les intrants. Certaines 
améliorations sont possibles en transférant de la terre et de l’équipement d'irrigation des hommes 
aux femmes et en transférant des intrants et de la main-d’œuvre des femmes aux hommes. 
Cependant, étant donné que les hommes et les femmes sont inefficaces dans l'utilisation des 
intrants, plutôt que de transférer, il est préférable d’améliorer l’utilisation des intrants afin de 
réduire l'inefficacité. Étant donné que les ménages exploitent en moyenne 59% de leurs terres 
disponibles, il existe certaines possibilités ou potentialités d’accroitre les superficies cultivées, 
mais ceci est conditionnel à un meilleur accès aux équipements d’irrigation moins intensive en 
main-d’œuvre. Ceci suggère certaines implications politiques, qui doivent être plus sensible au 
genre, pour améliorer la capacité des hommes et des femmes à gérer plus efficacement leurs 
ressources productives. Un meilleur accès des femmes à la terre et aux équipements améliorés 
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d’irrigation sera un levier pour améliorer la performance économique des femmes et par 
conséquent, leur propre bien-être et le bien-être de l'ensemble du ménage. 
La deuxième question de recherche est traitée au Chapitre 4. Dans l'agriculture, la coexistence de 
différentes formes de contrat de terre ou de main-d’œuvre a été jusqu'ici expliquée par les 
théories relatives à l'inefficacité Marshallienne, les incitations, le partage du risque et les coûts de 
transaction y compris les coûts de supervision. Ces théories et les preuves empiriques ont 
grandement contribué à expliquer les raisons du choix de contrat de terre ou de travail. Cette 
étude va un peu plus loin en se concentrant particulièrement sur les technologies de production au 
niveau de la parcelle. Elle fournit une évidence théorique et empirique en concevant et testant un 
modèle basé sur l'optimisation du profit du ménage pour (i) comparer le profit optimal dérivé des 
parcelles sous main-d’œuvre du ménage, sous un contrat de main-d’œuvre métayère ou sous un 
contrat de main-d’œuvre salariale et (ii) tester l'efficacité du choix de la main-d’œuvre en tenant 
compte de l’équipement d'irrigation utilisée sur la parcelle. Le modèle ne tient pas compte de 
l’attitude au risque, mais se concentre essentiellement sur les coûts de supervision de la main-
d’œuvre sous contrat salarial et sur les ratios des couts ou salaires d'opportunité du métayer et du 
travailleur salarier, du métayer et du ménage propriétaire de la parcelle, et du travailleur salarier 
et du ménage propriétaire de la parcelle. Afin de tester l'efficacité du choix du contrat de main-
d’œuvre, pour chaque parcelle, des simulations ont été faites pour voir si un autre contrat que 
celui actuellement appliqué rapporterait au ménage plus de bénéfice. 
Comme prévu, les résultats montrent que l'élasticité de la production par rapport à la main-
d’œuvre diminue lorsque du matériel amélioré d'irrigation comme la motopompe est utilisé. La 
technologie présente une économie d’échelle croissante sur les parcelles sans une motopompe et 
une économie d´échelle constante sur les parcelles irriguées avec une motopompe. Sur les 
parcelles non équipées de motopompe le choix de contrat efficace de main-d’œuvre conduisant au 
plus grand profit optimal pour le ménage est le contrat basé sur le métayage, tandis que sur les 
parcelles irriguées avec une motopompe, le meilleur choix de contrat de main-d’œuvre est celui 
basé sur le salaire. Par conséquent, nous pouvons conclure de ce résultat que l'utilisation d'une 
motopompe pousse à abandonner les contrats de métayage en faveur de la main-d’œuvre du 
ménage ou du contrat de main-d’œuvre salariale. Avec l'utilisation croissante des technologies 
moins intensives en main-d’œuvre, les ménages seront moins disposés à embaucher sur la base 
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d'un contrat de métayage sauf si les règles de partage couramment appliquées, 50-50 du profit, 
soient modifiées avec une part plus grande pour le ménage propriétaire foncier. 
Chapitre 5 étudie sur le plan théorique et empirique les questions de risque. La production 
agricole est généralement une entreprise risquée. Les ménages agricoles ont à s'attaquer à 
plusieurs risques. Pour cette raison, l’attitude au risque des ménages agricoles est une question 
importante liée à la prise de décision et affecte considérablement leur performance économique. 
Au Sénégal, pour les ménages horticoles, le prix des produits horticoles est l'un des plus grands 
risques. En plus, au sein d'un ménage, le mari et ses épouses peuvent se comporter différemment 
vis-à-vis du risque. Cette recherche apporte la preuve théorique et empirique concernant les 
mesures et les effets de l'attitude au risque sur la performance économique et sur le choix des 
intrants et selon le genre du manager de la parcelle. Plus précisément, ce chapitre basé sur un jeu 
expérimental mis en œuvre dans la Zone des Niayes du Sénégal, examine la dimension genre de 
l’attitude au risque et les liens de causalité entre l’attitude au risque, l’inefficacité du choix des 
intrants et les décisions concernant le choix du contrat de main-d’œuvre. 
Les résultats montrent qu’en moyenne, les producteurs hommes et femmes affichent une aversion 
absolue au risque envers le prix du marché des produits horticoles, et que les femmes sont aussi 
averse au risque que les hommes. Comme prévu et en harmonie avec le modèle théorique, 
l’évidence empirique montre que l’inefficacité de l’allocation des intrants augmente avec 
l'aversion au risque. De surcroit, la preuve empirique confirme le modèle théorique soutenant que 
si les producteurs sont réticents au risque, ils préfèreront embaucher de la main-d’œuvre sur la 
base d’un contrat de métayage plutôt que sur la base d’un contrat de salaire. Nous avons identifié 
des recommandations pour les décideurs politiques en termes de stratégies qui peuvent aider à 
rendre les producteurs hommes et femmes plus neutre au risque envers le prix du marché et à 
réduire les répercussions du risque sur leur efficacité. 
Dans l'ensemble, cette thèse apporte avec innovation de l’évidence théorique et empirique à 
ajouter à la littérature de l'économie de l'allocation des ressources du ménage avec un accent 
particulier sur le genre, la main-d’œuvre et le risque. En plus de sa contribution scientifique, la 
thèse propose aux décideurs un certain nombre de recommandations pour une meilleure 
performance économique des ménages horticoles avec les femmes jouant un rôle leader, et ceci 
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en faveur du bien-être des ménages. Bien que la croissance agricole pilotée par l'horticulture soit 
un véritable défi pour la croissance économique et la lutte contre la pauvreté, il est 
potentiellement réalisable. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Vrouwen spelen een belangrijke rol in de landbouwproductie, met name in Afrika, zowel door 
hun eigen productie van eigen grond als door hun arbeid in te zetten op de akkers van hun 
echtgenoot. Hoewel vrouwen aanmerkelijk minder toegang tot hulpbronnen hebben dan mannen, 
vormen zij een belangrijke factor in de ontwikkeling van de landbouw. In de hele wereld blijven 
de genderproblematiek in de ontwikkeling van de landbouw en de rol van vrouwen en hun 
bijdrage aan de landbouw een belangrijk onderwerp van debat. Ondanks de vele publicaties 
hierover, bieden het belang van de landbouw in de economische ontwikkeling in Afrika en de 
essentiële rol van rurale vrouwen binnen deze sector nog steeds een aantrekkelijke 
onderzoeksagenda. 
In sub-Sahara Afrika, waar de meerderheid van de bevolking leeft van de landbouw, is een sterke 
groei van de landbouw van vitaal belang voor economische ontwikkeling. Landbouw moet de 
leidende sector zijn voor groei en armoedebestrijding en de vermindering van de 
inkomensongelijkheid. In dit licht is vooruitgang van de landbouw van cruciaal belang. De 
recente veranderingen in de voedselsituatie in de wereld, die van meer invloed zijn op Afrika dan 
op welke andere regio ook, laten zien dat veel meer aandacht moet worden besteed aan de 
aanbodzijde van de landbouw, zowel voor de voedselgewassen als marktgewassen. Deze 
marktgewassen, en in het bijzonder de hoogwaardige tuinbouwgewassen bieden kansen voor 
groei van de landbouw in ontwikkelingslanden zoals Senegal, waar de tuinbouw een sleutelrol 
kan spelen. 
De recente prijsstijgingen van voedsel hebben nogmaals duidelijk gemaakt dat het meer dan ooit 
nodig is om de economische performance van de boeren te onderzoeken en met name de 
doelmatigheid van het gebruik van de schaarse middelen, om zo de toekomst onder ogen te zien. 
De centrale rol van vrouwen in de landbouwsector in veel delen van de wereld, en met name in 
Afrikaanse landen, waar die sector de basis van de economie vormt, vraagt om een aanpak met 
gevoel voor man-vrouw verhoudingen en om beleid dat rekening houdt met verschillen tussen 
man en vrouw. Tezamen rechtvaardigen deze bevindingen het onderzoek van dit proefschrift naar 
Samenvatting 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 243 
de economische prestaties van de tuinbouwhuishoudens in Senegal, met doelmatigheid en 
rentabiliteit als voornaamste indicatoren en met oog voor de man-vrouw relaties.  
Efficiëntie wordt beoordeeld in een zekere sociale, culturele, economische en institutionele 
context. Polygamie komt voor en man en vrouw(en) beheren gewoonlijk afzonderlijk hun akkers. 
De gebruikte arbeid wordt geleverd door het huishouden zelf maar ook via de arbeidsmarkt 
aangetrokken als loonarbeid of als deelpachter. Het marktrisico is groot, met prijzen voor de 
producten die sterk fluctueren. Dit leidt tot vier hoofdvragen van de thesis:  (i) de efficiëntie van 
de toewijzing van de hulpbronnen van het huishouden aan mannen en vrouwen, (ii) de efficiëntie 
van de contracten met ingehuurde arbeiders, te weten loonarbeiders of deelpachters, (iii) het 
gedrag van mannen en vrouwen ten aanzien van risico’s, en (iv) de gevolgen ervan voor de 
economische prestaties en de keuze van de arbeidscontracten. Drie hoofdstukken (3, 4 en 5) 
bieden theorie en de empirische uitwerking ter beantwoording van deze onderzoeksvragen. De 
hoofdstukken worden voorafgegaan door twee hoofdstukken (1 en 2) waarin het doel en de 
achtergrond van dit onderzoek worden gegeven. 
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft tuinbouwhuishoudens met een focus op man-vrouw relaties op basis van 
een enquête van 203 huishoudens in de Niayes zone in Senegal. Er zijn 422 akkers in 
beschouwing genomen, beheerd door 279 producenten, van wie 190 mannen en 89 vrouwen. De 
huishoudens verbouwen een verscheidenheid aan tuinbouwgewassen tijdens de drie belangrijkste 
seizoenen. Wij hebben de vijf meest geteelde gewassen meegenomen, namelijk uien, kool, 
tomaten, sperziebonen en aardappelen. Al deze gewassen zijn bestemd voor de nationale en 
subregionale markt. Alleen sperziebonen worden ook geëxporteerd naar de Europese landen, 
vooral  naar Frankrijk.  
Dit beschrijvende hoofdstuk  laat zien dat de huishoudens 3 tot 26 leden tellen, met een 
gemiddelde van 10. Tuinbouwhuishoudens halen hun inkomen voornamelijk uit de tuinbouw, 
met een aandeel van 77% van de totale jaarlijkse inkomen van mannen en 60% van het inkomen 
van vrouwen. Vrouwen zorgen voor 15% van het totale jaarinkomen van het huishouden, dat 
gemiddeld op fcfa 2,1 miljoen wordt geschat. Met een inkomen per hoofd per dag van fcfa 575 of 
1,3 US dollar, leven tuinbouwhuishoudens iets boven de nationale armoedegrens van fcfa 497 en 
de nieuwe van extreme-armoede grens van 1,25 dollars in ontwikkelingslanden. 
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Het grondbezit van het huishouden varieert van 0 tot 20 hectare, met een mediaan van 3. Een 
groot verschil tussen man en vrouw treedt op bij de verdeling van toegang tot land en irrigatie-
apparatuur. Binnen het huishouden zijn de mannen hoofdzakelijk de eigenaars hiervan. In 60 
procent van de huishoudens zijn vrouwen zeer betrokken bij de tuinbouw. Zij voeren het beheer 
over hun eigen stukje grond, hun gewoonlijk toegewezen door de man. Hoewel man en vrouw 
hun eigen akkers beheren, werken zij toch vaak samen op elkaars akkers, vooral bij lastige of 
tijdrovende taken. Met een gemiddelde van 460 m2 zijn de akkers van vrouwen 4,7 maal zo klein 
als die van mannen. Er zijn echter geen grote verschillen in natuurlijke gesteldheid van de akkers. 
Op deze kleine akkertjes worden de productiemiddelen met de hoge intensiteit gebruikt. Als 
gevolg hiervan zijn de opbrengsten per ha op vrouwenakkers 17 procent hoger dan op die van 
mannen en leveren zij 40 procent hogere winst per ha op.  
Tuinbouwproductie is zo arbeidsintensief dat arbeidskracht van het huishouden niet altijd 
voldoende is en verscheidene huishoudens gebruiken dan ook ingehuurde arbeid. Waar sommige 
huishoudens arbeid aantrekken op basis van een deelpachtcontract (31 procent), trekken andere 
huishoudens arbeid aan op basis van arbeidscontracten (7 procent). De opbrengst per seizoen is 
voor een deelpachter gemiddeld hoger dan voor een seizoensarbeider in loondienst. Het meest 
tijdrovende werk is het water geven aan de gewassen, meestal met emmers en vanuit een put, 
soms met een irrigatiesysteem en een motorpomp. Het water geven kost wel 75 of 85 procent van 
de totale werktijd van het huishouden op resp. mannen- en vrouwenakkers. Het aandeel is 
gemiddeld hoger op vrouwenakkers dan op mannenakkers, omdat vrouwen geen hebben toegang 
tot verbeterde irrigatieapparatuur zoals een motorpomp. De markt voor tuinbouwproducten wordt 
gekenmerkt door een hoge variabiliteit van de prijzen, wat dus grote risico’s inhoudt. Voor 
dezelfde akker en hetzelfde gewas kan de prijs sterk variëren tussen de ene oogst en de volgende, 
ook al liggen er hier maar enkele dagen tussen. Dit beschrijvende hoofdstuk brengt zodoende de 
onderzoeksvraagstukken aan het licht die in de volgende hoofdstukken aan de orde komen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft antwoord op de eerste vraag van de onderzoek door het bestuderen van de 
efficiëntie van de toewijzing van hulpbronnen door het huishouden. Ook wordt hier bezien of 
specifieke modellen voor mannen en vrouwen, in plaats van hetzelfde model voor beiden, 
geschikter zijn ter beschrijving van de gebruikte technologie en om te meten hoe efficiënt de 
aanwending van arbeid en kunstmest is op mannen- en vrouwenakkers.  Zodoende draagt 
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hoofdstuk 3 bij aan de kennis op het terrein van man-vrouw relaties en economie en verschaft het 
empirisch materiaal over de toewijzing binnen het (soms polygame) huishouden, waarin man en 
vrouw(en) hun percelen afzonderlijk beheren. 
Zowel de algemene als de man/vrouwspecifieke stochastische grensproductiefuncties tonen aan 
dat vrouwen hun akkers even technisch-efficiënt beheren als mannen, en dat mannen  noch 
vrouwen volledig technisch of allocatief efficiënt zijn. De determinanten van technische 
inefficiëntie laten overeenkomsten maar ook verschillen zien tussen mannen en vrouwen. Op 
basis van man/.vrouwspecifieke modellen, is de waarde van het marginale product van de grond 
en irrigatieapparatuur overigens op de vrouwenakkers hoger dan op de mannenakkers, terwijl de 
waarde van het marginale product van kunstmest en arbeid op de mannenakkers hoger is dan op 
die van de vrouwen binnen hetzelfde huishouden. 
Uit de bevindingen kunnen wij concluderen dat optimale allocatieve efficiëntie vanuit het 
perspectief van het huishouden lang niet voor alle productiemiddelen wordt bereikt. 
Verbeteringen kunnen worden bereikt door het verschuiven van de grond en irrigatieapparatuur 
van mannen- naar vrouwenakkers en kunstmest en arbeid in de omgekeerde richting. Gezien het 
feit dat zowel mannen als vrouwen in de toewijzing van productiemiddelen inefficiënt zijn, kan 
een toeneming in het gebruik beter zijn dan een verschuiving. Aangezien de huishoudens 
gemiddeld maar 59 procent van hun beschikbare grond gebruiken, zijn er mogelijkheden om het 
gecultiveerde areaal uit te breiden, maar een voorwaarde is wel een betere toegang tot 
arbeidsbesparende irrigatieapparatuur. De beleidsaanbeveling die hieruit volgt is om meer gevoel 
te tonen voor man-vrouw relaties, en de efficiëntie van het beheer door zowel mannen als 
vrouwen te verhogen. Een betere toegang van vrouwen tot grond en verbeterde 
irrigatieapparatuur is een hefboom naar hogere economische prestaties van vrouwen en daarmee 
naar hoger eigen welzijn en dat van het hele gezin.  
De tweede vraag van het onderzoek wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 4. In de landbouw is de 
coëxistentie van verschillende vormen van pacht of arbeidscontracten tot nu toe verklaard vanuit 
theorieën over Marshalliaanse inefficiëntie, prikkels, het delen van risico en transactiekosten, 
inclusief de kosten van toezicht. Deze theorieën en het empirische bewijsmateriaal hebben 
aanzienlijk bijgedragen aan de verklaring van de keuze voor pacht en/of arbeidscontract. Dit 
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onderzoek gaat een stapje verder door te focussen op  productietechnologieën op het niveau van 
individuele percelen. Het onderzoek levert theoretische en empirische argumenten door het 
ontwerpen en testen van een model dat gebaseerd is op winstmaximalisatie van het huishouden 
waarmee (i) een vergelijking wordt gemaakt tussen de optimale winsten van akkers met eigen 
familiearbeid, met een deelpachtcontract en met een arbeidscontract tegen vast loon en (ii) de 
efficiëntie van de gemaakte keuzes hiertussen kan worden getoetst, rekeninghoudend met de 
irrigatieapparatuur die wordt gebruikt op de akker. Het model houdt geen rekening met risico, 
maar richt zich voornamelijk op de kosten van supervisie bij een contract tegen vast loon en op de 
opbrengsten bij alternatieve aanwending van arbeid van de deelpachter en familiearbeid. Om de 
efficiëntie van de arbeidscontractkeuze voor iedere akker te toetsen, zijn simulaties gemaakt van 
de winst die zou resulteren uit andere arbeidscontracten dan momenteel toegepast. 
Zoals verwacht op basis van de theorie, tonen de uitkomsten aan dat de productieelasticiteit van 
de arbeid afneemt wanneer verbeterde irrigatieapparatuur zoals een motorpomp wordt gebruikt. 
De technologie kent toenemende schaalopbrengsten zonder, maar constante schaalopbrengsten 
met een motorpomp. Op akkers zonder motorpomp is deelpacht de efficiënte keuze, terwijl voor 
akkers met een motorpomp beter arbeidscontracten kunnen worden gebruikt. Het gebruik van een 
motorpomp verdringt dus deelpacht. Als de algemeen toegepaste regel bij deelpacht van 50-50 
verdeling van de winst niet wordt aangepast ten gunste van de eigenaar, zullen, met het 
toenemende gebruik van arbeidsbesparende technologieën, huishoudens minder en minder bereid 
zijn deelpachtcontracten aan te bieden. 
Hoofd stuk 5 onderzoekt theoretisch en empirisch de kwestie van risico’s. Deze zijn groot in de 
landbouw en landbouwhuishoudens moeten verschillende risico's aanpakken. Daarom is hun 
houding ten aanzien van risico’s een belangrijke kwestie in verband met de besluitvorming en 
hun economische prestaties. Voor de Senegalese tuinbouwbedrijven vormt de marktprijs een van 
de belangrijkste risico's. Binnen het huishouden, kunnen man en vrouw anders tegen deze risico’s 
aankijken. Dit onderzoek biedt theorie en empirie met betrekking tot maatstaven voor houding 
t..a.v. risico en gevolgen ervan voor economische prestaties en de keuze van de 
productiemiddelen en de verschillende tussen man en vrouw. In praktijk zijn experimentele 
spellen gedaan in de Niayes zone van Senegal, op basis waarvan dit hoofdstuk de man-vrouw 
verschillen in houding t.a.v. risico is bepaald, alsmede de gevolgen ervan op voor allocatieve 
Samenvatting 
Economics of Gender, Risk and Labour in Horticultural Households in Senegal 247 
inefficiëntie bij de keuze van productiemiddelen en beslissingen over een arbeidscontract, dan 
wel deelpacht. 
De uitkomsten laten zien dat de gemiddelde man of vrouw absolute risicoaversie vertoont in 
relatie tot marktprijsonzekerheid. Vrouwen zijn niet meer of minder avers dan mannen. Zoals 
verwacht, en in overeenstemming met het theoretische model, laat de empirie zien dat hogere 
risicoaversie de allocatieve inefficiëntie in het gebruik van productiemiddelen vergroot. 
Bovendien bevestigt de empirie dat producenten die meer risicoavers zijn, eerder kiezen voor een 
deelpachtcontract dan voor een vast arbeidscontract voor hun arbeiders. We geven als 
beleidsaanbevelingen om maatregelen te treffen die producenten meer risiconeutraal laten zijn en 
de gevolgen van de risico's voor efficiëntie kunnen temperen. 
Al met al voegt dit proefschrift innovatief theoretisch en empirisch materiaal toe aan de literatuur 
over de economie van het gebruik van productiemiddelen in tuinbouwhuishoudens; met speciale 
aandacht voor man-vrouw verschillen, risico’s en arbeidscontracten. Naast de wetenschappelijke 
bijdrage, bevat het proefschrift beleidsaanbevelingen die tot betere economische prestaties van de 
tuinbouwhuishoudens kunnen leiden, met een leidende rol voor de vrouwen wegens de gunstige 
uitkomsten voor het welzijn van het huishouden. Groei van de landbouw gedreven door bloeiende 
tuinbouw is een uitdaging voor economische groei en armoedebestrijding, maar is potentieel 
haalbaar.  
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